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Abstract 
This dissertation analyses the epistemology in Plato’s Meno, Phaedo and 
Theaetetus. It will explain how Plato constructs his thought on knowledge in those 
three dialogues into a coherent explanation. In the Meno and Phaedo Plato offers an 
outline of his epistemology. The Meno introduces Meno’s paradox, the theory of 
recollection and the formula “knowledge is true opinion with an explanation of the 
reason why”. In the Phaedo, Plato proposes recollection theory as a proof of 
immortality of soul and introduces the theory of Forms to make the epistemological 
outline complete. Although this outline of epistemology is systematic, it still has 
problems, such as knowledge is limited to a narrow sphere and the epistemological 
function of the body is denied.  
Theaetetus is an attempt to rethink the definitions of knowledge and to 
supplement the epistemological outline in the Meno and Phaedo by presenting new 
theories. In Theaetetus, three definitions of knowledge are discussed, namely, 
knowledge is perception, knowledge is true opinion, and knowledge is true opinion 
with an account. During the investigation of the three definitions, Plato successively 
supplies the detailed explanations of the process of perceiving colours, the wax block 
analogy, the aviary example and the discussion of the meaning and nature of the 
concept of account.  
In the progress of my study, I will also prove that not all of Socrates’ arguments 
about knowledge are good and strong. Those poor or weak arguments are mainly 
caused by employing metaphors to illustrate philosophical thought.  
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Introduction 
 
The aim of this research  
This study analyses the epistemology in Plato’s Meno, Phaedo and Theaetetus. 
It will explain how Plato constructs his thought on knowledge in those three 
dialogues into a coherent explanation. In the Meno and the Phaedo, Plato employs 
the theory of recollection, the theory of Forms, the immortality of the soul and the 
concepts “true opinion/judgement” and “an explanation of the reason why” to 
illustrate a complete epistemological system. In the Theaetetus, Plato supplements 
the outline of his epistemology in the Meno and the Phaedo by giving the detailed 
explanations of the process of seeing colours, the wax block analogy, the aviary 
example, the discussion of the meaning and nature of the concept of “account” and 
three definitions of knowledge. As well as explaining how Plato constructs an 
epistemological system in these dialogues, the thesis will discuss the unclearness and 
the difficulties in the arguments for those theories, and will show that Plato is in a 
dilemma in his thoughts on knowledge.  
Theaetetus is the central dialogue among the three dialogues in this thesis. The 
Theaetetus seems to be an attempt to rethink the question of knowledge and to give 
theories for supplementing what is not mentioned in the epistemological system that 
is outlined in the Meno and Phaedo. Although the theories appear to be empiricist in 
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the Theaetetus, the purpose of this thesis is to prove that in Theaetetus Plato firmly 
insists on his anti-empirical position, since all the theories discussed in the 
Theaetetus could be seen as a supplement to the epistemological system in the Meno 
and Phaedo. Indeed, all the theories mentioned in the Theaetetus are themselves a 
new systematic explanation of how the soul recollects knowledge in the sensible 
world.  
This thesis will show that Plato faces a dilemma. On the one hand, Plato insists 
that the soul could only recollect rather than gain knowledge in the sensible world. 
Therefore, his epistemology is rooted in the ground of the region of the Forms. 
However, on the other hand, he has to explain the phenomenon of knowing and how 
the soul regains knowledge in the sensible world; otherwise knowledge would be 
useless. Plato needs theories of knowledge in the sensible world. For Plato, it is so 
difficult to offer convincing theories to explain what happens in the region of the 
Forms, since it is too abstract. Fortunately, Plato could give explanations of what 
happens in the process of knowing in the sensible world and then use the explanation 
in two ways: namely, the same explanation can be used both for what happens in the 
sensible world and in the region of the Forms. This thesis will show that Plato’s 
endeavor is not entirely successful. The failure of his endeavor can be shown by the 
aporia at the end of the Meno and Theaetetus. Further, the failure can also be shown 
by the poor arguments of the theories in all three dialogues that will be revealed in 
the chapters of this thesis.  
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The process of gaining knowledge in the Meno and Phaedo 
The Meno and Phaedo show that Plato insists on a position of innate knowledge. 
Therefore, knowledge unavoidably refers to its real objects, the Forms. Plato’s 
Socrates does not say anything about the Forms in the Meno, but introduces the 
theory of Forms in the Phaedo. However, that does not mean that Plato did not have 
the theory of the Forms in his mind when he composed the Meno. As I will prove in 
chapter two, there is evidence to show the Plato holds the same position on 
epistemology in both Meno and Phaedo.  
The outline of the epistemological system constructed in Meno and Phaedo can 
be summarized as follows: 
(1) The soul “has seen (ἑωρακυῖα) all things on earth and in the underworld, 
there is nothing which it has not learned” (Meno 81c).1 Nevertheless, in Phaedo, soul 
enters into a region of “noble and pure and invisible” and gains knowledge there 
(Phaedo 78d, 79b and 80d). The Forms are the objects of knowledge.  
(2) There are two reasons why the soul in the sensible world cannot gain 
knowledge but only recollect it. Firstly, the soul is always influenced by the body 
(Phaedo 80b-d). Secondly, the objects of recognition in the sensible world are always 
in flux and “never in the same state” (78b). There are two criteria of knowledge, i.e. 
knowledge is always of what is and is always unerring (Theaetetus 152c, Αἴσθησις 
ἄρα τοῠ ὄντος ἀεί ἐστιν καὶ ἀψευδὲς ὡς ἐπιστήµη οὖσα. “Perception, then, is always 
of what it is, and unerring – as befits knowledge”). According to these criteria, the 
                                                 
1
 All the English translations of Plato’s dialogues in this dissertation come from Plato: Complete Works edited by 
John Cooper, unless otherwise indicated. For Greek texts, I have used Oxford Classical Texts.  
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objects in the sensible world make knowledge impossible, for it is impossible to 
learn knowledge from an object that is always in flux.  
(3) Hence, the soul can only recollect knowledge in the sensible world and 
“learning is recollection” (Meno 81c-86b, Phaedo 72e-73a). If so, someone who does 
not know about something has within himself true opinion about that thing that he 
does not know (Meno 85c). Then how could true opinion become knowledge? One 
answer from Meno is that “…He will have true opinions which, when stirred by 
questioning, become knowledge…” (Meno 86a)  
(4) The questions will give the respondent an opportunity for recollecting an 
account of the true opinion about something. This recollection will finally make the 
true opinion become knowledge, according to the formula “knowledge is true 
opinion with an explanation of the reason why” that is introduced by Socrates in the 
Meno (98a).  
(5) Socrates in the Phaedo offers another version of recollection theory. 
Someone could recollect the Forms as the objects of his knowing when he 
experiences things similar or not similar to the Forms and realizes that all these 
things are inferior to the Forms (Phaedo 74a-c).  
The most important feature of this epistemological system is that it is rooted in 
the Forms. It unavoidably emphasizes the region beyond the sensible world, where 
the soul can gain knowledge. Based on this, Plato’s Socrates employs recollection for 
explaining how the phenomenon of knowing or recognition happens in the sensible 
world. Socrates offers two versions of recollection theories and tries to illustrate the 
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process of recollection in detail. In the sensible world, the bodily elements from the 
body and the things in flux make knowledge impossible to gain. Socrates uses this to 
confirm that knowledge could only be gained in the region of Forms rather than in 
the sensible world.  
From this system, we can deduce how a soul gains knowledge during the time 
of its existence. Firstly, the soul “has seen” (ἑωρακυῖα) all things in the region of 
Forms. This means that the soul learns everything there through “consorting with” 
the Forms. Then, for some souls, incarnation happens.  
A soul combines with a body and becomes a human being which exists in the 
sensible world. At the moment of birth, the soul loses or forgets the knowledge it 
already had (Phaedo 73e, 75d and 76a). That explains why we still need to study in 
our human life, though “learning” or “knowing” to Plato’s Socrates means something 
completely different. For him, all learning is recollection, i.e. the soul recalls the 
knowledge that it already has.  
As set out (4) and (5), there are two ways by which someone could recollect the 
knowledge. (4) is set in motion by questions about something. Socrates gives us a 
paradigm to show the process of recollection through questions in the Meno, where 
Socrates successfully makes a slave who has never learned geometry gain the correct 
answer to a geometrical question through Socrates’ questions (82b-85b).2 Socrates 
does not mention whether someone could start the process of recollection through 
questions by himself. For example, whether someone could raise a question by being 
                                                 
2
 Charles Kahn argues that “three acts of the intellect: (1) grasping concepts, (2) forming judgment, (3) following 
inferences” “are illustrated by the slave-boy’s answers to Socrates’ questions”. See Kahn (2009) p. 121. 
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curious about something himself and then, by virtue of his own logical deduction and 
analysis, gain the right answer to the questions he has raised. It seems that we cannot 
deny such a possibility, since Socrates admits that the slave has opinions “within 
himself” (ἐνῆσαν δέ γε αὐτῷ αἱ δόξαι) (Meno 85c). That is why true opinion is a 
necessary component of knowledge in the formula “knowledge is true opinion with 
an explanation of the reason why” which appears in the Meno. 
The second way, as (5) shows, by which someone could recollect knowledge is 
that recollection could be triggered directly by the sensible objects. When someone 
sees equal things, he could realize the existence of the Form of Equality that makes 
the equal things deficient compared to it. If all learning is recollection, then 
knowledge is impossible to gain in the sensible world for two reasons: firstly, the 
objects of recognition in the sensible world are always in flux; secondly, the body is 
always a hindrance to recollecting knowledge within the soul.  
In order to purify the bodily elements and see the true realities, namely, the 
Forms, the soul in the sensible world must take care of itself and avoid the 
contamination of the body (Phaedo 81a-84b).  
Socrates emphasizes that, after death, the soul could separate from the body and 
gain the knowledge from the real realities (Phaedo 80e, 83a). This does not mean 
that Socrates encourages suicide, for the soul in a reasoning state can gain knowledge 
from Forms. The right way for practising philosophy is to keep the soul pure and 
leave nothing bodily with the soul when death happens. That is what Socrates calls 
“training for death” (79e-81a). This kind of training is necessary for gaining 
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knowledge directly from the Forms. The fact that knowledge cannot be gained in the 
sensible world does not mean that you cannot have knowledge in the sensible world. 
As Socrates illustrates when he mentions the training for death, a philosopher who 
loves wisdom could occasionally “gather his soul together” and avoid the influence 
from the body and therefore have or recollect knowledge. Nevertheless, a soul 
having knowledge in the sensible world cannot last for a long time for two reasons. 
Firstly, it is extremely difficult for soul to keep away from the influence of the bodily 
elements, even if it is a philosopher’s soul; otherwise, the training for death would be 
pointless. Secondly, the objects in the sensible world are in flux; so even though the 
soul grasps the knowledge on a specific object, this piece of knowledge on 
something could not be applied to the object in the next moment, since the specific 
object has changed by then. These two reasons also explain why gaining knowledge 
is impossible in the sensible world. 
 
Problems in the process of gaining knowledge in Meno and Phaedo  
Surely, Plato’s Socrates should supply more information to explain the whole 
system; otherwise, it appears problematic. How does the soul exist without 
combination with the body? How does the soul learn knowledge from the Forms? 
What is the relationship between soul, knowledge and the Forms? Do they co-exist? 
Alternatively, are the Forms like books which contain the knowledge, so that the soul 
gains the knowledge from the Forms as it sees or watches them? If the Forms are not 
like books, do they have a specific function or effect that makes the soul itself 
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produce knowledge? After the soul is combined with the body, in what way does 
knowledge exist in the soul? What is the procedure through which the soul recollects 
knowledge when it is stimulated by the sensible objects? Does the body really make 
no contribution in the process of knowing? Indeed, Plato in Theaetetus tries to face 
these difficulties3 and offers ideas and theories to supplement the epistemological 
system, while insisting on the whole system.  
 
Plato’s strategy for pursuing the definition of knowledge in Theaetetus 
Theaetetus seems to overthrow what has been said about knowledge in Meno 
and Phaedo, especially where Socrates rejects the formula “knowledge is true 
opinion plus an account” which is similar to the formula “knowledge is true opinion 
plus an explanation of the reason why” in the Meno (Theaetetus, 210a). 4 But, Plato 
does not give up his philosophical position on knowledge in the Meno and the 
Phaedo, since all the theories or ideas in the Theaetetus that seem to be empirical 
                                                 
3
 Reasonably, we could assume that Plato realized that the outline of his epistemological system is not so clear 
and persuasive when he composed Theaetetus. Maybe he has had discussion or research on epistemology with his 
pupils or he knew that the topics of the Meno and the Phaedo are not specific about knowledge, and the 
epistemological system could not well be delivered in those dialogues. All these lead him to compose a dialogue 
on knowledge.  
4
 The formula “knowledge is true opinions (αἱ δόξαι αἱ ἀληθεῖς) plus an explanantion of the reason why (αἰτίας 
λογισµῷ)” in the Meno is not the same as the third definition of knowledge in the Theaetetus, namely, 
“knowledge is true opinion plus an account” (τὴν µὲν µετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήµην εἶναι). Nevertheless, as 
E. S. Haring points out, “Theaetetus’s definition is very like the one sketched by Socrates in the Meno: true 
opinion tethered by ‘working out the reason’ or ‘reasoning out the ground [aitia]’. This resemblance may be an 
ambiguous clue; perhaps Plato is criticizing rather than reinforcing the Meno definition. However, the ties 
between the Theaetetus and Meno are so numerous as to indicate a positive regard for the earlier dialogue” 
(pp.510-511). He also argues that “Thus it seems also fair to say that Theodorus’s true opinion has been 
transformed by the addition of a ground...On such an interpretation ‘true opinion accompanied by logos’ can also 
be formulated as ‘grounded true opinion,’ in terms recalling Meno 97e-98a.The grounded true opinion is a 
definition. It is not the initial true opinion externally coupled with something which can be called the ground or 
logos or reason; the discovery of the ground requires the initial -- sometimes somewhat list-like -- judgment to be 
replaced (p.525). I agree with him, though I think that Theaetetus’ definition is a kind of supplement of the Meno 
definition. Moreover, Glenn R. Morrow also declares, “But when Theaetetus proposes that knowledge be defined 
as true belief accompanied by logos, we seem at last to be on Platonic ground. It at once recalls the statement in 
the Meno (98a) that true belief becomes knowledge when it has been fastened by reasoning. There is no obvious 
difference in meaning between saying that knowledge is belief ‘bound by reasoning (λογισµῷ)’ and saying that it 
is belief ‘accompanied by logos (µετὰ λόγου)’ See Haring (1982). pp. 510-511 and 525. See also Morrow (1970) 
p. 309.  
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actually supplement the outline of epistemology in the Meno and Phaedo. Moreover, 
the theories and ideas solve the difficulties and clarify the outline of knowledge in 
some degree, although they themselves have problems. The philosophical 
investigation of knowledge in Theaetetus could be roughly divided into three parts 
that follow the three definitions. The three definitions are: (a) knowledge is 
perception; (b) knowledge is true judgement/opinion; (c) knowledge is true 
judgement/opinion with an account.  
Plato’s Socrates strategy for (a) is to reframe the possibility of Protagoras’ “men 
are the measure of all things” as a reasonable assertion. During the process, he offers 
a detailed account of the process of seeing the colour white (Theaetetus 153d-154a, 
156d-e, 159d-160c). The procedure refers to three things and two stages. At first, a 
motion between the eyes and the white object produces whiteness, then the seeing 
eyes and the whiteness makes the white colour come into being. If that is what 
happens, nothing has being, rather all are coming-into-being. This theory of 
perception indeed differs from Protagoras’ thought and it also opens a door to see 
how Socrates understands perception. Socrates’ comprehension of perception on the 
one hand supplements the epistemology by explaining the steps of the process of 
perceiving, which are not given in the discussion of perception in Meno and Phaedo. 
This new account of perception is surely a supplement to the theory of recollection. 
Moreover, it also demonstrates why the sensible objects have no being, but are 
coming-into-being; it emphasizes the fact the all sensible objects are in flux.  
As the Socratic strategy for (a) “knowledge is perception” shows, Socrates 
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never rebuts the three definitions of knowledge directly, rather he always tries to 
reject the definitions indirectly. In his criticism of (a), Protagoras’ “human beings are 
the measure of all things” is shown ridiculous from many aspects. The same strategy 
is employed for (b) “knowledge is true judgement/opinion”, since Socrates does not 
reject the definition, but talks about the possibility of false judgement. According to 
the investigation of false judgement, Socrates seemingly proves that false judgement 
is impossible. If so, every judgement is true. Even if someone actually makes a false 
judgement, this person would think it is a true one. Assuming that knowledge is true 
judgement, as Theaetetus insists, then as Socrates points out that, in practice, a 
juryman could possibly make a true judgement without knowledge under the 
influence of persuasion. Consequently, knowledge is not true opinion. Socrates 
claims the impossibility of the second definition of knowledge by giving a 
counterexample, which rebuts the definition “knowledge is true opinion” directly.  
We should not be surprised when the strategy is repeated in (c) “knowledge is 
true opinion with an account”. Theaetetus claims that this definition is what he heard 
from an unnamed informant. Socrates calls what Theaetetus heard a “dream” and 
suggests that he himself has heard the dream, but does not know whether it is the 
same version of the dream and so, he wishes to check it. Socrates, again, does not try 
to denounce the third definition and the dream directly. Rather, he firstly asks 
Theaetetus how to distinguish knowable things and unknowable things in the dream 
theory. After the arguments on three pairs of things, i.e. the elements and complexes, 
the letter and syllables and the sum and whole, Socrates overthrows the dream theory. 
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In the next stage, Socrates tests three meanings of the concept “account”, namely, 
“account” is the image or reflection of thought (206d) or is “a matter of going 
through a thing element by element” (207c) or is the “statement of the distinguishing 
mark”5 (208d). All the three meanings of “account” fail to produce the definition of 
knowledge.  
 
Theaetetus supplements the outline of epistemology in the Meno and Phaedo 
According to the rejections of the three definitions, knowledge is neither 
perception nor true judgement nor true judgement with an account. It seems that 
Theaetetus does not make any positive proposal for building the definition of 
knowledge. However, during the process of investigating the meaning and the nature 
of knowledge, Socrates gives us some philosophical thoughts that are an important 
supplement to the epistemological system in Meno and Phaedo. These valuable 
philosophical theories in the Theaetetus clarify some points and solve some 
difficulties in the outline of epistemology in Meno and Phaedo, although these 
further ideas and theories have problems in themselves. In the discussion of the first 
definition of knowledge, i.e. knowledge is perception, Socrates describes in detail 
how the eyes see the colour white. This description is significant in at least two 
aspects. It not only offers us a process of how perception happens in the sensible 
world, but by extension also helps us an opportunity to imagine how the soul gains 
knowledge from the Forms. The only difference when the procedure applies to the 
                                                 
5
 The phrase “statement of distinguishing mark” comes from Sedley. See Sedley (2004) p. 174. 
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soul and the Forms is that the object changes. The object is no longer a sensible 
object which could have other properties, rather it is a Form, which is pure and 
changeless. Therefore, the process of seeing the colour white is suitable as a parallel 
example for imagining how the soul gets knowledge from the Forms. 6  Further, 
Socrates uses the key metaphor of soul “seeing” the Forms (Phaedo 83b4) and the 
colour white example highlights the importance of the ability of seeing among the 
perceptual abilities. This is not just a coincidence, rather the choice of such an 
example invites or allows a comparison with the activity of soul.  
Socrates employs two analogies in his arguments on the impossibility of false 
judgement. One analogy is the wax block and the other is the analogy of the aviary. 
At first sight, the wax block analogy seems to present an empiricist theory, but it is 
significant for Plato’s philosophy in three ways. Firstly, it points to the recollection 
theory. If the recollection theory is true, is false judgement impossible? A doubt on 
the recollection theory is: “If everyone’s soul is different, is it possible to judge 
falsely?”. That is why Socrates emphasizes that the wax block in each soul is 
different (191c-d, 194e). Amazingly, the result of the wax block still proves that false 
judgement is impossible (196c). Although the wax block analogy does not mention it 
explicitly, the discussion is actually about the recollection theory. Secondly, the wax 
block analogy admits that the body has a function in the process of knowing, though 
whether the product gained in the wax block analogy is knowledge still needs to be 
clarified. The wax block gives a clear analogy about how the soul operates in the 
                                                 
6
 “That is not to say that the Theory of Forms” in Theaetetus “is not very different from the Theory of Forms as 
expounded in the Phaedo and Republic”, as W. G. Runciman argues. See Runciman (1962) p. 130.  
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sensible world for gaining knowledge through the bodily organs. It is a strong 
supplement to Plato’s epistemological system. Thirdly, it has the same effect as the 
description of the eyes seeing the colour white, namely, it could be treated as a theory 
of what happens when the soul “sees” the Forms. If the description of the eyes seeing 
the colour white supplies the details of what happens when the soul begins to 
perceive the Forms, then the wax block if applied to the Forms gives us a theory of 
what happens after the soul saw the Forms.  
If the description of the eyes seeing the colour white is the first stage of 
knowing and the second stage is what happens according to the wax block analogy, 
then the analogy of aviary can be seen as the final stage. Here, I assume that all those 
three analogies can be applied to the knowing process both in the sensible world and 
in the region of the Forms. The aviary analogy offers explicitly a vivid description of 
how the soul operates when gaining knowledge which is already at hand and within 
itself. Nevertheless, the analogy also could help us to imagine how the soul recollects 
the knowledge after it gained the knowledge from the Forms.  
Besides the description of the eyes seeing the colour white and the two 
analogies, in the discussion of the third definition of knowledge in the Theaetetus, 
namely, knowledge is true judgement with an account, Socrates talks about the 
relationship between the element and the complex and about the three meanings of 
the notion “account”. Although they are two issues, since the relationship between 
the element and the complex is relevant to understanding the meaning of “account”, 
they could be seen as one. In the Meno, Socrates explains why knowledge is more 
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valuable than true opinion, though both of them could lead to the right behaviour, 
since true opinion is not stable. It can become knowledge only when it is tied down 
by an account/explanation of the reason why. Following this idea, it is significant to 
make clear what is the exact meaning of “account” when we begin to talk about 
knowledge. The meaning of “account” is not investigated in the Meno and the 
Phaedo, which makes their discussions about knowledge abstract and obscure.  
 
Scholarly Rationale 
My research tries to prove that the philosophical thoughts on epistemology in 
the Theaetetus are coherent with what is said on knowledge in the Meno and Phaedo. 
Nevertheless, this conclusion has never had consensus among scholars. A majority of 
scholars stand on the opposite side to my conclusion, especially when they doubt 
whether there is even any connection at all between Meno, Phaedo and Theaetetus 
on epistemology.  
The disconnection between the outline of Plato’s epistemology in the Meno and 
Phaedo and the philosophical thoughts in the Theaetetus can be divided for two 
reasons. The first reason is that the theories and ideas in the Theaetetus are irrelevant 
to the theory of Forms that is introduced in the Phaedo. The second reason is that the 
philosophy in the Theaetetus and the recollection theory that is mentioned both in the 
Meno and the Phaedo are entirely separate.  
The theory of Forms is the most important part of the outline of Plato’s 
epistemology. Nevertheless, the fact that Plato himself never mentions the theory of 
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Forms in the Theaetetus leads a number of scholars to conclude that Plato either 
gives up or revises essentially the theory of Forms in his late dialogues. Those 
scholars explaining Plato’s epistemology in this way construct a long academic 
tradition. The scholars in this tradition include J. L. Ackrill 7 , David Bostock 8 , 
Renford Bambrough9, G. E. L. Owen10, Gilbert Ryle11 and Kenneth M. Sayre12. The 
opposite explanation of this issue begins with Vlastos who proposes that Plato never 
abandons the theory of Forms.13 He is followed by Gokhan Adalier, Cornford, M. 
Brown and Dorter. Adalier supports Vlastos’ view by arguing that the problems that 
appear in Socrates’ discussion of the wax block and aviary models and on false 
judgement need the theory of Forms to be solved.14 Another believer in the idea that 
the theory of Forms could solve difficulties of the theories and ideas in the 
Theaetetus is F. M. Cornford.15 He not only connects the theory of Forms to the text 
of Theaetetus, but also links the theory of recollection to the Theaetetus. Cornford 
firmly believes that Theaetetus is connected to the theory of recollection in the Meno, 
especially when Socrates describes his midwifery. Malcolm Brown supports 
Cornford’s view, by referring to the evidence of the anonymous commentator on 
Theaetetus in antiquity,  
 
“…the [side of the] two-foot square is also incommensurable…but he left it out, 
                                                 
7
 Ackrill (1955) pp. 199-218. 
8
 Bostock (1988). 
9
 Bambrough (1972) pp. 295- 307.  
10
 Owen (1953) pp. 313-338. 
11
 Ryle (1939) pp.97-147.  
12
 Sayre (1969). 
13
 Vlastos (1954) pp. 231-263. 
14
 Adalier (2001) pp. 1-37. 
15
 Cornford (1935). 
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they say, because it is in the Meno”.16  
 
Kenneth Dorter reminds us, “The Theaetetus in fact recalls the Meno at almost every 
turn”. 17  Hackforth beleieves that Cornford’s idea is correct by examinating 
Robinson’s article which dissents Cornford’s general interpretation of Theaetetus, 
namely, an acceptable definition of knowledge will not be reached, if the Forms are 
lefe out of account.18 Hackforth offers two important conclusions: “(a) that it seems 
in general impossible to separate the question of the essence or nature of knowledge 
from the question of its object or objects”; “(b) that throughout the dialogue Plato is 
in fact concerned with both questions.”19  McDowell disagrees with Cornford and the 
scholars who support him, since Socratic midwifery belongs to Socrates rather than 
to Plato and it is only “a metaphorical description of a method”. In contrast, for Meno 
and Phaedo, the recollection theory is a doctrine and belongs to Platonic 
philosophy.20 Sedley also disbelieves that Theaetetus refers to recollection theory, by 
giving the evidence that 
 
“Socrates makes explicit the opposite assumption, that our aviaries, far from 
being stocked with all species of knowledge-birds, are in fact empty in infancy 
(197e2-3)”.21 
 
Cornford realizes the importance of recollection theory and the theory of the Forms 
                                                 
16
 Brown (1969) p.360, note 4. 
17
 He also gives us eight examples to show the connection between the Theaetetus and the Meno. See, Dorter 
(1994) p. 71. 
18
 Robinson (1950) pp. 3-30. 
19
 Hackforth (1957) pp. 53 and 58. 
20
 McDowell (1973) pp. 116-117. 
21
 At the same time, Sedley suggests how recollection might be relevant to understanding Theaetetus in his book. 
Sedley (2004) p. 29-30. 
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for understanding the philosophical contents in Theaetetus, I agree with Cornford’s 
idea that, although Theaetetus does not mention the recollection and the Forms 
theory, there is still a connection between the theory of Forms, the theory of 
recollection and the theories and ideas in the Theaetetus.22 When Cornford explains 
perception theory, the wax block analogy and the aviary example in Theaetetus, he 
does not apply these three issues to explain how the soul “consorts with” the Forms 
and thus gains knowledge. The theories and the ideas in the Theaetetus are connected 
to the recollection theory and the Forms theory. I hold that the theories and ideas of 
Theaetetus are supplement to the recollection and Forms theories mentioned in the 
Meno and Phaedo.  
 
Reasons for the choice of Meno, Phaedo and Theaetetus 
There are six key reasons (A-F) why Meno, Phaedo and Theaetetus are relevant 
to my research. The reasons are as follows: 
(A) The most important theory in Plato’s epistemology is the theory of Forms 
that is formally introduced in the Phaedo.  
(B) If the theory of Forms is necessary in this research, then the recollection 
theory is another key theory that needs to be discussed, since the recollection theory 
is the bridge betwen the Forms and the knowledge that can be recollected by the soul 
through stimulation in the sensible world. Plato offers his readers a detailed account 
                                                 
22
 R. Hackforth firmly agrees with Cornford’s idea that “the main purpose” of Theaetetus “is to show that no 
acceptable definition of knowledge can be reached if the Forms are left out of account”. See Hackforth (1957) p. 
53. 
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of recollection  theory in the Meno.  
(C) Plato’s Socrates supplies at the end of Meno a formula “knowledge is true 
opinion plus an explanation of the reason why”, which is a very important attempt to 
state the nature and meaning of knowledge. Moreover, an extremely similar formula 
“knowledge is true opinion/judgement plus an account” is investigated in the 
Theaetetus as the third definition of knowledge, although it is rejected there.  
(D) Meno also makes the distinction between true opinion and knowledge and 
proposes that knowledge is more valuable than true opinion. This distinction is also 
important in Theaetetus.  
(E) The theory of Forms, the theory of recollection, the distinction between true 
opinion and knowledge, the formula “knowledge is true opinion plus an explanation 
of the reason why” and the discussion of the immortality of soul that appear in the 
Meno or Phaedo construct a basic outline of Plato’s epistemology.  
(F) Theaetetus is the only dialogue that investigates directly the meaning and 
nature of knowledge. This fact puts Theaetetus in a special position in relation to 
Plato’s theory of knowledge. During the process of discussing the meaning and 
nature of knowledge through the three definitions of knowledge, Socrates offers a 
series of theories and ideas about epistemology, which serves as a supplement to the 
outline of knowledge theory in the Meno and Phaedo.  
This thesis will argue that Theaetetus offers doctrines that are not only linked to 
the theory of Forms and recollection theory, but which also supplement the outline of 
the epistemology in Meno and Phaedo. In this sense, the ideas in the Theaetetus have 
19 
 
positive significance. They are positive, since they lead Plato’s readers to consider 
what Plato has said on knowledge through trying to clarify what is unclear and to 
solve the problems in the outline of knowledge. Further, they also have negative 
significance. They are negative, since all of them fail after scrutiny, which means all 
of them have difficulties in themselves. In this sense, I agree with Burnyeat and 
Sedley that Theaetetus is a kind of “dialectical exercise” which offers us a chance to 
re-consider what has been discussed on epistemology and gives us a “maieutic” 
method which is like a ladder to help Plato’s readers to come as closely as possible to 
the real meaning and nature of knowledge.23 
  
                                                 
23
 I borrow the term “maieutic” from Sedley. See Burnyeat (1990) pp.7-10 and Sedley (2004) pp. 4-6. 
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Chapter One: Meno on Knowledge, True Opinion and Recollection 
 
Introduction 
Meno is a key dialogue on epistemology in Plato’s dialogues. In it, Socrates tries 
to discuss whether virtue could be taught and what virtue is. 24 Then Socrates tries to 
use epistemology to solve these ethical questions. The appearance of Meno’s paradox 
shows that Plato realizes that the solution to the epistemological question is the basis 
of the ethical questions. Then, the topic of Meno becomes an epistemological 
question “Is virtue knowledge?” from the ethical question “Is virtue teachable?”.  
The change to the approach of taking epistemology as the basis of ethics is 
prompted by Meno’s paradox. This paradox is the starting-point of the discussion of 
a series questions about knowledge or knowing. Considering three scholars’ 
arguments, I will argue that the main problem of Meno’s paradox is that Meno only 
considers the situation of the cognitive blank, i.e. when someone is completely 
ignorant on something (section 1.1). 
Socrates employs two theories to solve Meno’s paradox, namely, the 
immortality of the soul and the theory of recollection (learning is recollection). 
Focusing on the recollection theory in this chapter (section 1.2), I will argue that it 
does not apply to all kinds of knowledge and, therefore, confine knowledge to a 
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 Irwin reminds us, Meno’s first definition of virtue satisfies “a metaphysical demand”, but “Socrates adds an 
epistemological demand”. See Irwin (1999) pp. 146-147.  
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narrow sphere, as scholars have shown. Although having such a defect, the 
recollection theory shows that all knowledge or true opinion comes from the soul. 
Having realized that apart from the soul there is no other possible teacher of the 
virtue, Socrates refuses the idea that virtue could be a kind of knowledge, since only 
knowledge could be taught. The solution to this problem is the introduction of “true 
opinion”. Socrates gives an example, the road to Larisa, to explain that both true 
opinion and knowledge could lead to the right behavior (section 1.3). The only 
difference between true opinion and knowledge is that true opinion is not stable and 
needs an account of the reason why to “tie it down”. I will emphasize that Socrates 
offers his version of gaining knowledge as a process. To illustrate this process 
Socrates asks one of Meno’s slaves geometrical questions to helping him to recollect 
the relevant geometrical knowledge. I will especially emphasize the Socratic idea 
that true opinion is an intercourse between perception and knowledge, even if his 
arguments will also raise two problems. 
In the last section of this chapter (section 1.4), I will discuss why knowledge is 
more valuable than true opinion, if true opinion and knowledge have the same 
practical value, namely, both of them could lead to the right behavior.  
 
1.1 Meno’s Paradox 
Meno’s paradox is a turning point of the dialogue, since the relationship 
between epistemology and ethics comes close after it, though there is an indistinct 
connection between them before it. Moreover, Meno’s paradox itself as a kind of 
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skepticism is an important query of epistemology. An analysis of Meno’s paradox is 
necessary.  
Meno’s paradox begins at 80d and the text of it is as follows: 
 
Καί τίνα τρόπον ζητήσεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο, ὅ µὴ οἶσθα τὸ παράπαν ὅ τι ἐστίν; 
ποῖον γὰρ ὧν οὐκ οἶσθα προθέµενος ζητήσεις; ἢ εἰ καὶ ὅτι µάλιστα ἐντύχοις αὐτῷ 
πῶς εἴσῃ ὅτι τοῠτό ἐστιν, ὃ σὺ οὐκ ᾔδησθα; （Meno 80d 5-8） 
(How will you look for it, Socrates, when you do not know at all what it is? 
How will you aim to search for something you do not know at all? If you should 
meet with it, how will you know that this is the thing that you did not know?) 
 
Scott divides this paradox into two parts, M1 and M2, as he labels them.25  There 
are three questions in the paradox, the first two questions belong to M1; the last 
question belongs to M2. Scott also thinks that the name of Meno’s paradox “has been 
used confusingly” (p. 75) and we should avoid using it.26 “The weakness of M1 is 
clear” (p.76), since the premise of the paradox is that “one really were in a cognitive 
blank” (pp.76-77). Nevertheless, “this hardly represents the situation of either Meno 
or Socrates in the dialogue” (p.77). In other words, since they have discussed the 
unified form of virtue in the dialogue, both of them could not be in a cognitive blank. 
Then, M1 is obviously weak.  
M2 to Scott has two interpretations. Let us consider the first explanation only.27 
It is as follows: “While M1 focuses on the beginning of an inquiry, this part of the 
                                                 
25
 Scott, D. 2006. Plato’s Meno, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 75-79. 
26
 Meno’s paradox is actually a confusing name in Scott’s interpretation of it. Scott thinks that there are two 
stages in the paradox, namely, Meno’s three questions and Socrates’ paraphrase or response to these questions. 
However, in my argument, I shall not refer to Socrates’ response to it and shall purely analyse Meno’s paradox 
itself. 
27
 I shall leave the second untouched, for it relates to Socrates’ response of the paradox, according to Scott’s idea. 
See also previous note above. 
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challenge envisages a problem about ever completing it (even if one could, per 
impossibile, get started)” (p. 77). Then, M2 “is continuous with the problem raised in 
M1: if you are in a cognitive blank about some object, you cannot make a discovery 
about it by means of inquiry” (p. 77). Nevertheless, Scott thinks this is “impossible” 
(p. 77), for “you may be able to grasp x, but since you have never had any 
specification of y, how can you make any sense of the statement ‘x is y’?” (p.77). 
This is in fact the same as the rebuttal to M1, namely, you could grasp some 
phenomena or some parts of something, but not hold the essence or knowledge of it. 
This gives us a new perspective: we could grasp some phenomena or some parts of 
something through inquiry or learning. This new perspective contradicts the 
conclusion of Meno’s paradox, i.e. we could discover nothing through learning or 
inquiry. Therefore, M2 is essentially as weak as M1.  
McCabe shares with Scott the same conclusion about Meno’s paradox, but she 
investigates the situation of “knowing completely” (an opposite phrase to “in a 
cognitive blank” in Scott’s terms) in detail. 28  According to her idea, the word 
“οἶσθα/know” that Meno employs in his paradox is vague, because we could 
understand “know” in two ways: 
(1) Either I know x completely or I am completely ignorant of it; 
(2) Either I have x in mind or I do not have x in mind. 
The situation in (2) expresses the same idea as Scott. According to McCabe, 
Meno in his paradox considers only the situation (1) and does not think about the 
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 See McCabe (1994) pp. 53-54. 
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situation (2). In the situation (1), it is obviously right to say that one cannot even start 
an inquiry. However, this situation is extreme and rare. There are a vast number of 
cases between complete knowledge and complete ignorance. That is to say, there are 
three possibilities: complete knowledge, complete ignorance and insufficient 
knowledge (in the sense of having something in mind but not fully knowing/having 
not enough knowledge). Take France as an example to illustrate this. I have the 
notion of “France” or I know there is a country “France”, but I have no idea about its 
specific circumstances, such as its territory, its races or its politics. More interestingly, 
because of the notion “France” in my mind, I could learn something about it by 
means of learning from a textbook or asking someone or searching it through the 
internet. This example shows that Meno’s paradox could only apply in some limited 
situations, namely, when someone “is completely ignorant of” or is “in a cognitive 
blank” about or with regard to something. 
Fine analyses Meno’s paradox or eristic paradox.29  She believes that Socrates’ 
rephrase of the paradox is important for understanding Meno’s paradox. She recasts 
Socrates’ response as follows (pp. 205-206): 30  
 
1. For any x, one either knows, or does not know, x. 
2. If one knows x, one cannot inquire into x. 
3. If one does not know x, one cannot inquire into x. 
4. Therefore, whether or not one knows x, one cannot inquire into x. 
 
                                                 
29
 See Fine (1992) pp. 205-206. 
30
 The quotation refers to Socrates’ response. However, in Fine’s article, there is no difference between Meno’s 
paradox and Socrates’ response, which is very distinctive from Scott’s idea. Therefore, I could employ it without 
difficulty. 
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According to her own discussion, Fine points out that (1) and (4) are valid, but (2) 
and (3) are suspect, since the word “know” in them is not clear. In order to illustrate 
this, she offers an example, saying, “I might know who Meno is, but seek to know 
where he is; I might know something about physics, but seek to know more about it” 
(p. 206). The example has shown that “I might lack all knowledge about x, but have 
some (true) beliefs about it; and perhaps they are adequate for inquiry” (p. 206). In 
other words, so long as I hold some beliefs to start my inquiry, it is not important 
whether they are true or false.  
It is apparent that Fine, McCabe and Scott all agree with each other. I also agree 
with them, but have to supplement what actually happens in Meno’s paradox. At 
Meno 71b, Socrates insists that if someone does not know what something is, then he 
could not know what qualities it possesses. It seems that the question “What is 
something?” is in Socrates’ mind a basic question compared to the question “What 
are the qualities of something?”. Meno points out that the real basic question should 
not be “What is something?” but rather “How is learning possible?” This shows that 
epistemology is the real and main problem in the dialogue. Socrates himself admits 
that he has “complete ignorance about virtue” (Meno 71b). Meno could judge that 
Socrates actually admits that he is “in a cognitive blank” about virtue. If so, then, it is 
valid for Meno to propose his paradox. All the three scholars above suspect that 
Meno’s paradox itself has some defects, but the defects are not the result of Meno’s 
mistake, but rather of Socrates’ mistake.  
More importantly, Meno uses wrong words in his paradox. He should employ in 
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his paradox words like “collecting information” or “how to understand a concept or 
notion when you have no concept in your soul/mind” rather than “learning/inquiry”. 
This is the real problem of Meno’s paradox --- Meno does not correctly set his 
question. This happens because Meno’s understanding of the concept “learning” is 
different from the three scholars’ understanding on that notion. As the three scholars 
show, any learning or inquiry for Meno means the inquirer has an intention or 
motivation for inquiring about something. This kind of intention suggests that the 
inquirer has had some information on the object of the inquiry before he starts 
inquiring. The idea of learning itself could avoid Meno’s paradox without any 
problem. Nevertheless, Meno’s paradox tries to highlight the question of how the 
inquiry happens. Before the inquiry, there is a pre-assumption or pre-procedure, i.e. 
we should have the concepts in the inquiry or should know how to collect or gain the 
concepts, even though the concepts are vague. The scholars have shown that this 
paradox could only happen in a “cognitive blank” situation. However, Meno would 
rebut them, saying that that is the very situation on he wishes to consider. The 
paradox tries to query how a person in a cognitive blank could understand anything. 
The analyses from those scholars illustrate what situation could lead to such a 
paradox, but these analyses do not offer any answer to the paradox. Socrates employs 
the immortality of soul and the theory of recollection to respond to this paradox. 
These two ideas show that a cognitive blank could not happen in human beings, 
because our souls have learnt everything we need before our birth. This is at least an 
answer, though it is not a good answer, for Meno could continue his doubt by asking 
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“how could the soul learn when it knows nothing?” A possible answer that Socrates 
could offer is that because “the whole of nature is akin” (Meno 81d). Therefore, the 
soul could learn everything.31 
 
1.2 Theory of Recollection 
The theory of recollection is the answer that Socrates offers to solve Meno’s 
paradox and it provides important information about epistemology in Meno. Since G. 
Vlastos published Anamnesis in the Meno, many other scholars have tried to develop 
his idea about recollection in Meno. In this section, I introduce three analyses from G. 
Vlastos, J. Moravcsik and A. Nehamas on recollection and then present my own 
understanding. 
In the Meno, in order to prove his theory of recollection, Socrates shows how a 
slave, who had never learnt geometry before, could gain a correct answer to a 
geometrical question for himself after being asked a set of questions. Vlastos32 raises 
a doubt about this proof, since knowledge of geometry is different from other kinds 
of knowledge (such as the knowledge of history, of anatomy or of botany), it could 
be gained completely through “any advance in understanding which results from the 
perception of logical relationships” (p. 145).33 Thus, he shows how the slave example 
could not apply to all kinds of knowledge, especially those that rely on experience or 
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 A possible Stoic answer may be like this. Because the whole of nature has rationality, though different in degree. 
Therefore, the soul could learn everything.  
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 Vlastos (1994) pp. 101-102. 
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recording data. If this is the case, how can Socrates prove the recollection theory (i.e. 
learning is recollection) through the slave example? In other words, since some kinds 
of knowledge, for instance, history, botany or anatomy, cannot be proved by the slave 
example. Vlastos’ doubt shows that according to his understanding there are at least 
two kinds of knowledge. One is the knowledge from deduction, which can be gained 
logically through a correct assumption, premise or hypothesis. The other is the 
knowledge composed completely by experience or by recording data, such as history, 
botany or anatomy, which does not rely on a right premise or any other deduction. 
Socrates’ slave example only proves that the theory of recollection applies to the first 
kind of knowledge rather than the second. We could call the first kind of knowledge 
“analytical knowledge” which does not need any experience, the second one 
“synthetic knowledge” which contains empirical materials.34  
Vlastos distinguishes “the minimal sense of the theory of recollection” and the 
“full strength of the theory of recollection”.35 He thinks that “the minimal sense of 
the theory of recollection” could apply to the deductive knowledge that is 
independent of experience. The “full strength of the theory of recollection” not only 
implies that non-empirical knowledge exists, but also, unfortunately, implies that 
empirical knowledge does not exist. That is to say, all knowledge including analytical 
knowledge and synthetic knowledge is non-empirical, since the theory of recollection 
in full strength means that knowledge is found in the soul. Therefore, experience is 
irrelevant. Based on this explanation, Vlastos makes a connection between the theory 
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 This distinction is made by Kant. Kant uses “analytic judgement” and “synthetic judgement” as terminology. 
See, Kant (1998) pp. 141-143.  
35
 Vlastos (1996) p. 161 and p. 163.  
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of recollection and the theory of Forms36 and believes that incarnation is the premise 
of recollection.  
Moravcsik concentrates on the meaning of logical terminology in the Meno. He 
thinks that Meno’s paradox (namely, we could find nothing through learning or 
inquiry), could only apply to “learning by deliberate inquiry” rather than other kinds 
of learning. This actually excludes “learning by chance (luck) or as the results of 
external agency”.37 Like Vlastos, Moravcsik also thinks that Plato talks about non-
empirical knowledge in the Meno. This kind of knowledge is in fact the prior 
knowledge or innate knowledge. 38  Nevertheless, there is a difference between 
Moravcsik’s idea and Vlastos’ idea. Moravcsik does not agree that recollected truth 
could be gained through deduction. Although he does not make his points clear, 
Moravcsik seems to imply that the knowledge that Plato mentions in the Meno is 
prior and that it points to the theory of Forms (which agrees with Vlastos again), 
since recollection itself has manifested “experience”. Recollection must be the 
memory of something, or more exactly experience.39 
Nehamas’ article offers a new way to understand the meaning of the word 
“knowledge” (ἐπιστήµη) in the Meno.40  Unlike the two scholars above, he does not 
understand “ἐπιστήµη” as “knowledge”, a kind of entity, which is in the soul, and 
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 Many scholars agree that Plato had a theory of Forms when he wrote Meno. Nevertheless, there is a dispute on 
whether the Forms in the Meno are the same as Socrates' forms (such as in Euthydemus). Ross thinks that they are 
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does not link the process of gaining knowledge to the theory of Forms and 
incarnation. Rather he treats “ἐπιστήµη” as “understanding” or “reasoning”. This 
explanation follows a long history of how to understand “ἐπιστήµη” in Plato’s 
philosophy and is one of three kinds of explanation models. One of the explanation 
models holds that, in Plato’s mind, “ἐπιστήµη” is always a process of “reasoning”. 
Moravcsik and Jon Moline hold this explanation.41 The second model is that Plato’s 
usage of “ἐπιστήµη” has a development. At the beginning, Plato employs “ἐπιστήµη” 
as “knowledge”, i.e. a kind of entity, but gradually he treats it as “understanding” or 
“reasoning”, i.e. a process. Myles Burnyeat agrees with this development in Plato’s 
philosophy. 42  The last model tries to show that “ἐπιστήµη” is neither pure 
“knowledge” nor pure “understanding”, but “knowledge” with “understanding”. That 
is to say, knowledge is a kind of entity. However, in the process of gaining 
knowledge, there must be a process of recognition, understanding or reasoning. 
Jonathan Barnes thinks this third explanation is the right one.43 Based on the dispute 
above, Nehamas questions why Socrates and Meno, who both claim that they know 
nothing about “virtue”, try to find a teacher of “virtue”. Moreover, agreeing with 
Meno, he doubts how could they begin their discussion about “what is virtue?”, if 
they do not know it at all. Nehamas suggests that unless Socrates has the answer to 
“what is virtue?”, or at least has the concept of “virtue”, they could not know even 
whether the object of their inquiry is “virtue”. Further, if someone could know what 
he does not know, he would have the ability to answer questions. If someone has 
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 Moravcsik (1979) pp. 337-348 and Moline (1981) pp. 32-43. 
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 Burnyeat (1980) pp. 97-139. 
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such ability, he in fact has reached knowledge. In the Meno, if Meno could always 
respond to Socrates’ question, he actually would reach the knowledge of “what is 
virtue?” in some degree.44 According to Nehamas’ line of thinking, Socrates, Meno 
and the slave reach the knowledge of virtue in the dialogue, because their “question-
answer” approach to virtue constructs a discussion. According to Nehamas’ 
conclusion, the solution that Socrates offers to Meno’s paradox is dialectical, not 
logical.  
All these scholars’ analysis show that “ἐπιστήµη” refers only to non-empirical 
knowledge in the Meno. Moreover, both of Vlastos and Moravcsik gain this 
conclusion from the theory of recollection and reincarnation, which offers a profound 
and coherent understanding of the texts in the dialogue. I also agree with their doubt 
about the possibility of empirical knowledge. Especially Vlastos’ agument that some 
disciplines, such as biology, history and anatomy, cannot gain the relevant 
knowledge through deduction is persuasive. The only thing that Vlastos and 
Moravcsik ignore is that recollection as memory actually means “experience”, i.e. if 
someone recollects something, this has shown he must recollect some experience 
from the past, since if there is nothing in your soul, it is impossible to recollect 
something.  
Nehamas’ doubt about whether teachers of virtue exist is what actually happens 
in the texts of Meno. Socrates seriously discusses why there is no one who could be 
the teacher of virtue in the Meno (91a-96c). In such a long text, Socrates successively 
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 Nehamas could gain this conclusion, because he treats “ἐπιστήµη” as “understanding”, as explained above 
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denies that sophists and gentlemen in the city could be teachers of virtue. Socrates 
employs this denial to shake the root of the proposition “virtue is teachable”, because, 
as he says, if there is no teacher nor student of virtue, it is impossible that virtue 
could be taught. Nevertheless, does Socrates really think that there is no teacher of 
virtue? If he insists that virtue is knowledge and knowledge is recollection, then we 
could reasonably say that the soul itself is the teacher of virtue. Everyone’s soul is his 
or her own teacher, because what you need to gain virtue is already in your soul.  
Vlastos and Moravcsik correctly realize that the theory of recollection is highly 
important to Meno’s paradox, but they miss some aspects of this theory. Nehamas 
does not see the importance of recollection, since he thinks that we could know 
something through “ask-answer” discussion. This is obviously a misunderstanding of 
what Socrates says in the Meno. At 98a, Socrates uses a metaphor for the relationship 
between true opinion and knowledge: “For true opinions, as long as they remain, are 
a fine thing and all they do is good, but they are not willing to remain long, and they 
escape from a man’s mind, so that they are not worth much until one ties them down 
by (giving) an account of the reason why.” In this metaphor, Socrates does not treat 
knowledge and true opinion as a process of recognition, understanding or reasoning, 
but as a kind of entity, as can be seen in the phrases “willing to”, “remain”, “escape” 
and “tie them down”. Since Socrates does not treat “ἐπιστήµη” here as a kind of 
process. Nehamas’ conclusion, that the solution that Socrates’ solution to Meno’s 
paradox is dialectical, not logical, is not right. Although Nehamas analyses the texts 
in a fragmentary way, he reminds us of a key question of how to understand both the 
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position of recollection in the dialogue and the meaning of dialectic. On the latter, he 
offers an etymological explanation. Since dialectic derives from the Greek word 
“διαλέγω” which is constructed by two parts, i.e. “δια” and “λεγω”, with “δια” 
meaning “divide” and “λεγω” meaning “say, speak”, therefore, “διαλέγεσθαι” could 
be translated as “dialectic” or “dialogue”. Nehamas’ understanding is based on such a 
background and is relevant to Socrates’ arguments about true opinion and knowledge. 
For even if Socrates, Meno, Anytus and the slave have a discussion about virtue, true 
opinion or knowledge, they still do not reach true knowledge, but remain at the level 
of opinion only. 
 
1.3 Example of “Larisa”: Knowledge and True Opinion 
After Socrates refuses the principle “Virtue is Knowledge” (Meno 96c), because 
there is no teacher or student of virtue, he turns his attention to “true opinion”. Both 
Socrates and Meno have agreed that “good men are beneficent” (96e). Good men 
could offer “a good guide in our affairs” (96e-97a). 
In order to illustrate this idea and to introduce the concept of “true opinion”, 
Socrates gives an example:  
 
Socrates: …A man who knew the way to Larisa, or anywhere else you like, and 
went there and guided others would surely lead them well and correctly?   
Meno: Certainly. 
Socrates: What if someone had had a correct opinion as to which was the way 
but had not gone there or indeed had knowledge of it, would he not also lead 
correctly?  
Meno: Certainly. (Meno 97a-b) 
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According to this example, the similarity between “knowledge” and “true 
opinion” is that both would lead to a good consequence or bring benefits. 
Leading someone to Larisa is a question of “how-to”. A “how-to” question 
relates to whether someone has an ability to do something. This kind of ability is 
different from “know what” or, to borrow the terminology of Gilbert Ryle, “know 
that”.45 According to the example, if someone has the ability to “lead himself or other 
people to Larisa” and in fact he really did it, then, he has knowledge of the “know-
how” type and so he has specific knowledge on Larisa. If he only successfully led 
himself or someone else to Larisa without any ability of the “know-how” type, or he 
did that simply by chance or “sheer luck”, as R. W. Sharples says, then he only has 
true opinion on Larisa.46 
Even if someone does not have any knowledge on Larisa but at least knows 
some facts, he at least has some other kind of knowledge about Larisa (“know-what”) 
in his mind. Otherwise, even in the case of succeeding by sheer luck, he hardly hits 
the aim. Take a mathematical question as an example. Let us suppose a child faces a 
mathematical question, “3+2=_”. If he wrote down “5” in the place of the “_”, then 
he answered this question correctly, even if he did it by chance. However, he must 
know, at least, what “_” means, otherwise he would not know that “_” is the right 
place to write the answer. Through this example, we can see that the ability of 
“know-how” is based on the “know-that” or “know-what” type of knowledge.  
Based on the framework of Ryle, it seems that Plato also admits the distinction 
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 Ryle divides all mental conduct or intelligence into “know how” and “know that”. Ryle (2000) pp. 28-32. 
46
 Sharples (1991) p. 10. 
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of “know how” and “know that” (or “know what”). 47 Following this distinction, the 
concept of true opinion in the quotation of 97a-b is close to know-how, though it has 
no knowledge at all and more or less relies on luck and chance.  
It is useful to link the example of Larisa to the famous paragraph on the 
distinction of “true opinion and knowledge”. Let us start our analysis with the text: 
 
For true opinions, as long as they remain, are a fine thing and all they do is good, 
but they are not willing to remain long, and they escape from a man’s mind, so that 
they are not worth much until one ties them down by (giving) an account of the 
reason why. And that, Meno, my friend, is recollection, as we previously agreed. 
After they are tied down, in the first place they become knowledge, and then they 
remain in place. That is why knowledge is prized higher than correct opinion, and 
knowledge differs from correct opinion in being tied down. (Meno, 98a-b) 
 
This paragraph tells that the only thing that knowledge has which true opinion 
does not have is “an account of the reason why” (98a). It offers a formula: 
knowledge = true opinion + an explanation of reason why. 
Disregarding whether this formula is correct or not, let us consider the 
relationship between this formula and the “Larisa” example above. The “Larisa” 
example mainly refers to the similarity between knowledge and true opinion, while 
this formula emphasizes the difference between them. In order to become knowledge, 
true opinion must add an explanation of the reason why.  
Nevertheless, there is a problem: the example of Larisa actually does not only 
                                                 
47
 Diskin Clay emphasizes “the Socratic equation of virtue and knowledge”. He says, “All genuine craftsmen 
possess ‘virtue’ (ἀρετή aretẽ) because of their know-how (ἐπιστήµη, epistẽmẽ). In Plato, this is not to be 
identified with intelligence, which represents a higher order of knowledge. when Socrates speaks of epistẽmẽ, we 
should say skill, but a Greek would say ‘virtue’”. He also points out the equation of knowledge and know-how. 
(“…Greek epistẽmẽ is not exactly ‘knowledge’, for it does not at first denote abstract or scientific knowledge; it 
means ‘know-how’”). See Clay (2000) pp. 191-193.  
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refer to the similarity between knowledge and true opinion, it says more. At 97a-b 
Socrates says that if someone led the right way, “but had not gone there or indeed 
had knowledge of it”, then, he has a true opinion, since he maybe led the way by luck. 
Socrates thus seems to be suggesting that the difference between the man who has 
knowledge about Larisa and the man who only has true opinion about it depends on 
whether he had been to Larisa before. R. W. Sharples is correct in his assesssment,  
 
“the contrast between opinion and knowledge in terms of working out the 
explanation (below 98a) does not apply well to the present example (having travelled 
the road oneself hardly means that one now knows, whereas one did not before, why 
it is the right road.)”48  
 
The problem is how Socrates could ensure that someone who went to Larisa will 
know the right road the next time. The road to somewhere is changing, one who went 
to a place cannot make sure the experience of the past will work the next time. 
Moreover, someone who wants to go to a place may have many choices, since there 
may be many ways to the same place. Why does Socrates in this example only use a 
single word “the road” (97a)? Maybe Socrates wishes to emphasize the concept 
“doing right” that we only need one right way to go to Larisa.  
We, however, are still curious to know how the formula “knowledge = true 
opinion + an account/explanation of the reason why” is compatible to the implication 
of “went to Larisa” entails the knowledge of “how to go to Larisa”. For convenience, 
we can borrow Bertrand Russell’s terms “acquaintance” and “description” to 
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 Sharples (1991) p. 183. 
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illustrate the problem.49 Russell explains: “acquaintance” as follows: “We shall say 
that we have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware, without the 
intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truth”. On his use of 
the term “description”, he explains: “by a ‘description’ I mean any phrase of the form 
‘a so-and-so’ or ‘the so-and-so’”. The experience of “went to Larisa” in the Socratic 
example is in accordance with Russell’s term “acquaintance”. But “know how to go 
to Larisa” is not similar to Russell’s term “description”. Russell’s “description” 
remains only theoretical, while Plato’s knowledge (both the knowledge of “how-to” 
and the knowledge of “know what/that”) is not only theoretical, but also practical. 
The problem can be switched into another question: how could the “acquaintance” 
with Larisa become the “description” of “how to go to Larisa”? How could a 
personal experience be generalized? According to the Socratic formula “knowledge 
is true opinion plus an account/explanation of the reason why”, the only difference 
between knowledge and true opinion is the “an account/explanation of the reason 
why”. Therefore, the way to generalize personal experience is to add “an 
account/explanation of the reason why””. Is it possible for someone who has been to 
Larisa to give a reasonable account of why the road he took is really a right way, 
even if he only went there once? It seems difficult, for someone may make a mistake 
and give a wrong guide to Larisa, especially if the road to Larisa is extremely 
complex.  
Having considered the reasons above, we conclude that the example of Larisa 
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 See Russell (2001) pp. 25-32. Cf. Matthews (1972) pp. 20-23.  
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says nothing about the real difference between knowledge and true opinion in the 
Meno. Then what is the real difference between them? In the quotation of 98a-b and 
the formula for knowledge just mentioned, besides “know-how” and “know-what”, 
there is the third kind of knowledge, namely, “know-why”. Take a chess game as an 
example. A master of the chess game may face a question: “why do you move this 
way?” He may answer, “Because of some reasons, I move this way”. That means he 
generalizes his own thought, for another person could make the same move in any 
chess game, if they face the same situation. 
This gives us a light on the question of Larisa: how can someone who went to 
Larisa once be sure that the experience of the past can be applied to the present? It is 
because his experience can be generalized if the situation is still the same as the past. 
That is to say, if everything is now as it was in the past, e.g. the road still exists as it 
did in the past, if the destination is still Larisa, and if the environment (the weather 
etc.) is still the same as in the past, then my experience could be applied to everyone 
who now wishes to go to Larisa. The result of this process is actually what Socrates 
himself thinks:  
 
At the moment <the slave’s> beliefs are newly aroused, as though in a dream. 
But if someone asks him these same questions over again on many occasions and in 
many ways, you know that in the end he will have knowledge as accurate as 
anyone’s about them. (Meno, 85c-d)50 
 
If the analysis above is correct, then Plato in the Meno does not think that the 
                                                 
50
 Translation comes from Terence Irwin. See Irwin (1989) p. 88. 
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principle of Heraclitus, “People can’t step twice into the same river”, is possible in 
the sense world. For if the experience can be applied twice, then it must be in exactly 
the same situation, but that apparently contradicts Heraclitus’ principle.  
The Larisa example can be used to consider the question: “Could someone who 
only has true opinion be a teacher?” In the Meno, both Socrates and Meno assume 
that virtue is knowledge (Meno 87c), but Socrates immediately proves in the 
following texts that there is no teacher of virtue and therefore, no student of virtue. 
The result is that Socrates refuses to admit that knowledge is virtue. Moreover, if 
virtue is not knowledge, and only knowledge is teachable, then virtue is not teachable. 
We are not concerned here with whether virtue is teachable or not, or whether there 
are teachers of virtue, 51 The question here is what is the standard of a teacher for 
Plato/Socrates? Is it necessary for a teacher to have relevant knowledge?  
Return to the example of Larisa. Someone who has knowledge of how to go to 
Larisa is definitely a teacher in this matter, for he has the specific knowledge on it. 
Nevertheless, can someone who only has true opinion or even lacks knowledge also 
be a teacher in this matter? This question is equivalent to the question “Could 
someone who lacks knowledge or only has opinion arouse the knowledge which is in 
another’s mind or soul?” There seems a paradox here. If Plato denies that someone 
who has only true opinion or lacks knowledge can arouse knowledge in another, then 
it would contradict the proof of the theory of recollection. For Socrates successfully 
makes Meno’s slave recollect geometrical knowledge. Further, if we consider the 
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 I have discussed the teacher of virtue problem in section 1.3. The question here is a relevant but other topic.  
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midwifery in the Theaetetus, it also contradicts the task of Socrates as a midwife who 
himself knows nothing but helps other people to produce knowledge. If Plato admits 
that someone who has true opinion or lacks knowledge can arouse knowledge in 
another, then argument that “there is no teacher of virtue” is wrong. 
Here we need to consider Nehamas’ article again. Nehamas does not directly 
deal with how to understand the “ἐπιστήµη” problem, but he treats the idea that 
“ἐπιστήµη” is reasoning or understanding as his background. He actually understands 
“ἐπιστήµη” as a kind of ability (δύναµις). This contradicts the texts in the dialogue. 
For at 98a, Socrates defines “ἐπιστήµη” as “true opinion” plus “an explanation of the 
reason why”, rather than as “understanding” or “reasoning”. Here, the other defect of 
Nehamas’ explanation appears, since this kind of explanation makes the boundary 
between true opinion and knowledge blurred. We could ask, under such an 
explanation of “ἐπιστήµη”, how could we distinguish knowledge from true opinion? 
Socrates only points out that knowledge is more stable than true opinion and needs 
an account/explanation. If we understand “ἐπιστήµη” as “understanding” or 
“reasoning”, we would not know any distinction between them in the Meno. Then 
how could we understand true opinion and knowledge correctly in the dialogue to try 
to answer these difficulties? We should consider the theory of recollection, the 
immortality of the soul, knowledge and true opinion together.  
Vlastos thinks that there is no empirical knowledge in the theory of recollection, 
no matter whether in the sense of “the minimal sense of the theory of recollection” or 
the “full strength of the theory of recollection”. That means all knowledge is non-
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empirical. Moravcsik points out that deduction cannot be the only way for helping to 
gain the truth through recollection, as Vlastos believes. When someone recollects 
something from his memory, the thing should be an experience of the past. If we 
employ the terminology of the theory of recollection, say, when the soul recollects 
something that it has learnt before birth, then what it has learnt is actually an 
experience of the past. Therefore, deduction in one sense is independent of the 
experience or facts, but in another sense, it is just an experience.  
Following my argument, we could avoid the difficulties in Nehamas’ article and 
could absorb his idea. He thinks that someone who is ignorant could not answer 
questions and if someone could answer questions, he in fact reaches knowledge. 
Socrates uses dialectical not logical method to solve Meno’s paradox. Nehamas is 
partly right. When the soul combines with the body, what it has learnt, namely, 
knowledge, becomes “prior” or “innate” knowledge from “experience” or “intuitive” 
knowledge. The change is caused by different conditions for the knowledge in the 
soul. The first difference is that knowledge will be disturbed by the body after the 
soul combined with the body. The second difference is that the object of knowledge 
is no longer the Forms, but rather the sensible things. The last difference is that the 
soul will no longer gain knowledge through the soul “has drawn near and consorted 
with” (πλησιάσας καὶ µιγεὶς) the Forms (Republic 490b), but will recollect 
knowledge through the stimulation of sensible things.52 Then, knowledge is already 
in the soul, but it is just forgotten. The example of the slave finally getting the answer 
                                                 
52
 Cf. Phaedo 79d, Laws 904d and Timaeus 90c2. 
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to a geometrical question, which Nehamas also uses, may make this point clearer. 
When the slave recollects the geometrical knowledge through Socrates’ questions 
and the picture of a square (82b), the questions and the picture are the sensible things 
which stimulate the slave and help him recollect what he has learnt from the Forms 
and what is already in his soul. In this process, the prior knowledge has been reached 
by both Socrates and the slave, in contrast to Vlastos’ idea that they gain the 
knowledge after many deductions. That is why Socrates asks his interlocutors to get 
rid of the influence of the body and to purify their soul as much as possible, 
especially in the Phaedo.53  
Central to the epistemology of Meno is Socrates’ explanation at 98a of why 
knowledge is more worthy than true opinion.54 Here, Socrates says of true opinions: 
“they are not worth much until one ties them (true opinions) down by (giving) an 
account of the reason why”. The idea is that “tying down” a true opinion in this way 
would convert it into being knowledge. Since the text is not so clear, we could 
borrow E. Gettier’s reconstruction about what is knowledge in the Meno.55 He re-
defines knowledge at 98a as following:  
 
S knows that P   IFF                       
（ⅰ）P is true,                           
（ⅱ）S believes that P,                 
（ⅲ）S is justified in believing that P.56           
                                                 
53
 I have no room to discuss “purification”, though this is an important topic in Plato’s philosophy. Socrates 
makes clear at 69c in the Phaedo, “wisdom itself is a kind of cleansing or purification.” This tries to show that 
“the soul still exists after a man has died and that it still possesses some capability and intelligence” (70b). Rohde 
gives a good discussion about the meaning and functions of the soul in ancient Greek thought. See Rohde (1966) 
p. 471. 
54
 Theaetetus has a similar text, see 201e.  
55
 See Gettier (1963) p. 121. 
56
 Edmund Gettier uses two counter-examples to prove that Socrates’ definition about knowledge is wrong. The 
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This structure is actually a simple formula “ἐπιστήµη (knowledge) = ὀρθὴ δόξα (true 
opinion) +αἰτίας λογισµός (an explanation of reason why)”57. In view of the theory 
of recollection, since an account seems to be the thing that is already in the soul, then 
what about true opinion? Socrates just mentions that true opinion is “in the soul” 
(85c). It is probable that true opinion which is in the soul comes from sensible 
objects and is the stimulation necessary for recollecting the relevant account or 
reason.58 In order to make this argument clearer, we should consider two further 
points.  
Firstly, true opinion, compared with knowledge, only lacks “an account of the 
reason why” (98a), i.e. it lacks stability. If we consider that the objects which are the 
sensible things in the sensible world are always in flux,59 while the objects in the 
world of Forms are “εἲδη” (Forms)60 which are changeless,61 then we can easily 
understand why true opinion lacks stability, since the objects in the sensible world 
                                                                                                                                          
problem on the definition of knowledge is called “Gettier Problem”. In his article, he also cites Chisholm’s and 
Ayer’s reconstruction of the definition of knowledge at 98a, both of which have the same structure. Cf. Gettier 
(1963) pp. 121-123. 
57
 Here, I do not consider the relevant discussion at Theaetetus which will be analyzed carefully in the later 
Chapter Four. Socrates himself repeats Meno’s paradox, though he employs different argument, at Theaetetus 
188b and has a discussion of it. The key point is that Socrates thinks, “It is in cases where we both know things 
and are perceiving them that judgement is erratic and varies between truth and falsity” (194b). Theaetetus defines 
that “τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήµην εἶναι/ knowledge is true judgement/opinion (200e)” which Socrates refuses to 
accept. Then Theaetetus uses Socrates' own definition about knowledge in the Meno, i.e. true judgement with an 
account is knowledge (201d). Strangely, Socrates rebuts this idea in the dialogue. See Theaetetus, 158d, 167b, 
170b, 188b, 194a-b, 198c, 200e-201b. 
58
 Gulley would disagree with my argument. He argues that true opinion which is the same as knowledge in the 
Meno is also prior. The difference between true opinion and knowledge is that true opinion is a single and isolated 
truth and cannot be recognized as a whole system. Accordingly, knowledge is a system and all the elements inside 
this system could be explained. Based on this understanding, he thinks that true opinion is akin to “δίανοια” 
(understanding) in the Republic and its object is the mathematical object. See, Gulley (1986) pp. 15-16. 
59
 There is no knowledge in the sensible world, since sensible things are always in flux. This is generally accepted 
by Platonists. Of course, this is still in controversy. Irwin reminds us to consider the exact meaning of “flux” in 
Plato’s philosophy. He distinguishes “self-change” and “aspect-change” in Plato’s ideas and offers us some new 
ideas. Irwin (1977) pp.1-13. Cf. Colvin (2007) pp. 759-765. 
60
 Form is not an innate idea, rather than a real entity. McCabe admits this idea through her analysis on the texts 
in the Phaedo and Republic. See, McCabe (1999) pp. 75-83. 
61
 The word “world” is actually “region” in Greek and it does not imply any ontological assertion, but should 
always be in the sense in epistemology, as Vlastos correctly points out. See Vlastos (1973) pp. 58-75. 
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are always unstable. If the objects are unstable, recollection would be in flux or 
changeable as well. Under such a situation, the person who is recollecting is 
perceiving the objects in the sensible world and gains true opinion according to what 
he is perceiving by his ability of reasoning. This process of reasoning always 
accompanies the process of recollection. There are two processes which correspond 
to two abilities in the soul: the process of reasoning corresponding to the ability of 
reasoning and the process of recollecting corresponding to the ability of recollecting. 
A whole process of recognition could be made clear as follows: someone perceives a 
sensible object in the sensible world and stimulated by the sensible object he 
produces a piece of true opinion by his ability of reasoning. After the stimulation and 
the appearance of the true opinion, he recollects something which is an account of 
the reason why for the relevant true opinion. The very thing that he recollects comes 
from what he has learnt before his birth through the ability of intuition or perception. 
When the two things, i.e. the true opinion and the account of the reason why, appear 
in the soul, they combine with each other and produce knowledge in the soul.  
Secondly, when the combination of the account of the reason why and the true 
opinion about something is complete, i.e. the recollection is in its “full strength”, if 
we borrow Vlastos’ terminology, we could say that the soul is in its purest reasoning 
state and grasps the relevant knowledge. However, this is just a moment and could 
not last too long, simply because the objects in the sensible world are changeable. 
Even if the knowledge that the soul itself grasps is stable, the soul could not hold the 
knowledge stably. Moreover, the soul stimulated by the sensible objects always 
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passively gains knowledge, in contrast with the situation where the soul always 
positively and actively gains knowledge in the world of the Forms. The soul in the 
sensible world needs true opinion as the necessary stimulator to help it recollect 
knowledge, though the state of the soul grasping knowledge lasts only a moment. 
That is why Plato does not think that a sensible object could supply any knowledge 
(Meno 86a). Further, this idea of the passive soul in the world of flux that could lead 
to the view that the sensible object could only supply the stimulation and that there is 
no real knowledge in the sensible world. Aristotle’s point in Metaphysics supports 
this conclusion:  
 
…For, having in his [Plato’s] youth first become familiar with Cratylus and with 
the Heraclitean doctrines (that all sensible things are ever in a state of flux and there 
is no knowledge about them), these views he held even in later years. (Metaphysics, 
987a32-b1)62.  
 
Socrates’ idea about knowledge and true opinion has two problems. The first 
problem is that Socrates excludes the function of perception in the process of gaining 
knowledge. Socrates would deny the possibility of knowledge in the sensible world, 
since the objects in the sensible world and the perceptions that are produced by the 
objects are not stable and need an account that the soul has learnt before the process 
of the recognition. The only function that Socrates has left to perception is the 
stimulation that could provide the true opinion. In the Meno, perception is not a 
necessary component of knowledge. But what the perception produces, i.e. true 
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opinion, is a necessary part of knowledge. We could call perception an “unnecessary 
requisite” here.  
The second problem is that Socrates could not explain how the soul gains 
knowledge before birth and how perception provides the stimulation that could make 
possible the match between true opinion and the relevant account. The only clue that 
we have in the Meno about how the soul gains knowledge is that Socrates points out,  
 
“As the soul is immortal, has been born often, and has seen all things here and 
in the underworld, there is nothing which it has not learnt…” (Meno 81c). 
 
The word “seen” is the key point, because it suggests that, in Socrates’ mind, the soul 
gains true opinion (and then knowledge) through seeing things, rather than using its 
ability of reasoning.63 Moreover, Socrates admits that the soul sees things in the 
underworld which following Phaedo’s redefinition of Hades may imply that the soul 
“sees” Forms there.64  Nevertheless, it does not explain how what is seen could 
become abstract knowledge and how the soul could grasp true opinion without 
understanding. By saying that the soul “sees” things, Socrates treats the soul as a 
person, or inner person when the soul combines with the body. This will definitely 
produce an infinite regress, namely, the soul needs another soul or whatever faculty 
could undertake the same function of the soul.  
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 Diskin Clay offers a description about the relationship between seeing and knowledge in Plato’s philosophy: 
“‘to have seen,’ therefore, ‘to know’”. See Clay (2000) pp. 214-215. 
64
 Kahn points out that in order to “offer a solution to Meno’s paradox, such prenatal seeing of all things must be 
radically different from the ordinary learning that is to be accounted for by recollection…So the Meno 
presupposes something like direct knowledge by acquaintance”. Kahn (2009) p. 122. 
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1.4 Knowledge Is More Valuable Than True Opinion 
In this section, I shall explain why knowledge is more valuable than true 
opinion. In the Meno, ethics and epistemology are mixed in some degree in the 
dialogue. Although the solution of the ethical questions is dependent on the solution 
of epistemological questions, this mix suggests that the discussion of ethical 
questions will help the investigation of the value problem between knowledge and 
true opinion. In the following paragraphs, two questions will be discussed. Firstly, 
why is knowledge always better than true opinion, which is a key component of the 
knowledge? Secondly, why and how can ethical discussions in the Meno help us to 
understand the relation between knowledge and true opinion?  
At 97e-98a, Socrates gives us a clear idea about the relationship between 
knowledge and true opinion: 
 
For true opinions, as long as they remain, are a fine thing and all they do is good, 
but they are not willing to remain long, and they escape from a man’s soul, so that 
they are not worth much until one ties them down by (giving) an account of the 
reason why… After they are tied down, in the first place they become knowledge, 
and then they remain in place. That is why knowledge is prized higher than correct 
opinion, and knowledge differs from correct opinion in being tied down. (Meno 97e-
98a) 
 
There are many approaches to understand the meaning of this quotation. What I 
am concerned with is why Socrates says that “knowledge is prized higher than 
correct opinion”, i.e. why is knowledge always more valuable than true opinion? 
From the quotation, it seems that the answer is clear: because true opinion is not 
stable, though true opinion and the knowledge have the same effect on behavior --- 
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both of them make behaviors correct (or good) (Meno 97c). If we consider the text 
more deeply, however, then we will find that the meaning of what Socrates says is 
not clear.  
What has been said in 98a is at most a relation between knowledge and true 
opinion. Knowledge is defined as true opinion with an account of the reason why 
(αἰτίας λογισµός). However, the question “What is knowledge?” is not discussed 
systematically and Socrates does not offer any definition of knowledge -- he just 
treats the concept as unquestionable and clear enough to him and his interlocutor. A 
problem arises here: why does Socrates say that knowledge is always better than true 
opinion, even if both he and Meno have no idea what knowledge is? 
There is one possible answer to these two questions. Socrates, although he does 
not offer a clear definition of knowledge, actually does give some explanations of 
what knowledge is. Socrates points out that knowledge = true opinion + an account 
of reason why. This seems to be an explanation of knowledge. This formula has been 
analyzed by one contemporary epistemology scholar as follows: (1) there is a true 
opinion; (2) there is a fact about the true opinion; (3) the true opinion is justified.65 If 
these three conditions are fulfilled, then we can say a piece of opinion is knowledge. 
This is not helpful, for these three conditions are about the properties of knowledge, 
not knowledge itself.66 The formula at most is that knowledge has three essential 
conditions or components. What knowledge itself is, which is not investigated in the 
Meno, is still unsolved. The reason why knowledge is always better than true opinion 
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 These three components are attributed to Gettier. See Gettier (1963) pp. 121-123. 
66
 The question “What is knowledge?” is still a basic question in epistemology. Williamson argues that knowledge 
cannot be defined or analyzed and could not be replaced by another notion. See Williamson (2000) pp. 2-5. 
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is still unsolvable as well.  
Although the question “What is knowledge?” is not discussed, it is actually a 
question in the Meno and it is investigated in Theaetetus. So, if the question “What 
are true opinion and an account?” does not give rise to an unlimited regress, Meno’s 
failure to answer this question shows that the solution of the value problem of 
knowledge and true opinion still relies on a clear definition of knowledge and true 
opinion. 
That only leaves the last possibility. In the Meno, Socrates gives a new method 
to approach the question of “what is virtue?”, i.e. the method of “Hypothesis” 
(86e).67 The method assumes that even if we do not know what virtue is or what 
properties virtue has, we still can inquire into the question of “could virtue be taught?” 
by assuming that virtue is knowledge. The same method could apply to the notion of 
knowledge, i.e., assume that knowledge always has the property or character 
“teachable”, whether knowledge is just a recollection or can be gained through 
teaching. If Meno tries to understand whether virtue is teachable, then he needs to 
consider whether virtue is a kind of knowledge. Through this means, Socrates links 
virtue, knowledge and true opinion together. Socrates gives an explanation about 
these two notions through the discussion of virtue.68 The very notion “virtue” here 
does not refer to any definition of virtue, but to a core feature of virtue, namely, 
helping people to act well. Indeed, Socrates also illustrates that both knowledge and 
true opinion will help an agent to gain the rightness of action (97b). By taking a 
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 According to C. C. W. Taylor’s elucidation, “hypothesis” in Plato’s philosophy has various meanings. See 
Taylor (1967) pp. 193-203.  
68
 Meyer (2008) pp. 14-17. 
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practical perspective, Socrates establishes a comparison between knowledge and true 
opinion and answers the question “Why is knowledge more valuable than true 
opinion?” The answer can be considered into two aspects. 
Firstly, the absolute value of knowledge is better than true opinion, because, as 
Socrates says, knowledge is more stable than true opinion. Moreover, for Socrates 
the one who holds true opinion about something either does not have any experience 
of it or he lacks of knowledge of it (97b). Nevertheless, this does not mean that 
knowledge would always make behavior right, while true opinion sometimes would 
lead the agent to do the right thing but sometimes would fail to do that, as Meno 
thinks (97c). Socrates does not accept this point, simply because if the opinion about 
something is true, then it is impossible that an agent would do something wrong. For 
Socrates, knowledge is better than true opinion, because it is more stable. Knowledge 
is more stable than true opinion, because knowledge attaches an account or a reason 
why. The account or reason removes the factor of luck or guessing. Take “telling a lie” 
for an example. A doctor who holds knowledge on the principle of “do not tell lies” 
would know that he or she is never permitted to tell a lie to his patients, since he 
knows why he cannot tell a lie.69 Another doctor who holds only a true opinion about 
the principle would think why by guessing, intuition or pure luck that it is wrong to 
tell a lie. Now, let us grant that he or she faces a patient who has cancer. Should he or 
she tell the patient that there is a cancer in his body? This is a choice: telling the 
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 A reason for “do not tell a lie” comes from Kant. He asks an agent to do something that could make his 
behavior to be generalized --- “so act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a UNIVERSAL 
LAW OF NATURE”; therefore, if telling a lie is possible, it will necessarily lead to self-contradiction. Assume 
that people are all liars, then telling a lie as a phenomenon is destroyed. On this sense, telling a lie will finally 
lead to self-contradiction. Kant (2011) p. 71. 
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patient the truth would possibly stimulate the patient’s nerves and would lead to 
some disadvantages for his remedy; or telling a lie to the patient would contradict the 
principle of “telling a lie is a wrong-doing”. How could the doctor make such a 
decision? Both of these two doctors would tell the truth for different motivations: one 
is for a reason; the other is based only on intuition without any idea of why he or she 
should do this. Obviously, in Socrates’ mind, both doctors are doing right, but they 
are different. The former doctor is better than the latter one and the first doctor 
deserves more praise for his behavior.70 In this sense, knowledge is more valuable 
than true opinion. 
Secondly, knowledge is always better than true opinion, since there is “practical 
value” in knowledge. By practical value, knowledge not merely attains to the truth, 
but also helps an agent to gain something significant from the action. Significant here, 
refers to the value that is gained successfully in the action. This does not mean that a 
man who just holds true opinion will not gain anything significant in his action, but 
rather that what he gains is significant just in a negative way, namely, avoiding 
failure. Consider an example to illustrate this point. Someone has a gun and wishes 
to shoot an object. If he merely wants to shoot the object without any consciousness 
of what is meaningful or of the reason why he should shoot the object, then I define 
him as a man who has some true opinion about shooting, i.e. he knows how to shoot 
and does not fail to do that. Correspondingly, a man who is good at shooting with 
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 Of course, in a concrete circumstance, as we could argue, most doctors may not choose to tell the truth to the 
patient directly, but to the relatives of the patient. This is really a difficult and complex question, fortunately, 
however, it does not affect both my argument and Socrates’ arguments.  
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knowledge of how to shoot, maybe knows clearly why he should shoot the object.71 
If the analysis above is correct, then Ryle’s insistence that there are two kinds of 
knowing in Plato’s dialogues, i.e. “knowing what” and “Knowing how”, is not 
sufficient for this analysis.72  
Let us put absolute value and practical value together to see what the exact 
meaning of Socrates’ saying is at 97e-98a. There are two kinds of value in the 
relationship between knowledge, true opinion and virtue. Since knowledge always 
guides an agent to act virtuously for a reason, while true opinion does so only by 
intuition, guessing or luck, knowledge leads significance to the virtuous actions. 
Although both true opinion and knowledge could reach the truth, they differ from 
each other in relation to considering these values. Then, we can see the clear 
relationship between knowledge and true opinion, although we still do not know 
what is knowledge and what is true opinion. Moreover, the relevance of virtue for 
epistemology in the Meno can be seen: the relationship and difference between 
knowledge and true opinion are made clear through their relationship with virtue.  
 
Conclusion 
There are two problems in the version of epistemology given in the Meno. 
Firstly, if the theory of recollection is correct, then it will raise an infinite regress. 
Further, even the immortality of the soul does not solve the Meno’s paradox, namely, 
how is it possible to learn under the situation of complete ignorance? Secondly, the 
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 Sosa gives us a wonderful analysis of this example. See, Sosa (2010) pp. 35-66. 
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 See Ryle (2000) pp. 28-32. 
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reason that Socrates refuses to investigate the question “could the virtue be taught?” 
is that we need to know “what is virtue?” but this is not a good reason. Take water as 
an example, we could define “water” as “a transparent, odorless, tasteless liquid”, 
where “transparent”, “odorless”, “tasteless” and “liquid” are all the properties or 
attributions of the water. Actually, when we try to know or define something, we 
should know first the properties of the thing in question.  
Many issues that are discussed in the Meno notably the theory of recollection 
will be discussed again in the Phaedo and Theaetetus. Theaetetus also reconsiders 
the function of perception in the process of gaining knowledge. The nature of true 
opinion is a middle term between perception and knowledge in the Meno. Theaetetus 
will also divide the process of recognition into two parts and will employ three 
components to illustrate the whole process. Compared to the Theaetetus, Phaedo has 
a closer relationship with Meno. In the Phaedo, Socrates completely repeats the 
theory of recollection and introduces the theory of Forms. Phaedo is the same as 
Meno in two ways: it does not talk about the question “What is knowledge?” and 
uses knowledge in the strictest sense. Overall, Phaedo raises the same problems as 
the Meno. 
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Chapter Two: Phaedo on Knowledge and How to Gain it 
Introduction 
In the Meno, Plato offers us an outline of his epistemology, though it has 
difficulties. However, Plato is not inclined to improve this outline in the Phaedo; 
rather he tries to modify the theory of recollection and supplement the theory of 
Forms to make the outline clearer. Although the difficulties that appeared in the 
outline of epistemology in the Meno still exist, Plato still uses the basic principles of 
this outline to construct his epistemology in the Phaedo.  
To summarize what Plato’s outline of epistemology is in the Phaedo, we could 
give three stages of knowledge as follows. (1) When a soul is in a pure state, it gains 
knowledge by consorting with the Forms. (2) When a soul combines with a body, the 
soul forgets all knowledge at that time, though the soul could still regain the 
knowledge through the stimulation of sensible objects. Although the soul could 
regain knowledge, the soul is inevitably disturbed by the body, so that it is really hard 
to regain knowledge. (3) After death, the soul could fully get rid of the influence of 
the body, if a person endeavors to “practice death” in his lifetime. Separating fully 
from the body means the soul regains knowledge.  
In these three stages of the blueprint, the problems of the outline of Plato’s 
epistemology still remain, though the difficulties are solved to an extent. Firstly, the 
knowledge is still in a narrow sphere, for Plato still insists that knowledge could only 
be gained in the world of Forms. Socrates offers us a new version of the theory of 
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recollection in the Phaedo. The change in the new recollection theory means that the 
difficulty of “cognitive blank” would not happen, for the accumulation of experience 
becomes a function of the theory of recollection. In the new version, recollection no 
longer helps the agent to regain knowledge directly, rather the agent considers 
sensible objects first, and next, after the accumulation consideration of the sensible 
objects, the agent would finally be led to the Forms.73 
This new advance is not able to cover all the problems of Plato’s 
epistemological blueprint. Knowledge that derives from the Forms is still used in a 
narrow sense. The new version of recollection theory brings even more questions, 
while the old problems in it are still there. The imbalance between soul and body 
makes the bodily organs still have no positive contribution in a process of 
recognition in the Phaedo.  
Indeed, the soul becomes crucial to the blueprint of Plato’s epistemology in the 
Phaedo for three reasons. Firstly, Form is the object of knowledge. Only the soul 
itself could reach the region of the Forms and gain the knowledge there. Secondly, 
the soul could be inside or with the body and outside or apart from the body, namely, 
it could be in contact with both the region of the Forms and the region of the sensible 
world. That is to say, the soul consorts with both the object of knowledge (the Forms) 
and the reminders of knowledge (the sensible things which participate in the Forms). 
Thirdly, in the sensible world, knowledge dwells in the soul.74 The arguments in the 
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 Lee Franklin calls an “approach to recollection in the Phaedo the ordinary interpretation”. This kind of 
recollection refers to “an ordinary kind of learning, typically related to the capacity for everyday speech and 
though”. In contrast, “the sophisticated interpretation of recollection in the Phaedo”, as he calls, is “the view that 
recollection in the Phaedo is a kind of philosophical learning”. Franklin (2005) pp. 290-291. 
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 I will stop here and will not try to find out what exact meaning of “in the soul”, though this phrase is not clear.  
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Phaedo are complicated. On the one hand, on the literal level, the arguments about 
knowledge, such as the discussion on death, the theory of recollection and the theory 
of Forms, are used as the proof of the immortality of the soul. On the other hand, 
some properties of the soul (the soul can move, for example) are assumed to support 
the arguments about knowledge. 
In this chapter, my discussion and criticisms will follow the three stages of the 
blueprint in the Phaedo. Firstly, I will talk about the theory of Forms and the Forms 
as the causes of knowledge (section 2.1-2.3). Secondly, how the soul under the state 
of combining with the body gains knowledge through recollection will be discussed 
(section 2.4-2.6). Thirdly, I will consider the imbalance between soul and body and 
how this influences epistemology in the Phaedo. After death, when a soul recovers 
its state of pure reason and how the soul gains knowledge will be emphasized 
(section 2.7-2.8).  
 
2.1 Forms as the objects of knowledge 
Socrates first mentions Forms in the Phaedo at 65d, where he asks Simmias 
whether there are Justice itself, the Beauty and the Good. Simmias answers: “We do 
say so, by Zeus”. He confirms that the Forms cannot be seen by eyes or perceived by 
any other bodily organs. Socrates identifies the Forms as the reality of all things, 
“that which each of them essentially is” (Phaedo 65d). Further, Socrates links 
knowledge and the Forms. He claims that someone who wishes to come closest to 
the knowledge of the thing should grasp the thing itself, i.e. the Form of the thing he 
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wants to investigate (65e).  
In order to approach the Forms, the soul needs to use reason alone and to get rid 
of the affections from the body as far as possible. Socrates emphasizes the separation 
between the soul and the body and highlights the function of the soul in the process 
of approaching the Forms and gaining knowledge. This idea also shows the 
important role of death, for after the soul has combined with the body only death 
could both let the soul free from the body in a great extent and let the soul go into 
another region, namely the region of the Forms. 
How could the soul gain knowledge and approach the Forms? Socrates in the 
Phaedo, as in the Meno, tries to use the recollection theory as a bridge to connect the 
soul and the Forms. After a short discussion on the recollection theory, Socrates 
introduces the Form of Equal through the equal stones, equal sticks and any other 
kind of equal thing. He emphasizes that the equal things, such as the equal stones or 
equal sticks, are inferior to the Form of Equal, because they “appear to one to be 
equal and to another to be unequal” (74b). The Form of Equal itself, however, can 
never be unequal. Further, if it is, someone who recognizes that there is the Equal 
itself will grasp the knowledge of Equal and must have this knowledge before his 
birth, for he cannot grasp anything if there is nothing in his soul. Socrates extends the 
idea on the Equal to any other thing which could be marked with “the seal of ‘what it 
is’” (75d). However, what kinds of qualities do the Forms hold except the quality 
itself? Take the Form of Equal as an example: does the Equal itself, besides the 
quality of equal, have any other qualities? Socrates employs many words to define 
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the Forms at 80a-b, “divine, deathless, intelligible, uniform, indissoluble” and 
“always the same as itself”.  
In sum, Socrates in the Phaedo links knowledge and Forms together for the first 
time and explains why what we recollect is superior to the thing that provoked the 
recollection. 
Socrates continues to illustrate his idea on the theory of the Forms by giving 
Simmias a number of examples to state how to get to the Form from particular items. 
Take the equal as an example. When you have seen many equal items, such a stick 
equal to a stick, stone equal to a stone, then you will find “something else beyond all 
these, the Equal itself” (Phaedo 74a). Moreover, at 100d, Socrates points out: 
“nothing makes it (the beautiful thing) beautiful except that Beautiful itself”, and the 
“Beautiful itself is beautiful”. As D. N. Sedley comments, Beautiful itself makes the 
beautiful thing beautiful, means that Beautiful itself or the Form of beauty is the 
cause of the beautiful thing being beautiful, or the beautiful thing is beautiful because 
of the Form of beauty. And he also gives us an account of what “because of” and the 
“cause” mean here: all these phrases mean “responsible for”.75 I undoubtedly agree 
with Sedley. Nevertheless, why and how does Plato make sure that such Forms can 
produce knowledge in our soul? 
In the texts of 74b and 75c, Socrates gives a list of the Forms, including the 
Equal itself, the Great itself, Small itself, Good itself, Beauty itself, Justice itself, 
Pious itself and “all those things which we mark with the seal of ‘what it is’”. In the 
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later text, he adds some other Forms, such as Large itself (or Largeness) (100e), 
Oneness (101c), Shortness (102b), Tallness (102b), Hotness (103d), Coldness (103d) 
Oddness (104a) and Evenness (104a). These Forms can not all be divided into one 
single category. Take Large and Small, Good and Bad, these two pairs of opposites 
are not the same. We could apply Large and Small to mathematical issues and to the 
affairs of common life to describe a fact, such as “3 is smaller than 4” and “Jim’s 
shoes are larger than Tom’s”. It seems that the Large and Small will always be used 
in a comparative case. Even if sometimes we use them to describe other situations, 
such as “The ball is big”, they are always in a vague sense -- we cannot really know 
how big the ball is until some more information is offered. Good and Bad, however, 
seems a different case from the Large and Small. The Good and Bad are not mainly 
used in a comparative sense and they are not used to describe the truth or facts. 
Rather they are used to evaluate something or express someone’s emotion, e.g. “The 
taste is good”, “It is a good thing to him”, “There is good weather today.” Further, 
Large and Small give us a kind of ability, if we know what they mean. For when I do 
a mathematical exercise, seeing “3_4”, I have the ability to write down “is smaller” 
or “＜”, while the Good and the Bad cannot develop such a kind of ability in our 
mind. 
The discussion above is important, because the Forms in the Phaedo could 
produce knowledge as Socrates says at 74b and 74c. If the formula of knowledge in 
the Meno, i.e. knowledge = true opinion + an explanation of the reason why, is 
correct, then knowledge could be divided into two parts: “know-what” or “know-
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how” and “know-why”. If someone thinks about the Form of Largeness, then he has 
the knowledge of Large (he knows what Large is). Then he has a kind of ability to 
make the things or affairs right when the affairs refer to the lager, as the example 
“2_3” shows. He knows how to tackle affairs referring to “large”. And obviously, he 
also knows why he writes down “＜” in the place of “_”, because he has a reasonable 
account, namely, he is using the Form of Largeness.  
Nevertheless, when we consider Goodness and Badness, the situation will 
become difficult. For Goodness and Badness cannot give a definite kind of ability to 
determine what is good and what is bad. If someone faces the question: “Is it good or 
bad when someone kills another man in a battle?”, what kind of answer should he 
give? Some people would say that it is always evil to kill a man; others would think 
that it is good if our soldiers kill the enemies’ soldiers while it is bad if our soldiers 
are killed. It seems that when referring to moral values or sensations (such as hot and 
cold), the theory of knowledge in the Meno is no longer compatible with the theory 
of the Forms.  
 
2.2 Knowledge in a narrow sense 
The other main problem about the theory of Forms is the limitation of 
knowledge. The Phaedo gives an impression that knowledge is a clear concept to 
both Socrates and his interlocutors, for there is only one place (76b) mentioning 
about the concept of knowledge through the dialogue. All the persons that appear in 
the Phaedo seem to have an agreement about what knowledge is. Is the concept of 
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knowledge really a clear notion in the dialogue?  
In order to answer this question, we have at least two options. The first choice is 
judging that the concept of knowledge is not well defined, so we need reconsider it. 
The second way is that we could assume that the concept of knowledge is a clear 
notion in the Phaedo, because Socrates has given its definition in the Meno, where 
knowledge is defined as the formula “knowledge = true opinion + an explanation of 
the reason why” (Meno, 98a). Since Socrates nearly repeats in the Phaedo two most 
important theories of the Meno (the immortality of the soul and the theory of 
recollection), we have reason to believe that for both Socrates and his companions 
knowledge is still the same concept that appears in the Meno. Moreover, when 
Socrates mentions the theory of recollection, Cebes reminds us that he mentions this 
theory frequently (Phaedo 72e). We have more reason to believe that the definition 
of knowledge in the Meno is also mentioned frequently, so that no one would feel 
uncomfortable to use it again in the Phaedo. Having considered this, we have firstly 
to check whether the Meno’s definition is also used in the Phaedo and second 
whether it is used thoroughly and coherently in the dialogue.  
I will employ a method, namely, quoting some small paragraphs from Phaedo 
on knowledge as examples to check whether they fit the definition of knowledge in 
the Meno.76 
Example one: “Then what about the actual acquiring of knowledge? Is the body 
an obstacle when one associates with it in the search for knowledge?” (Phaedo 65a) 
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In the next sentence, Socrates continues to say that men cannot “find any truth” in 
any bodily abilities, such as seeing, hearing or any other sense. Here, the concept of 
knowledge could be replaced by the phrase “true opinion plus an explanation of the 
reason why”, for in this quotation Socrates treats knowledge as truth. The emphasis 
on the inaccuracy of bodily abilities in this quotation will not affect my argument. 
For firstly the only difference between true opinion and knowledge, as Meno tells us, 
is that knowledge is stable, while true opinion is not. Secondly, there is no proof in 
the Meno that true opinion is derived from bodily senses.77  
Example two: “Whoever of us prepares himself best and most accurately to 
grasp (διανοηθῆναι) that thing itself which he is investigating will come closest to 
the knowledge (τοῠ γνῶναι) of it” (Phaedo 65e). This sentence shows that the Forms 
are the objects of knowledge. It is also compatible with the formula “knowledge = 
true opinion + an explanation of the reason why”. If we use the phrase “true opinion 
+ an explanation of the reason why” instead of “knowledge”, then one issue appears. 
The meaning of the phrase “come closest to knowledge of it” becomes unintelligible. 
If someone has grasped the Forms, then why does Socrates still employ the phrase 
“come closest to”? Even if someone grasps the Forms, does he still not have but only 
come close to knowledge? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to 
understand knowledge as true opinion + an explanation of the reason why here. For 
Socrates has said that philosophers practice for death in order to gain the truth and to 
live with Gods (Phaedo 63b-c). Then, the meaning of the quotation only emphasizes 
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 There is no pre-statement on the concept of true opinion, but suddenly Socrates throws this concept out at 85c-
d in the Meno. Therefore, I have assumed that Socrates is just adding “true” to “opinion”.  
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that true opinion is unstable. Take a pair of pencils as an example. Assume that the 
two pencils are equal in appearance. Through this pair of pencils, someone could or 
could not recollect the Form of Equal. Once someone recollects the Form of Equal, 
then he gains the knowledge of equality and will not be confused about whether 
these pencils are equal or about any other cases that refer to equality. Moreover, 
gaining Equality itself makes someone’s judgements on equality more valuable. This 
case also shows that someone needs the empirical stimulations or reminders to 
recollect Forms. Nevertheless, even if someone does not successfully gain the Form 
of Equal through the pair of pencils, he still has many other opportunities to recollect 
it. In the process of recollecting Forms, knowledge depends on continuing contact 
with empirical examples, and so in this sense, we only “come close to” knowledge. 
Indeed, empirical reminders are like “ladders”, someone should throw them away 
after they gain the Forms.78 In every case such as “These two pencils are equal”, 
someone still needs the help of the sensible objects in the particular example.  
Example three: “(Cebes says) when men are interrogated in the right manner, 
they always give the right answer of their own accord, and they could not do this if 
they did not possess the knowledge and the right explanation inside them (εἰ µὴ 
ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῐς ἐπιστήµη ἐνοῠσα καὶ ὀρθὸς λόγος)” (73a). This quotation is from 
Cebes, not Socrates, but it still works for examining whether the formula of 
knowledge fits the context of Phaedo, for Cebes here is repeating the explanation of 
the recollection theory that appeared in the Meno. The next sentence of this quotation 
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is “Then if one shows them a diagram or something else of that kind, this will show 
most clearly that such is the case” (73b). Grube points out, “Cf. Meno 81e ff., where 
Socrates does precisely that”.79 I agree with Grube that Cebes is giving the audience 
a description of recollection and a brief version of the example that Socrates employs 
for proving the recollection theory. If we replace knowledge in the sentence by the 
formula “true opinion + an explanation of the reason why”, we could see the formula 
fits well except a little redundancy, especially since the sentence mentions the phrase 
“the right explanation (ὀρθὸς λόγος)”. Considering context of this sentence is the 
recollection theory, it is not strange that we could understand smoothly the quotation 
by the idea which appeared in the Meno.  
Example four: “but it is definitely from the equal things, though they are 
different from that equal, that you have derived and grasped the knowledge of 
equality?” (74c). Socrates gives three kinds of things, the Equal, the equal things and 
the knowledge of equality. He points out that the knowledge of equality is from the 
equal things. The formula could be understood as follows, “knowledge of equality” = 
“the true opinion about the equal things” + “an explanation of the reason why of the 
Equal”. The formula operates well in the quotation.  
Example five: “Do we think with our blood, or air, or fire or none of these, and 
does the brain provide our senses of hearing and sight and smell, from which come 
memory and opinion, and from memory and opinion which has become stable, 
comes knowledge (ἐπιστήµην)?” (Phaedo 96b). This quotation comes from 
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“Socrates’ account of his intellectual history”.80 It seems that there are two types of 
explanations for it. The first version is that Socrates follows an explanation of a 
natural process of recognition. Human beings think about something with whatever, 
through our senses, generates opinion and memory, then when their opinion and 
memory becomes stable, they become knowledge. This seems to fit our common 
sense on how we gain knowledge in our life. The second version is that Socrates here 
is actually repeating his recollection theory. The opinion and memory that come from 
the stimulations of the senses help us to recollect what has existed in our soul. The 
things that have existed in our soul are the “account” part in the formula, which we 
could treat as general or specific principles. However, as Aristotle has mentioned,  
 
“By universal knowledge then we see the particulars, but we do not know them 
by the kind of knowledge which is proper to them; consequently it is possible that we 
may make mistakes about them, but not that we should have the knowledge and error 
that at contrary to one another: rather we have universal knowledge but make a 
mistake in regard to the particular” (Prior Analytics 67a25-30).81  
 
Once the combination of true opinion and the account of something is complete, a 
piece of knowledge comes into being. Both of the explanations are reasonable. 
Fortunately, these two explanations do not affect the examination of the usage of 
knowledge. When the formula, “true opinion plus an explanation of the reason why”, 
substitutes for “knowledge”, the whole sentence is comprehensible and meaningful.  
In sum, in all five examples, the usage of the word “knowledge” could be 
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replaced meaningfully and coherently by the formula “true opinion + an explanation 
of the reason why”, which is employed as a definition of knowledge in the Meno 
through our examination. The selected examples are representative, for they spread 
through the relevant main arguments in the Phaedo. Then, the concept of knowledge 
is well defined and is the same in the Phaedo as it is in the Meno.  
Nevertheless, knowledge that is defined as “true opinion + an explanation of the 
reason why”, though it has been clarified to some extent by introducing the theory of 
Forms, still confines knowledge to a narrow sphere and does not fit various kinds of 
knowledge. In both dialogues, knowledge to Plato must be subject to the most rigid 
standards and various possible interpretations are completely eradicated in Plato’s 
concept of knowledge. Knowledge relates to the verb “know”, which means that 
when we use the verb “know”, we could refer to the content of the sentence “I 
know…” as knowledge.82 What Plato attributes to his definition of knowledge is a 
type of true proposition and a kind of knowledge. It asks for the most strict criterion 
of “being unerring”, since Plato eliminates the factor of time in his knowledge and 
excludes other types of true propositions in his philosophy. 
This kind of proposition reflects a fact or facts. For instance, “it is 11 pm.” is a 
true proposition if it is 11 pm now. It could not be knowledge under Plato’s terms, 
since Plato’s knowledge must be always of what is and correct forever, then it must 
be beyond the limitation of time and eternal. If this is right, then the scope of 
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 I am enlightened by Heidegger in this idea. He points out that ἐνεργεια (reality, activity) in Aristotle’s 
philosophy comes from “ἔργον” (work) which must be understood in the sense of its verb form “be present”. He 
actually expresses an idea that the verb is prior to other forms in a language. See Heidegger (1995) and Heidegger 
(2000) p. 33, note 24. Heidegger’s understanding about Theaetetus can be seen in Stern (2008) pp. 210-214.  
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knowledge in Plato’s ideas (whether it is a kind of ability or a kind of abstract-entity) 
is very narrow and not all propositions that are true for us are necessarily 
“knowledge” in Plato’s mind. Let us consider two examples. First, when someone 
asks, “What time is it?” another one replies, “six p.m.”. The definition of knowledge 
discussed in contemporary epistemology83 is that someone believes that P is true; P is 
true; P can be justified. According to this view, the statement “six p.m.” is true, and is 
a kind of knowledge. But it is not knowledge in Plato’s eyes, for it is just true in an 
instant or moment. Second, assume that the library is closed every Saturday night 
and someone says that “the library is closed” one Saturday night. The statement is 
not “knowledge” in Plato’s eyes, for this situation depends on the time. For it could 
be wrong and not necessarily true, though it is true at the moment that the people in 
the example makes this statement.  
There are four aspects to explain why Plato rejects the factor of instant time in 
his understanding of knowledge. (1) The substance and property are not divided 
clearly in his idea. The Forms themselves are a good example to illustrate this 
assertion. Take a quotation from Phaedo 102d-e as an example. Socrates says,  
 
“Now it seems to me that not only Tallness itself is never willing to be tall or 
short at the same time, but also that the Tallness in us will never admit the short, but 
one of two things happens: either it flees and retreats whenever its opposite, the short, 
approaches, or it is destroyed by its approach.” (Phaedo 102d-e) 
 
This quotation shows two things: (A) the Form Tallness itself is both an entity and a 
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 This definition is the target of Gettier’s criticism and contemporary epistemologists are work on this definition, 
trying to consummate this definition in order to give out a definition of Knowledge. See Gettier (1963) pp. 121-
123; Greco and Sosa ed (1999) and Williamson (2000). 
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quality, because Tallness itself is tall; (B) “Tallness in us” is also something that is 
both a quality and an entity, since it either “flees” or “is destroyed by” its opposite. If 
knowledge as Plato defines it must be stable, it cannot tolerate change through time. 
(2) If knowledge comes from the Forms, the time is incompatible with the 
knowledge, since time means change. (3) Since the soul is immortal, Plato rejects 
any influence of instant time in knowledge, because for him the knowledge is in the 
soul. If the soul is immortal, knowledge should be compatible with this quality 
(namely, knowledge should be unchangeable), for Plato treats the principle that 
opposite things cannot co-exist as true (when fire approaches snow, snow will either 
retreat or be destroyed) (Phaedo 104d). (4) Knowledge must “be always of what is 
and it must be unerring” (Theaetetus 152c), which has shown that it will not tolerate 
any change (i.e. time). 
 
2.3 Soul gains knowledge from Forms  
Although the Forms are the objects of the knowledge, we are still unclear about 
the relationship between Forms and knowledge, especially on the question of how 
these two things connect. Are the Forms like a book that contains knowledge inside? 
Plato never makes this relationship clear in his dialogues. What we know is that the 
soul is the agent that gains knowledge from the Forms. Then why and how can the 
soul gain or grasp knowledge from the Forms? This is actually two questions. The 
first one is why does the soul have such a function that can link knowledge and the 
Forms? The second one is by what means does the soul reach knowledge of the 
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Forms? 
The answer of the first question is that the soul is akin to the Forms (79b). In 
order to prove this, Socrates begins his argument about the properties of the Forms. 
Socrates attributes to the Forms the qualities of being “non-composite” (78c), 
“always remaining the same” (78c), and being “changeless” (78d). In conclusion, 
Socrates says that each of the Forms is “uniform by itself, remains the same, and 
never in any way tolerates any change whatever” (78d). Moreover, Socrates proceeds 
to the difference between the two kinds of existences, visible and invisible. 
Specifically, Socrates and his companions agree that the difference between “visible” 
and “invisible” things (79b). Naturally, soul is invisible to human eyes, while body is 
visible to human eyes. Socrates does not say that the soul is the same thing as the 
Forms, rather he just emphasizes that the soul is “more like” (ὁµοιότερον) the 
invisible things (79b).  
Soul, because of its kinship to the invisible things, namely, the Forms, is able to 
gain knowledge from these Forms. After death, the soul must purify and free itself 
from the influence of the body, i.e. the soul gets rid of “confusion, ignorance, fear, 
violent desires and the other human ills” (81a) and under such condition, the soul 
could have the ability to grasp knowledge. If the soul does not practice philosophy 
and is affected by the bodily elements, such as “carelessly practiced gluttony, 
violence and drunkenness” (81e), it will be punished and pay “the penalty for their 
previous upbringing” (81e). All those who are immersed in the bodily elements could 
be divided into two groups, according to Socrates, “money-lovers” and “honor-lovers” 
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(82c), as distinct from the “lovers of learning” (82d).  
From the negative aspect, the lover of learning knows that the soul is 
imprisoned in the body and is forced to examine things through the body that is like a 
cage. From the positive aspect, philosophy will help the soul free itself and avoid the 
deceptions from the bodily organs or senses. After the soul no longer “examines by 
other means, for this is different in different circumstances and is intelligible and 
invisible”, it will see what is intelligible and invisible (83b). Socrates admits that the 
body holds opinions as well (83d),84 but the soul must not try to mix the bodily 
opinions with its own. He describes the process of investigation that the bodily 
elements are involved in as recognition mixed into violent emotions, such as violent 
pain or pleasure:  
 
“That the soul of every man, when it feels violent pleasure or pain in connection 
with some objects, inevitably believes at the same time that what causes such 
feelings must be very clear and very true, which it is not” (Phaedo 83c). “The soul of 
the philosopher achieves a calm from such emotions; it follows reason and ever stays 
with it contemplating the true, the divine, which is not the object of opinion” 
(Phaedo 84a).  
 
This quotation shows two things. One is that any process of gaining knowledge 
that is mixed with bodily elements will inevitably involve a kind of violent feeling or 
emotion, such as pleasure or pain or other kinds of desires. For Socrates points out 
that the worst feature of the bodily imprisonment in the soul is that it is due to desires 
(Phaedo 82e). The second is that the soul uses reason to grasp knowledge from the 
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 The original sentence is, “As it (the soul) shares the beliefs and delights of the body…” (83d). This sentence is 
also shows that in Socrates’ mind, the soul also has emotions.  
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Forms, which are not the objects of bodily opinions. 
Once it has gained purification and freedom, the soul enters into an invisible 
region or realm where it “sees and understands” the Forms (83b).85 Socrates here 
does not make the process of gaining knowledge clear. He just uses a metaphor, “see” 
the Forms, like a man in our world sees a book, understands the contents of that book 
and gains knowledge from it. However, it is completely unclear how the soul gains 
the knowledge, since it is unclear whether the soul gains knowledge exactly like we 
gain knowledge by reading a book.  
One possible reason why Socrates does not explain the whole process of gaining 
knowledge in Phaedo is that it is not the right time to discuss this issue. The context 
in this dialogue is all about the relationship between body and soul and it is enough 
for Socrates to talk about how the bodily elements affect the soul in gaining 
knowledge, without any detail on the concrete cognitive process. After Socrates has 
given his history of his own intellectual development (96a-99d) and begins the so-
called “second voyage” (99d), he tries to demonstrate the process of gaining 
knowledge in detail. 
 
2.4 The theory of recollection 
Plato stands in a dangerous position when he emphasizes that knowledge comes 
from the region of the Forms, while he tries to explain how to gain knowledge and 
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 Dorothea Frede understands Forms from a “function view” and therefore, argues that “Plato neither intended to 
dispose of sensory evidence altogether nor to locate the Forms in a separate realm of pure understanding. The 
Forms should rather be understood as the ideal principles determining the proper function of each entity”. See 
Frede (1999) p. 191. 
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the phenomenon of learning in the sensible world. In order to achieve these two goals, 
Plato employs the theory of recollection. In the Phaedo, Cebes recalls the theory of 
recollection that is mentioned frequently by Socrates. Simmias, another interlocutor 
of Socrates in the dialogue, however, cannot remember the proof of the theory, 
asking Cebes to remind him. Cebes repeats what happens in the Meno, where 
Socrates successfully leads a slave boy who does not know geometry to give the 
correct answer to a geometrical question simply by questioning him. Cebes’ reminder 
is not an argument or proof. Therefore, Socrates tries to prove his theory of 
recollection in another way. 
Socrates’ argument is as follows. If someone recollects something, he must have 
known it before. A man who perceives something knows this thing and could 
recollect a different thing at the same time. Recollection can be caused not only by a 
similar thing, but by dissimilar things as well (Phaedo 74a). For instance, someone 
could recall Cebes by seeing a picture of Simmias or he could also recollect Simmias 
by seeing a picture of Simmias.86  
Socrates does not consider the situation where recollection is caused by 
different things, but focuses only on the recollections that are provoked by similar 
things. 87  According to his idea, when we consider the similarity between what we 
recollect and what causes the recollection, we must admit that what prompts the 
recollection is inferior to the object of the recollection (74a). The object of the 
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 Cf. Nehamas (1975) p. 183. 
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 Sedley carefully considers the situation “recoolection through different things” and formulates it as “(a) On 
perceiving x you recognize x and think of something different, y (especially if you had forgotten y); (b) x and y 
are objects of different knowledge” (p.312). See Sedley (2006) pp. 312. 
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recollection, however, has a change in its meaning, which Socrates uses but does not 
point out. Recollection should refer to the Forms, but here it also refers to sensible 
objects.88 Socrates claims that recollection could be provoked by similar or dissimilar 
things (74a). Before reaching this conclusion, Socrates gives his interlocutors some 
examples. Two typical examples are: (a) a man who sees a picture of Simmias 
recollects Cebes; (b) a man who sees a picture of Simmias recollects Simmias 
himself (73e). Next, Socrates concludes that both similar and dissimilar things could 
cause recollection. Moreover, what prompt the recollection are inferior to “similar 
things”89 or “the thing recollected” (74a).90  
If recollection is produced by a similar thing, what we recall is superior to what 
we are perceiving. Take Equality as an example: we could recollect Equality from 
equal sticks or equal stones or any other equal things. All the equal things are inferior 
to Equality itself in respect of being equal, for all the equal things could “appear to 
one to be equal and to another to be unequal” (74b). That means, in the sensible 
world, Socrates seems to insist on what Protagoras has taught, namely, a quality may 
be different in different people, at a different time or in a different environment. A 
quality could have a slight difference in some degree. A bottle of water may be too 
cold to one person, but a little hotter to another person, according to Protagoras’ 
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 Kahn believes “Socrates is running together two claims that ought properly to be distinguished, one concerning 
recollection for philosophers and one concerning cognition for all human beings. Only philosophers know what 
they are doing when they recollect, because only philosophers can distinguish Forms from particulars and 
recognize the deficiency of the latter. But all human beings implicitly refer to the Forms in every perceptual 
judgment. Thus they unwittingly refer to the Equal itself in judging sticks and stones to be equal”. I agree with 
him, but my argument here is different from his argument. See Kahn (2009) pp. 123-124. 
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 The original sentence is, “And when someone recollects something from similar things…” (Άλλ’ ὃταν γε ἀπὸ 
τῶν ὁµοίων ἀναµιµνῃσκηταί τίς τι...) 
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 Burnet calls this idea as “an additional thought”, namely, besides what we recollect and the similar things that 
cause the recollection, there is an additional thought which is “the thought of the presence or absence of any 
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theory. In addition, if Socrates here at 74b, thinks that the equal things could appear 
to be equal for one man but unequal to another person, he, then, is partly following 
Protagorean doctrine, though Socrates limits its application in the sphere of 
phenomenal world.  
Compared to the equal things, the form of Equality, is always equal for 
everyone and in any condition, simply because Equality can never be Inequality. 
More importantly, we could derive and grasp the knowledge of equality from the 
equal things (74c). Whether Equality itself is like or unlike the equal things makes no 
difference, because of the function of recollection.91 As Socrates and his interlocutors 
have agreed (73c-e), recollection could be caused either by similar things or by 
different things. As long as the equal things provoke to recollect something in the 
souls, the condition of recollecting is fulfilled. If someone who is stimulated by the 
sensible things “recollects” something in his soul, then there must be a piece of prior 
knowledge in his soul or he must have knowledge of the thing he is recollecting. You 
cannot recollect something in your mind, if there is nothing in your mind. That is to 
say, we must possess knowledge of the Equal before we first recognize the equal 
things (74e). 
“First” at 74e, does not only refer to time, rather it relates to knowledge. Let us 
take the equal sticks as an example. Socrates does not mean that a human being who 
first sees a pair of sticks will recollect the knowledge of equality. Nevertheless, after 
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 I do not talk about the relationship between sensible things and Forms here. According to Nehamas, A. E. 
Taylor, Burnet, W. D. Ross, Paul Shorey and Hugh Tredennick understand the relationship by “the approximation 
view”. This view agrees: (1) “Sensible objects only approximate the intelligible objects which they represent in 
geometrical contexts” and (2) “Plato, either consciously or unconsciously, applied this sense of imperfection to 
objects belonging to ethical and aesthetic contexts”.  Nehamas disagrees with “the approximation view”, since it 
“fails to make Plato’s theory of recollection coherent”. Nehamas (1975) pp. 172-175, p. 185 and p. 187.  
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this person grows up and has met many equal things on many occasions, he finally 
recalls the knowledge of equality when he sees equal things one day, such as the 
equal sticks. Then, “first” as used at is just in the sense of a trigger time when a 
person (a man or a baby) gets knowledge from the sensible things. Recollection does 
not refer to earlier time when he met the equal things without any understanding or 
gaining knowledge. We could express this by a Greek word, “καιρός” (a chance/right 
time). Socrates explains this idea like this: “We must then possess knowledge of the 
Equal before that time when we first saw the equal objects and realized that all these 
objects strive to be like the Equal but are deficient in this.” (74e-75a) the key words 
in this quotation are “knowledge”, “time”, “first” and “realized”. Socrates uses these 
words to emphasize the connection between the knowledge (i.e. the knowledge of 
Forms) and recollection.92 When Socrates spoke and argued his idea on this to his 
audience on the day of his death, the image of the human being in his mind does not 
refer to the human in general, but he has excluded babies, sleeping men, idiots or any 
other person who has mental illness or disorder.93  
Even if what I have argued is correct, how do I explain the meaning of what 
Socrates says immediately following the quotation at 74e-75a? Socrates at 75b, says:  
 
“Then before we began to see or hear or otherwise perceive, we must have 
possessed knowledge of the Equal itself if we were about to refer our sense 
perceptions of equal objects to it and, realized that all of them were eager to be like it, 
but were inferior.” (Phaedo 75b) 
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 Ross points out that “We saw that in the Meno the theory of anamnesis is not connected with the knowledge of 
Ideas; in the Phaedo it is.”, See Ross (1953) p. 22. 
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 Consider the culture at that time, maybe the women in general are also in this category.  
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This quotation at 75b is just suggesting a fact that is believed by Socrates, namely, 
the knowledge always exists in our soul even before we begin our perceiving and it 
does not mention at all what time we gain the knowledge. Moreover, in the quotation 
at 75b, the terms “knowledge” and “realized” appear again and the whole idea is 
consistent with what he says at 74e-75a. 
We must gain knowledge before our birth, for we begin our perception after our 
birth. We do not lose our knowledge, after having acquired it, for “to know is to 
acquire knowledge, keep it and not lose it” (75d). We call “losing of knowledge 
‘forgetting’” (75d). Socrates employs the concept of “forgetting” to explain why we 
do not realize our knowledge that always exists in our soul and why we still need to 
learn something if we already have knowledge. That is because we have lost or 
forgotten knowledge at the moment when we born and learning is a process of 
recovering our knowledge. There are two premises of this argument. The first one is 
that there are realities beyond sensible things. The second is that our souls exist 
before our birth and it gains knowledge from those realities. Those realities, beyond 
sensible things, are the Forms.  
Socrates admits that people (such as philosophers) could gain knowledge in the 
sensible world. It is the most significant point in the recollection theory in the 
Phaedo. For, on the one hand, it insists that knowledge comes from the Forms and 
we cannot gain knowledge in sensible world, but on the other hand, it shows that 
knowledge could be regained in the sensible world by the philosopher who always 
tries to get rid of the influence from bodily elements as much as possible and keeps 
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his soul in a pure reason state.  
 
2.5 The example of “lovers” in the Phaedo 
In this section, I will briefly consider the recollection theory itself through an 
investigation about the example of “lovers” in the Phaedo. The theory of recollection 
itself is definitely the most interesting but difficult argument in the Phaedo, as David 
Bostock says. 94  In order to remind Simmias what the theory of recollection is, 
Socrates gives a number of examples, trying to persuade him that the recollection 
theory and the immortality of the soul are true. 
Among these examples, the example of “Lovers” is a typical and interesting 
example: 
 
Well now, you know what happens to lovers, whenever they see a lyre or cloak 
or anything else their loves are accustomed to use: they recognize the lyre, and they 
get in their mind, don’t they, the form of the boy whose lyre it is? And that is 
recollection. Likewise, someone seeing Simmias is often reminded of Cebes, and 
there’d surely be countless other such cases. (Phaedo 73d, Translated by D. Gallop) 
 
The example is not the whole story, for it only points out that the lovers when 
they are seeing the belongings of their beloved will recollect a second thing other 
than the things they are perceiving. Socrates continues the example by saying: 
 
Again now, is it possible, on seeing a horse depicted or a lyre depicted, to be 
reminded of a person; and on seeing Simmias depicted, to be reminded of Cebes? 
Certainly. 
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And also, on seeing Simmias depicted, to be reminded of Simmias himself? 
Yes, that’s possible. (Phaedo 73e, Translated by D. Gallop) 
 
Through these examples, Socrates concludes that: “In all those cases, then, doesn’t it 
turn out that there is recollection from similar things, but also from dissimilar things?” 
Simmias gives him a confident answer: “It does”. (Phaedo 74a, Trans. by Gallop) 
These examples and the conclusion illustrated by Socrates seem not to be 
persuasive. We can consider and analyze it using ideas from Bostock and Gallop: 
 Firstly, Bostock correctly points out that these examples cannot be a kind of 
proof of “the pre-existence of the soul”. Moreover, he suggests that Plato ignores 
another possibility: “perhaps we simply came into existence at birth with the 
knowledge already in us, so we have had it all the time that we have existed, but have 
not existed for ever, in fact have not existed before this life at all.”95 Bostock also 
give us an important example to demonstrates his worry on the Platonic/Socratic 
argument of recollection: “If I am James Watt, and I perceive (and recognize) a kettle 
boiling, I may be led to think of a steam-engine. It obviously does not follow that I 
knew a steam-engine before: this may be the invention of a steam-engine”.96 The 
main points of Bostock’s arguments are: (1) We could gain knowledge before birth, 
according to Plato, but there are other possibilities besides Plato’s thought. (2) How 
does Plato face the question of “invention” or “progress”? 
Secondly, D. Gallop agrees that “recollection from the similar is… not parallel 
with recollection from dissimilar”, simply because someone cannot think of a man by 
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seeing his cloak, because the cloak is unlike the man.97 
Socrates’ statement about the concept of “recollection” needs to be considered. 
As 73d shows, Socrates admits that when the lovers are seeing the things from the 
beloved, they have the form of their lovers in mind, and “that is recollection”. 
Everyone will admit what Socrates says is right and this is really a common use of 
the concept of “recollection”. If, however, we consider the theory of recollection or 
the principle “learning is recollection” in the Meno and Phaedo, then the problem 
appears: are the lovers who are seeing the items of their beloveds learning? Is the 
mental act of the lovers a process of learning?  
It seems that if Plato or Socrates admits that the mental act of the lovers is 
recollection, then two kinds of recollection inevitably appear. The first kind of 
recollection or memory is the recollection of this life, namely, the memory of the 
experience after birth (when the soul has combined with the body, in 
Platonic/Socratic terms). The second kind of recollection is the recollection of the 
soul’s experience before birth. Here, we should be careful to select our vocabulary of 
the second kind of recollection, for two reasons. (1) The theory of the Forms is 
unavailable until it is introduced at Phaedo 73d.98 So what we can say now is that the 
soul has gained knowledge before birth, as was said in the Meno. (2) We cannot be 
sure that recollection will certainly lead the soul to regain knowledge that is in it. The 
last reason needs further consideration. 
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 Gallop (1980) p.118. 
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 The place where the theory of the Forms is introduced have different opinions amongs scholars. As Panos 
Dimas argues, “If the forms were introduced by 70b, as the traditional interpretation maintains, why does not 
Socrates use their properties to demonstrate the continuing existence of the soul when Cebes asked for it the first 
time, instead of postponing it until 79dl-7? The answer, I propose, is that the forms are not yet introduced at 70b”. 
(p. 185). See Dimas (2003) p. 185. 
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In the Meno, and even in the Phaedo, Socrates seems never to admit that 
recollection will necessarily lead the soul to regain knowledge, though we can 
conclude this by an indirect way. In the Meno, knowledge is teachable and learning 
links closely to what is teachable. If recollection is learning, then recollection, i.e. 
learning, will bring knowledge to the soul. This indirect way, however, is not 
necessary, since learning something is not equal to grasping knowledge or skill. Take 
pupils learning at school as an example. Pupils learn something through their 
teachers regardless of the subject (we do not need to consider the theory of 
recollection in this case). However, some of them will understand what the teacher 
teaches, while others will not understand the teaching properly. Therefore, the 
process of learning does not necessarily mean grasping knowledge.  
Having considered the difficulties above, the example of “lovers” seems to be 
insufficient to illustrate what Socrates wishes to say in the Phaedo. For the example 
in fact cut off the direct relationship between the theory of recollection and 
knowledge. The example also cuts off the relationship between recollection and the 
theory of the Forms.  
 
2.6 Problems in the theory of recollection 
Since any cognitive or emotional process (including the recollecting process) 
must have an agent or subject, the theory of recollection needs the factor of the soul. 
It seems that a controversy on epistemology is still not solved. The problem is 
“according to the recollection theory, in what degree is learning recollection?” This is 
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actually asking how broadly or to what extent we can apply the principle “learning is 
recollection”. 
There are two kinds of interpretation on this issue. The first is a controversy that 
what extent the recollection theory can apply. One approach thinks that in the Meno 
and Phaedo at least, all kinds of learning are recollection, while another approach 
insists that only some types of learning are recollection. Scott illustrates these two 
approaches in detail.99 The first approach is called “K” (for Kant), which means that 
all types of knowledge are recollection; Scott calls the second approach“D” (for 
Demaratus), which means recollection is only applied to the situation which will 
produce higher knowledge. These two approaches refer to the consequence or 
products of the principle “learning is recollection”, namely, whether it produces 
knowledge “D” type. 
The second controversy refers to which kinds of subjects could be involved in 
the principle “learning is recollection”. Vlastos has a suspicion about “learning is 
recollection”. Considering the slave episode of Meno, Vlastos points out that the 
knowledge of geometry is different from other kinds of knowledge. The knowledge 
of geometry itself can be gained through “any advance in understanding which 
results from the perception of logical relationships”.100 Compared to it, other types of 
knowledge that rely on experience cannot be gotten by this way. How does Socrates 
assure that “learning is recollection” can be used in history, botany or medicine 
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which need a huge quantity of experience to study?101 
Moravcsik’s article focuses on the meaning of logical terms in Meno. He thinks 
that Meno’s Paradox is only valid for “learning by deliberate inquiry”, but it excludes 
“learning by lucky or chance or as the result of external agency”. Moravcsik believes 
that in recollection Plato is talking about non-experiential knowledge or a priori 
knowledge. Maybe recollection itself has contained experience.102 
Nehamas asks, if Socrates rightly admits that he knows nothing about virtue, 
then why do he and Meno seek a teacher of virtue? How do they start their inquiry 
about virtue, if both are completely ignorant about virtue? Nehamas thinks that Plato 
has the answer of “what is virtue” beforehand. He also believes that the key point by 
which Socrates rebuts the Paradox is that “one can know what one does not 
know”.103 
The dispute essentially refers to the question of whether Plato admits 
“intellectual intuition” in the process of recollection. I use the word “intuition” to 
refer to an ability to understand something instinctively, without the need for 
conscious reasoning. I do not intend to discuss these disputes in detail here, but only 
try to demonstrate how we understand them from a new perspective, if the factor of 
the soul is considered. We need to consider whether the soul has the ability of 
“intellectual intuition” (using the terminology of Kant). 104  The concept of 
“intellectual intuition” I use here means “a form of immediate intellectual knowledge 
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or contemplation” or “knowing immediately by understanding”. Plato uses a 
metaphor to illustrate how the lover of knowledge “consorts with” (πλησιάσας) the 
Forms and gains knowledge (Republic 490b).105 This text shows that the soul has the 
ability of “intellectual intuition”, because there are reasons to say so. Firstly, when 
the soul “consorts with” the Forms, the soul is in intellect state, partly because Plato 
admits that the soul is “akin” (ὅµοιος) to the Forms in the Phaedo: “what about the 
soul? Is it visible or invisible?” “Invisible.”… “So the soul is more like (ὁµοιότερον) 
the invisible…” (79b). Before this argument, Socrates has explained “the invisible” 
things, i.e. they are “XX in itself”, namely, the Forms (78c-d). It is because of the 
kinship relationship between the soul and the Forms that only the soul in a state of 
pure reason can get in touch with the pure intellectual Forms. The process by which 
the soul grasps knowledge from the Forms is a intellectual process.  
In this sense, the soul is intellect. The soul gains knowledge by intuition, 
because Plato uses the word “eyes” (or verbs like “see” or “gaze at”) 106  as a 
metaphor to describe how the soul gains knowledge from the Forms. If we consider 
the meaning of this metaphor, then we can say that the soul gains knowledge by 
intuition. According to the definition of “intuition”, intuition emphasizes grasping 
and understanding things directly. If we combine these two considerations, the 
recognition process is a process by which the soul gains the knowledge from the 
Forms by means of “intellectual intuition”. The phrase “intellectual intuition” 
emphasizes that the process by which the soul gains knowledge does not involve any 
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 Cf. Phaedo 79d, Laws 904d6 and Timaeus 90c2. 
106
 See the metaphor of cave in the Republic and Symposium, 210c-e. Cf. Meno 81c and Phaedo 83b4. 
84 
 
reason or judgement. It also has a quality of “immediacy” which has a close 
relationship with “seeing” or “watching”. 
Briefly, the soul gains knowledge by means of “intellectual intuition” in the 
region of the Forms, but where the theory of recollection only applies in the sensible 
world, soul cannot do this, for two reasons. (1) The object of such a process is no 
longer the Forms, but the sensible things which are always in flux. (2) The soul in the 
Meno and Phaedo is pure intellect or reason, whereas the incarnate soul is always 
disturbed by the body. Therefore, in the process of recollection in the sensible world, 
the soul must recall knowledge of the Forms which is already inside of itself to 
recognize what it perceives. 
A further question arises from this problem, namely, is there any difference 
between the theory of recollection in the Meno and in the Phaedo, even when it is 
proved that the concept knowledge has the same usage in both dialogues?107 
Many scholars have noticed that there are some differences between the theory 
of recollection in the Meno and Phaedo and treat recollection in these two dialogues 
as two different versions of the theory.108 For convenience, in what follows, I call the 
arguments on “learning is recollection” in Phaedo as “LRP” and in Meno as “LRM”. 
Socrates himself says in the Phaedo that the argument on recollection is 
different from before. For at 73b, Socrates says that “if this (i.e. the argument on 
“learning is recollection”) does not convince you, Simmias, see whether you agree if 
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 See 2.2. 
108
 See Ackrill (1974) pp. 177-95. See also, Anderson (1993); Bostock (1986) and Hackforth (1955). All these 
scholars believe that the argument of recollection in the Meno and Phaedo are different on the one hand, but 
compatible in the other hand. Bostock is representative. He says: “As Socrates indicates at 73b3-4, the version 
now to be presented is not meant to be the same as the Meno's version”. But he also insists that the argument in 
the Meno is “an earlier version of this argument”. 
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we examine it in some such way as this, for you doubt that what we call learning is 
recollection?” Here, Socrates indicates that the argument of “learning is recollection” 
is different from elsewhere (i.e. Meno). 
The first difference between LRP and LRM is the scope of recollection’s 
application. In LRM, Socrates seems to suggest that the recollection theory can only 
apply to “any advance in understanding which results from the perception of logical 
relationships”, as Vlastos says.109 Nevertheless, in LRP, the scope of the theory of 
recollection becomes much wider. Because of the wider application of the Form 
theory, recollection theory is not limited to the mathematical/logical area, but also 
extends to the value area and the theory of Forms. Socrates in the Phaedo, gives us 
many Forms, such as Goodness (αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ), Beauty (αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ), 
Justice (δικαίου) and Holiness (ὁσίου) (75d). Therefore, recollection theory in the 
Phaedo, compared to the Meno, has a wider application.  
The second difference is the different status of the recollection theory in these 
two dialogues. In the Meno, the topic “what is virtue?” is finally led us to consider 
another question “what is knowledge?”. Therefore, LRM is actually a core theory in 
the Meno, though it seems just an interruption or interposition in the dialogue. And 
the status of LRP is different, because it is an argument which is used to prove the 
immortality of the soul, that is to say, its status is far lower than LRM.110 
Although there are two differences between LRM and LRP, they are still similar 
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 See Vlastos (1965) p. 97. Cf. Moravcsik (1971) Lpp. 53-69 and Nehamas (1985) pp. 1-30. 
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 Panos Dimas argues that “So Socrates’ reason for asserting what he does in the last sentence of his summation 
(i.e. that if these entities do not exist, our souls did not pre-exist our births, 76e7), as the remark about equal 
necessity at 76e5-6 clearly suggests, is that he understands the recollection argument as supporting the stronger 
claim that these entities exist if and only if our souls pre-existed our birth” (p. 177). See Dimas (2003) p. 177. 
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which are also very important to understand the theory of the recollection. Firstly, the 
recollection theory in LRP and LRM constructs a whole and comprehensive theory. 
Grasping only one of these versions will lead to an incomplete understanding of the 
recollection theory. Secondly, both of them aim to explain knowledge and the soul. 
 
2.7 Gaining knowledge through the soul in a reasoning state after death 
Facing his death, Socrates feels pleasure,111 for he is confident that “a man who 
has truly spent his life in philosophy is probably right to be of good cheer in the face 
of death and to be very hopeful that after death he will attain the greatest blessings 
yonder” (63e). In contrast, his companions are immersed in deep sorrow about his 
destiny. Socrates feels happy when he is facing his death, since “the one aim of those 
who practice philosophy in the proper manner is to practice for dying and death” 
(64a). 
This is a strange idea about death until Socrates gives his explanation of it 
following the response from Simmias. Simmias “laughed and said: ‘By Zeus, 
Socrates, you made me laugh, though I was in no laughing mood just now… and our 
people in Thebes would thoroughly agree that philosophers are nearly dead and that 
the majority of men is well aware that they deserve to be…’” (64a-b). This is 
obviously sarcasm. Socrates seems not to mind Simmias’ joke or even irreverence, 
but solemnly points out that the majority “are not aware of the way true philosophers 
                                                 
111
 As a human, Socrates feels not only pleasure, but also pain in front of his death, for these two things are like 
“two creatures with one head”, as he admits at 60b. Socrates, however, as the Phaedo describes, being a 
philosopher, emphasizes in his arguments his pleasure. 
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are nearly dead, nor of the way they deserve to be, nor of the sort of death they 
deserve” (64b-c).  
Why does Socrates have such an idea about death, i.e. why does he feel happy 
when he faces his death, while the majority of his followers in general fear it? Why 
does he not fear his death? What kind of “the great blessing” is it in Socrates’ view? 
After despising the common opinion about death, Socrates proposes, “let us talk 
among ourselves” (64c). That all the persons visiting Socrates more or less love 
philosophy, whether they are Socrates’ disciples or believe in Pythagoreanism, is a 
clear sign that Socrates wishes to talk about death at a philosophical level. If so, the 
answer to all those three questions above is almost reached. The answer is knowledge. 
As a philosopher, Socrates pursues knowledge all his life. Further, as he soberly 
realizes that philosophy is “love of wisdom” and a philosopher is “someone who 
loves wisdom”, which means that a philosopher himself properly has no wisdom at 
all on an ordinary understanding. If there is an event, namely, death, which could 
help him to gain true knowledge, we could imagine how pleased he is. Therefore, 
Socrates is really the person who “practices for dying and death” (64a) and welcomes 
his death.  
Socrates, however, does not relate death and knowledge immediately in the 
dialogue. He asks his interlocutor, “Do we believe that there is such a thing as death?” 
(64c). After gaining a positive answer, Socrates gives us the definition of death, i.e. 
the separation between the soul and the body, or “the separation of the soul from the 
body” (64c). Socrates then asks his companions whether a true philosopher would be 
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concerned with the pleasures that do service to the body, including “the pleasure of 
drinking and food”, “the pleasure of sex”, or “the acquisition of distinguished clothes 
and shoes and the other bodily ornaments” (Phaedo 64d). Everyone there agrees that 
the philosopher will despise those pleasures. It is not surprising that Socrates 
deprecates the body as whole and requires philosophers to free their soul from the 
body as much as possible. He speaks of the philosopher as “a man who finds no 
pleasure in such things and has no part in them is thought by the majority not to 
deserve to live and to be close to death; the man, that is, who does not care for 
pleasures of the body” (Phaedo 65a). Having said all the above, Socrates finally links 
the issue of gaining knowledge to the body and the soul, and then to death. Therefore, 
the whole argument could be divided into two parts. The first part of Socrates’ 
argument (65a-d) is: 
 
(A) The body is an obstacle to searching for knowledge, simply because no 
sensations through our organs are clear and accurate;112 
(B) The soul alone grasps the truth and when it does it, the body will surely 
deceive it; 
(C) In thought or reasoning (λογίζεσθαι), reality becomes clear to the soul; 
(D) When the soul is alone by itself, it reaches out (ὀρέγηται) toward reality 
(τοῦ ὄντος), taking leave of the body and having no contact or association with it. 
 
From this argument, Socrates points out that the soul itself could reach reality and 
that the body will hinder the soul in gaining knowledge. Clearly, the functions of the 
body in the process of gaining knowledge are completely removed by Socrates in his 
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 Socrates particularly emphasizes the superiority of seeing and hearing than other physical senses, but this not 
affects the paraphrase of Socrates’ argument here. 
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argument and the whole project of acquiring knowledge is undertaken by the soul 
alone.  
Socrates could therefore reasonably lead his interlocutors to think about what 
would help philosophers to get rid of the effects of the body and allow the soul alone 
to gain knowledge. The best answer seems to be death, for its definition is the 
separation of the soul from the body and that is exactly the answer that Socrates 
offers in the Phaedo. And this is the second part of Socrates’ argument: 
(A) If we have pure knowledge (καθαρῶς γνῶναι),113 we should escape from the 
body and “observe the things in themselves with the soul by itself” (Phaedo 66e);114 
(B) If it is impossible to attain any pure knowledge with the body, then one of 
the two things are true: either we can never attain any pure knowledge or we can do 
so after death (Phaedo 66e-67a).  
Socrates does not say which option is the right one in the dialogue. But, 
Socrates asks his audiences to purify their soul and to avoid the contamination of the 
body’ infections (Phaedo 67a). Moreover, Socrates insists that if we are able to do so, 
we shall finally get knowledge (Phaedo 67a). Socrates has clearly demonstrated his 
idea about why death is a method of gaining knowledge for the purified soul of the 
philosopher. It is time for him to explain why he does not fear his death and what 
exactly the “greatest blessing” is. Because of the argument, Socrates has confidence 
that “there is good hope” (67b) or “he is full of good hope” (67c) that he will purify 
himself through his death. Every true philosopher always longs for this event in their 
                                                 
113
 Sometimes, Plato uses “καθαρῶς τι” (66d) to refer the pure knowledge (καθαρῶς γνῶναι). 
114
 “The things in themselves” (αὐτα τα πράγµατα) refers to the Forms, though it is not so obvious in the English 
translation above, for Socrates has introduced the Forms before the quotation at 65d in the Phaedo. 
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life, for all the things that they are yearning for are wisdom. Moreover, “a true lover 
of wisdom” who knows that he will find the knowledge nowhere but “Hades” should 
not fear dying but rather be glad to start his journey. Compared to the common 
people who think that death itself is a great evil, a true philosopher faces his death 
with pleasure, with courage and moderation. Socrates calls this kind of courage and 
moderation “true virtue” (ἀληθης ἀρετη), (69b), and points out that true virtue must 
be with wisdom, i.e. knowledge. For him, “wisdom itself is a kind of cleaning or 
purification” (69b-c).  
What Socrates has discussed above is accepted by his audience, but it seems 
that everything he says is based on a premise, namely, the soul is immortal and will 
not be destroyed after death, as Cebes doubts in the dialogue. In order to respond to 
such doubts, Socrates begins to offer a series of arguments on the immortality of the 
soul. As relevant to the topic of knowledge, I will rephrase his argument about the 
theory of recollection in the next section.  
 
2.8 Denial of body’s contribution on epistemology  
The soul and the body have an unequal status in the Phaedo. Only the soul itself 
could gain knowledge. The soul is described as “more alike or akin” to the invisible 
existence, namely, the Forms (79b), while the body is closer to visible things. Only 
the soul by itself can grasp knowledge or the Forms and the body is the prison or 
obstacle to the soul purifying itself or getting in touch with knowledge/the Forms. In 
sum, the soul has priority over the body in the dialogue’s epistemology. This outline 
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also gives another principle of the relationship between the soul and the body. We 
can simply call this the “incompatibility principle”. This principle means that though 
the soul and the body together constitute a whole human being, the soul needs to 
repel the body as far as possible in order to gain knowledge. This incompatibility 
principle actually denies the function of body in gaining knowledge.  
Why does the soul need to overcome the body in order to gain knowledge? Why 
does Plato need this incompatibility principle in epistemology? The body is a prison 
to the soul to Plato, since the bodily desires will hinder the soul from grasping reality. 
If the soul is influenced by bodily desires, then it will be “dizzied” by these bad 
elements and will not able to consort with reality, which means that the soul will not 
gain knowledge. If the embodied soul cannot gain knowledge, there will be a 
problem in theory. 
The phrase “true reality” reflects that Socrates divides all the things in his 
thought into three parts: reality (the Forms), the quasi-reality (the objects in the 
sensible world)115 and some qualities that exist in the soul (knowledge or thoughts or 
ideas). True reality undoubtedly belongs to the Forms. The qualities are the things in 
the soul, i.e. the knowledge and the truths. The quasi-realities or the objects in our 
world will not give the soul knowledge, but will disturb the soul and only give it 
inaccurate ideas.  
Certainly, this does not mean that sensible things are completely useless for the 
soul in grasping the Forms or knowledge. Rather sensible objects do help human 
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 “Quasi-reality” is a term from T. M. Robinson. See Robinson (1970) p. 28. 
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beings to gain knowledge. According to Socrates, sensible things stimulate our soul 
to recollect the knowledge that already exists in our soul. This is a principle of the 
recollection theory. What needs to be noticed is that in the sensible world, the things 
or the objects give the soul some reminders that lead it to recollect similar knowledge 
that links to the stimulations. Take a chair as an example. A chair in the sensible 
world may not provoke the soul to recollect the knowledge or the Form of the Chair. 
Nevertheless, a chair may lead the soul to regain the knowledge of the Square, or 
even the knowledge of the Cat, if you still remember that there was always a cat in 
the chair when you were young. In sum, the similarity or dissimilarity between the 
Forms and the knowledge in our souls will make the soul recollect the knowledge 
that it has gained.  
 
Conclusion  
Epistemology in the Phaedo inherits the basic principles that appeared in the 
Meno, but Plato introduces the theory of Forms and offers us a new version of 
recollection theory, which constructs more of an outline of his epistemology. All the 
new theories and ideas in some degree supplement what has been said in the Meno 
on knowledge and make the outline more polished and clearer than it is in the Meno.  
Nevertheless, there are still problems. Plato in Phaedo still does not solve the 
difficulty that knowledge is used in a narrow sense. This kind of understanding of 
knowledge makes knowledge from experience impossible, even though it is possible 
to regain knowledge through recollection. Further, knowledge completely becomes 
93 
 
innate knowledge, i.e. the soul is born with knowledge. 116  By the theory of 
recollection, however, some kinds of true propositions that should be knowledge do 
not belong to knowledge any more, since the recollection theory still cannot be 
applied to every branch of knowledge. Moreover, Socrates emphasizes that the soul 
needs to overcome the influence of the body to gain knowledge. This idea makes the 
body or the bodily organs useless in epistemology except for the function of 
stimulation. 
All these difficulties arise from the arguments that Socrates offers in the Phaedo. 
Nevertheless, still more difficulties arise when we try to understand his idea more 
accurately. Take perception as an example. When someone is seeing a pair of equal 
sticks, according to Socrates’ idea, he could recollect the Form of Equality from his 
own soul. How does the perception remind the soul? What is the process or 
procedure of gaining the knowledge, especially in relation to the sensible organs? 
During the process of gaining knowledge, how does the soul interact with the 
sensible objects? What is the process whether the soul recollects the knowledge that 
already exists within it? Socrates does not demonstrate these issues clearly, maybe 
simply because Phaedo is mainly about the immortality of the soul. The root of these 
difficulties is that the nature of knowledge is still not clear. The concept of 
knowledge or the formula “true opinion + an explanation of the reason why” will not 
be completely understood until there is an answer to the question “what is 
knowledge?”. In Meno and Phaedo, knowledge could be replaced by the phrase “true 
                                                 
116
 Cf. Kahn (2009) p. 122. 
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opinion + an explanation of the reason why”. However, in the Meno and the Phaedo, 
Socrates does not present the arguments on why that formula is correct, rather he 
only uses analogies to illustrate the formula in the Meno. All these puzzles are left 
unanswered until the Theaetetus.  
  
95 
 
 
Chapter Three: The Prologue of Theaetetus as an Allusion to Anti-
empiricism? 
Introduction 
Plato in the Meno and Phaedo gives us an outline of his epistemology but the 
outline itself is not clear. The knowledge is limited to a narrow sphere. The body’s 
only function in the process of recognition is to help the agent to recall the 
knowledge that is already within the soul. Further, we have no idea how the soul 
“consorts with” knowledge for gaining knowledge. Plato does not offer his readers 
an example of how the body receives data from outside to construct perception or 
how perception reminds the soul for recollecting knowledge in detail.117 All these 
difficulties are rooted in the unclear meaning of all elements of the formula 
“knowledge = true opinion + an explanation of the reason why” and in the need for 
an answer to the question “What is knowledge?”. Theaetetus addresses this need by 
Plato investigating three definitions of knowledge, i.e. knowledge is perception; 
knowledge is true opinion; and knowledge is true opinion plus an account. There are 
three stages for this investigation in the dialogue. Firstly, Plato checks whether 
knowledge is perception; then he tries to figure out whether knowledge is true 
opinion; lastly, he tries to consider whether knowledge is true opinion plus an 
account. During these three stages, Plato supplies many new theories and ideas on 
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 Socrates, at Phaedo 73d-75a, has a discussion of how we recollect things from perceptions when he re-states 
the recollection theory. However, as we will find that the discussion in the Phaedo is not philosophically 
sufficient, compare to the process of perceiving colour, the wax block analogy and the aviary example in the 
Theaetetus.  
96 
 
epistemology. 
Even where the new theories and ideas of Theaetetus are not so satisfactory, 
they are still helpful for understanding Plato’s epistemology. Some of them offer 
solutions to the problems that appeared in the outline of the epistemology. Others 
finally provide details of some theories that are completely unclear when they are 
mentioned in the Meno and Phaedo. Specifically, Plato in the Theaetetus illustrates 
in detail the process of perceiving the colour white, which can be by extension 
treated also as an explanation of how the soul consorts with the Forms and gains 
knowledge from them.118 Broadly speaking, all the theories or ideas that appear as 
empirical theories in the Theaetetus could be seen as parallel explanations of what 
happens to the soul in the world of Forms. Those theories and ideas in the Theaetetus 
supplement the outlines of epistemology in the Meno and Phaedo. 
In this chapter, I will deal with the prologue of the Theaetetus, especially the 
persons who appear in the prologue. Plato as a wonderful dramatist reveals his skill 
in constructing the whole conversation, connecting one dialogue to others, choosing 
the cast, and particularly offering a brilliant prologue that not only supplies necessary 
information for understanding the whole dialogue, but also expresses the keynote of 
the Theaetetus through allusions. I will try to prove that Plato selects the persons who 
appear in the dialogue deliberately to make an allusion to anti-empiricism.119 Some 
of the key persons in the dialogue hold the philosophical position on anti-empiricism; 
others are selected as a symbol of anti-empiricism. 
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 C.f. Timaeus 45b-46c. 
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 Glenn R. Morrow has noticed this. See Morrow (1970) p. 314.  
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Since the information in the prologue is not sufficient to support my 
investigation, it is unavoidable to discuss the persons in their own history and their 
own philosophical position in history. With four of those characters, I will follow this 
method, except Socrates, since Socrates leaves no texts from which to discuss his 
philosophy and since the relationship between him and Plato is complex. Hence, 
when I consider the Socratic philosophical position in the dialogue, I will not only 
consider the philosophy of the historical Socrates, but of Plato’s Socrates as well.  
My investigation on the persons reaches beyond the prologue, for only four 
persons’ names appear in the prologue, i.e. Euclides, Terpsion, Socrates and 
Theaetetus. I, however, will include Theodorus amd discuss five persons in this 
chapter. The reason for this is not only because Theodorus is a main character in the 
dialogue, but also because his identity as a mathematician will help to identify 
Theaetetus’ position in the dialogue. The reason why I will not discuss Protagoras as 
a person in this chapter is that even though Protagoras has an important role in the 
Theaetetus, he does not actually participate in the conversation in person. Hence, 
even though Protagoras was the “dead friend” of Theodorus (168e) and Theaetetus is 
treated as his defendant by Socrates, I will not consider him in the following 
discussion, simply because of the principle that I only discuss the persons who take 
part directly in the dialogue. 
Euclides is the first person to be talked about. I will mainly discuss his 
connection to Eleatic tradition. Terpsion is the second and the discussion about him 
needs to be very brief, for there is insufficient information about him. Socrates, the 
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most complicated person in this investigation is the third person. I will talk about the 
distinction between him and Plato, the chronology of the Platonic dialogues, and the 
universal definition of the historical Socrates. The next person is Theodorus. I will 
argue that he is selected as a symbol of anti-empiricism for his identity as a 
mathematician, though he himself as a person was open-minded on the question. 
Theaetetus is the last person. I will focus on the similarity between him and Socrates 
which is emphasized in the dialogue, since Plato describes their similarity in detail. 
Through this similarity, I will argue that Theaetetus is a symbol of anti-empiricism 
who has the same philosophical position as the other four persons in the dialogue.  
 
3.1 Euclides: a follower of Eleatic tradition 
The prologue of Theaetetus is a conversation between Euclides and Terpsion.120 
It probably happens in a street in Megara, since when Euclides mentions Theaetetus 
in the dialogue, Terpsion says that, “…But why did not he put up here at Megara?” It 
is not strange that these two persons had a chat in a street in Megara, since both 
Euclides and Terpsion were born at Megara.121 Euclides, as philosopher, is known for 
his enthusiasm for logic.122 His philosophy is a synthetical system of the ideas of 
Eleatic and Socratic, according to Cicero’s and Diogenes’ reports.123  
The distinctive feature of the Eleatic tradition is monism and especially 
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 Michel Narcy reminds us: “Part of the plot of Plato’ Theaetetus is that it was written not by Plato, but by 
Euclides”. See Narcy (2013) p. 150. 
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 C.f. Seth Benardete carefully analyses the setting of prologue of Theaetetus, especially the whole dialogue is 
actually Euclides’ retranslation of Socrates’ report, and he also shows how Plato makes a way of logos through 
this opening setting with the dialogues Parmenides and Sophist. See Benardete (1997) pp. 25-53. 
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 R. E. Wood notes: “Here the two interlocutors ran their philosophic school which was noted for its eristic 
procedure and carrying on in the lines of both Socrates and Parmenides”. See Wood (1999) p. 810. 
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 See Nails (2002) pp.144-145. Nails in her book also offers some other information about Euclides of Megara. 
See also, Waterfield (1987) pp.135-136. 
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emphasizes the function of logic and its denial of perception as a way of gaining 
knowledge. This can be seen clearly in Parmenides’ philosophy. He is the first 
philosopher who seriously considers the question of “being”. He says through the 
mouth of a Goddess:  
 
“It is proper that you should learn all things, both the unshaken heart of well-
rounded truth, and the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true reliance.” (KRS. 
342) 
 
Moreover, he points out that there are two paths of thinking:  
 
“The one, that [it] is and that it is impossible for [it] not to be, is the path of 
Persuasion (for she attends upon Truth); the other — that [it] is not and that it is 
needful that [it] not be, that I declare to you is an altogether indiscernible track: for 
you could not know what is not — that cannot be done — nor indicate it.” (KRS. 
344)124  
 
Here, I only cite the research from G. E. L. Owen and M. Furth. The reason why I 
only employ these two scholars’ research is that both use the theory of reference to 
analyse Parmenides’ fragments. The meaning or definition of this theory is that the 
expression of a language should pair with certain values which will finally lead to 
reality. The meaning of a word is the real object of this word. Under the situation of 
ancient philosophy, τὸ ὄν (“being/reality”), λόγος （ ”thinking/reasoning”） and 
ἐπιστήµη (“knowledge”) are strictly correlated with each other. Owen and Furth 
discuss the ideas of Parmenides’ fragment above (KRS. 342 and 344),125 and these 
                                                 
124
 All the translations of Parmenides come from The Presocratic Philosophers (KRS.). See Kirk, G. et al. eds. 
(1983) pp. 243-247. See also Gallop (1991). Cf. Curd (2004) pp. 34-50 and pp. 64-93. 
125
 The theory of reference is one a branch of the theory of meaning and itself is full of dispute. Willard Van 
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lines:  
 
“ἡ µέν ὅπως ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν µὴ εἶναι, πειθοῦς ἔστι κέλευθος (Άληθείῃ γάρ 
ὀπηδεῖ)”（The one, that (it) is and that it is impossible for (it) is not be, is the path of 
Persuasion (for she attends upon Truth) (KRS. 344)126  
 
According to Owen and Futh, these lines show the absolutely truth or unconditional 
truth. The other path is the way of opinion and it is a wrong way, since that it is not 
and no reliable knowledge could be gained from it. And this is held by mortals (KRS. 
353). When the mortals say that there is a golden mountain, they unmistakably 
attribute the property of “existence/is” to the “golden mountain”.127 They speak as if 
the non-existent thing existed. If we borrow the terminology of semantics, this kind 
of opinion of the mortals makes the object without a reference become an object of 
reference. Based on such analysis, Owen reaches two conclusions: first, Parmenides 
holds to the theory of reference; second, what does not exist cannot be thought or 
spoken or what can be spoken or thought exists.128  
Furth’s idea is more extreme than Owen’s. He firstly tries to prove that Greeks 
use “being” (τὸ ὄν), “knowledge” (τὸ γνωστόν) and “belief” (τὸ δοξαστόν) 
interchangeably. Then he tries to use his conclusion to analyse Parmenides’ 
fragments. He believes that Parmenides is a monist in the strictest sense and reports 
Parmenides’ position as “What is (everything that is), is, he says, and (very 
                                                                                                                                          
Orman Quine refutes to admit the existence of meaning. Of course, Plato could not imagine such philosophical 
theory; therefore, I need not to consider it. See Quine (2003) pp. 1-19 
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 Both Greek text and English translation come from The Presocratic Philosophers. See Kirk, G. et al. eds. 
(1983) p. 245.  
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 This is an example raised by Alexius Meinong. Bertrand Russell cites and analyses this example in his article 
On Denoting. Thereafter, most philosophers usually use this example when they discuss about the theory of 
meaning. The other common used example is “unicorn is existence”. See Russell (1905) pp. 479–493. 
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emphatically) that's all (= nothing else!)”. 129  Moreover, he argues that any 
proposition about what is not is impossible to Parmenides, i.e. diversity is impossible, 
which is distinctive from Owen who thinks that diversity is still possible in 
Parmenides’ philosophy. Furth concludes, “given the is-not doctrine, Parmenides is 
in a position to claim that the statement that something is asserts the same as the 
statement that [ostensibly] something else is, because the attempted specification of 
the alleged difference is unintelligible.”130 Then everything is excluded and the only 
thing that is left is “what is” and the only thing that we could say is “What is, is”.  
Following Owen’s and Furth’s ideas, it is clear that in Parmenides’ philosophy, 
perception is useless. Even in Furth’s view, what we could say is just “what is, is”. 
Coming back to the case of Euclides who is a follower of the Eleatic tradition, we 
cannot help thinking that by this choice of character Plato gives us an allusion to 
anti-empiricism. If my argument is not so strong so far, since we could not judge 
Plato’s intention of using anti-empiricism as the keynote of the Theaetetus just by 
one name that is connected with Eleatic philosophers, then let us consider a little 
more.  
 
3.2 Terpsion: a Socratic follower 
The other four names that appear in the beginning of the dialogue are Terpsion, 
Socrates, Theodorus and Theaetetus. According to Waterfield’s introduction, 
Terpsion “looks like a minor member of the Megarian group of Socratic 
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 See Furth (1968) p. 126; reprinted in Mourelatos ed. (1974) pp. 241-270. 
130
 Ibid, p.129.  
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followers”.131 We have no other information about who Terpsion is,132 except his 
presence (alongside Euclides) in the Phaedo (59c). Therefore, I can make no definite 
judgement whether he could link to any anti-empiricism. 133  Nevertheless, a 
reasonable deduction could be made. Persons who presented the last day of Socrates 
are intimates of Socrates. They are familiar with or even accept Socratic philosophy. 
By “Socratic philosophy”, I do not refer to historical Socratic philosophy, rather 
Plato’s, for Socrates emphasizes in Phaedo that he has mentioned recollection many 
times. Hence, it is possible that Terpsion shares the same philosophical position with 
Socrates in both Phaedo and Theaetetus.  
 
3.3 Historical Socrates vs. Platonic Socrates: Universal Definition through 
experience 
Socrates is the most complicated among the persons in Theaetetus. When 
considering Socrates as a person, we immediately meet the issue of the 
“chronological problem”. 134  Socrates himself does not leave any works of his own, 
so all the information about Socrates comes from the secondary sources, mainly from 
Plato and Xenophon.135  
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 See Waterfield (1987) p.135. 
132
 See Nails (2002) p. 274.  
133
 Although we do not know whether Terpsion believes in anti-empiricism or not, Kenneth Dorter makes a 
comparison between Terpsion, Euclides, Theaetetus, Theodorus and Socrates with their intellectual ability in 
Theaetetus.Then, Dorter argues “love of reason is distinct from love of honor, and that there are three types of 
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person and “love of honor or love of pleasure” person. Terpsion, Euclides belong to the category of “lazy or 
sluggish and forgetful”. See Dorter (1990) pp. 344-345. 
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 See my discussion on chronological problem in the Introduction.  
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 See Xenophon. 1923. Memorabilia and Apology. Marchant, E. C. and Todo, O. J. trans. Loeb Classical Library, 
pp. 1-360 and pp. 637-664. Besides Plato and Xenophon, there are still some materials about Socrates’ thought. 
Those materials are included in Ferguson (1970). A brief discussion about sources for Socrates can be found in 
Stokes (1995) pp. 4-7. 
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If the historical Socrates always claims that he knows nothing,136 then we could 
not even know whether he is an anti-empiricist. Nevertheless, if Plato’s Socrates no 
longer makes such a claim and tries to give some positive ideas, then he should have 
some philosophical position. Moreover, the historical Socrates does not have the 
theory of Forms. Further, Plato’s Socrates is an anti-empiricist in the sense of having 
the theory of Forms. The dialogue Theaetetus is written in Plato’s late period, so 
Socrates in this dialogue is Plato’s Socrates who represents Plato’s own ideas, rather 
than the historical Socrates’ ideas. That is to say, Socrates in the Theaetetus is an 
anti-empiricist. 
Nevertheless, this assertation is too simplistic. Let us consider testimony from 
Aristotle about Socratic philosophy. On the Socratic search for definitions, Aristotle 
says, “Socrates, however, was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting 
the world of nature as a whole but seeking the universal in these ethical matters, and 
fixed thought for the first time on definitions” (Metaphysics 987b1). In another place, 
Aristotle adds, “Socrates occupied himself with the excellences of character, and in 
connection with them became the first to raise the problem of universal definitions…” 
(Metaphysics 1078b17).137 What is new in Aristotle’s testimony compared to what 
Vlastos says, is the universal definition. The typical question format for a Socratic 
definition is “What is X?” or more exactly, “What is X itself?”. The answer to such a 
question should be a definition that could cover every character of X. I do not want 
to use Theaetetus as an example of the method of definition, rather let us consider the 
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 Cf. Apology 21b, 22d 
137
 All the quotations about Aristotle are translated by W. D. Ross. There is another place that Aristotle mentions 
Socrates’ pursuit of definition in Metaphysics (1086b3). See Aristotle (1984). 
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definition issue in the Meno that is an excellent one to show what Socrates asks for in 
a definition. The purpose of this discussion is to support my claim that Socrates is an 
anti-empiricist. 
The investigation of “What is virtue?” begins at 71d in the Meno, where 
Socrates asks Meno for his answer to the question. Meno thinks that it is not a hard 
question and supplies various virtues for different persons. “Being able to manage 
public affairs and in doing so to benefit his friends and harm his enemies and to be 
careful that no harm comes to himself” are the virtues of men (71e). Taking care of 
children and managing home affairs are the virtues of women (71e). Meno can even 
identify the virtues for the elderly men, the free men and the slave. Socrates 
ironically says, “I seem to be in great luck, Meno; while I am looking for one virtue, 
I have found you to have a whole swarm…” (72a). Socrates takes the image of bee to 
illustrate his idea by saying, “if I were asking you what is the nature of bees, and you 
say that there are many and of all kinds…” (72b). Socrates does not think that this is 
the answer to what he asks. What he needs is the respect “in which they are all the 
same and do not differ from one another” (72c). Applying this principle to virtue, 
Socrates asks what definition of virtue could mark out all different kinds of virtue as 
virtues. In order to help Meno to offer a better answer to the question “What is 
virtue?”, Socrates provides an example of how to define “shape”. Socrates begins 
with the error of Meno, saying that “shape” is not roundness, for roundness is a shape 
not shape. Therefore, why Meno is wrong for supplying so many virtues in his 
answer is clear, since they are individually each a virtue and not virtue itself. What 
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Socrates pursues is the thing (or feature or character) that makes them all the same as 
a virtue. Nevertheless, Meno still cannot understand Socrates’ idea. Socrates gives 
his own definition of shape: “Shape is that which alone of existing things always 
follows colour.”(75b)138  However, Meno thinks this definition is stupid, since no one 
could be sure that everyone knows what colour is. Assuming someone does not know 
what colour is, then how does this definition work? Socrates praises this query and 
asks Meno whether he could understand the words “plane” and “solid”. After gaining 
Meno’s positive response, Socrates defines shape for a second time, “a shape is that 
which limits a solid; in a word, a shape is the limit of a solid” (76a). What about 
colour? Socrates defines colour as “an effluvium from shapes which fits the sight and 
is perceived” (76d).  
In sum, the universal definition that Socrates pursues should satisfy the 
following conditions: (a) The definition of X should reflect the characters or features 
that could make every item which could be called X an X. (b) An object could be 
defined in various ways, i.e. an object could have many definitions, as Socrates’ two 
definitions of shape show. From these three conditions and the definitions that 
Socrates offers in the Meno, it seems that Socrates is an empiricist rather than an 
anti-empiricist. We could reach this conclusion by analysing three definitions above. 
Before we analyse those definitions, we should consider the definition of 
“empiricism” and “experience”. “Empiricism” is the theory that all knowledge is 
derived from experience and observation. “Experience” could mean three things, 1) 
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 This translation G. M. A. Grube is not so clear; especially the word “follows”. R. S. Bluck translates it as 
“follows upon” or “accompanies” which is more helpful. See Bluck (1961) p.243.  
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observation of facts and events; 2) skills, knowledge or theories that are gained 
through time and 3) emotions stimulated by an event. 
Having made clear the definition of “empiricism” and “experience”, let us 
consider the three definitions.139 The first definition is, “Shape is that which alone of 
existing things always follows colour” (75b). The definition shows that “anything 
that has shape must have some colour”.140 This conclusion could be learned over 
time and through observation. When the definition uses the word “always”, it means 
that anyone who sees the shape of something repeatedly will observe that the shape 
has colour every time and then reach the conclusion that shape always accompanies a 
colour. The same procedure could be applied to the first characteristic. When 
someone tries to justify it, he or she could always observe something and see whether 
the object has a shape or not. Finally, after countless experience or justifications, 
someone can admit, “anything that has shape must have some colour”, as the 
definition says.  
The second definition, namely, “a shape is that which limits a solid; in a word, a 
shape is the limit of a solid”, needs to be considered. The same procedure that applies 
to the first definition could again apply to the second definition. Someone could test 
every existing solid that he could find to observe whether it has a shape. The answer 
is obvious, since there is no case that is not like this. This experiment is based on 
experience over time and the definition could be gained through practice, as in the 
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 Vlastos has discussed these three definitions from elenchus and mathematics direction. See Vlastos, G. 1991. 
Elenchus and Mathematics. In: Vlastos (1991) pp. 120-126. 
140
 Sharples offers two possible interpretations of this definition: (1) “one cannot have a patch of colour which has 
no shape”; (2) “anything that has shape must have some colour”. I take the second interpretation here. See 
Sharples (1991) pp.131-132. 
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first definition.  
The third and last definition is of colour and it defines colour as “an effluvium 
from shapes which fits the sight and is perceived”. Socrates clearly connects the 
word “effluvium” to Empedocles’ philosophy (76c). Since the definition of colour is 
an important issue in the Theaetetus, though it seems not so important in the Meno, 
let us analyse its definition carefully here. Generally speaking, as R .W. Sharples 
concludes,  
 
“Empedocles, like other Presocratics, explained sense-perception in terms of the 
giving off of particles from physical objects; some of these are of such size that they 
affect our sight, others affect other organs of sense.”141  
 
Theophrastus reports,  
 
“Empedocles has the same theory about all the senses, maintaining that 
perception arises when something fits into the passages of any of the senses. This is 
why one sense cannot judge the objects of another, since the passages of some are 
too wide, of others too narrow for the object perceived, so that some things pass 
straight through without making contact while others cannot enter at all.”(DK 31A 
86)142  
 
Socrates in the Meno gives us three simple principles to describe Empedocles’ idea 
about perception: (1) “There are effluvia of things”; (2) “There are channels through 
which the effluvia make their way”; (3) “Some effluvia fit some of the channels, 
while others are too small or too big” (Meno 76c). There is no difference between 
what Theophrastus reports and what Socrates says. Empedocles tries to explain what 
                                                 
141
 Sharples (1991) p.135. 
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 The translation comes from The Presocratic Philosophers. See Kirk, G. et al. eds. (1983) pp.309-310. 
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comes from a sensible thing as the object of what we perceive. Following this, the 
definition of colour could be understood, since the rest of the vocabulary is easy for 
Meno. “Shape” has been defined and Meno confirms that he knows that there is 
“sight” as Socrates asked (76d). If we generalize Empedocles’ idea, the definition 
tells how we perceive sensible objects. Firstly, there must be a sensible object outside 
of us, which could have the effluvia. Effluvia are actually of various sorts that could 
fit different types of channels of the organs, like the eyes, the nose or the ears. Then 
those channels of our organs receive the effluvia. At the moment of receiving the 
effluvia, we perceive the sensible object. Socrates does not refer to any types of 
knowledge or reflection in our soul, but only mentions the process of how we 
perceive. From the definition of colour, we could say that the definition itself comes 
from the experience of perceiving colours. Although the definition of colour seems 
more abstract than the first two definitions in the sense of relating to experience, it 
seems that the third definition is still an empirical definition.  
After the investigation of these three definitions in the Meno, we gain a 
conclusion, i.e. Socratic “universal definition” in the dialogue bases on experience.143 
If we generalize what I have gained through the Meno, it seems that the historical 
Socrates is an empiricist when he is pursuing universal knowledge. Two conclusions 
follow.  
The first conclusion is that the view of the historical Socrates as an empiricist 
seems to contradict my argument about Plato’s chronology, namely that he holds 
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 I have no more room to discuss the definitions in other Socratic dialogues. 
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neither empiricism nor anti-empiricism. Then there are four results from this 
contradiction. Either the historical Socrates is an anti-empiricist or he is an empiricist; 
or he is a complicated person who both is an anti-empiricist and an empiricist; or he 
is neither. How could Socrates hold both empiricism and anti-empiricism? One 
possibility could be that there is no such distinction between empiricism and anti-
empiricism in Socrates’ mind. What Socrates did was change his position to fit 
various situations. This is possible and is what I have argued above, i.e. it shows that 
Socrates himself does not hold a fixed position empiricism or anti-empiricism. The 
historical Socrates himself claims to know nothing and my argument is all about 
Theaetetus which represents the Platonic Socrates according to Vlastos’ scheme. 
There is a second conclusion. The texts about the universal definition are all 
from the Meno, so if Socrates in the Meno is Plato’s Socrates, then, he is the 
mouthpiece of Plato’s own idea. Then the conclusion about the definition, i.e. he is 
an empiricist, contradicts the conclusion above, i.e. that Plato’s Socrates is an anti-
empiricist. Nearly all the Socratic dialogues end in aporia. That means, nearly all the 
universal definitions that Socrates pursues are failures. Therefore, it is strange that 
Socrates successfully defines two things and supplies three definitions in the Meno. 
If we realize that the ideas in the Meno reflect Plato’s own idea, this strangeness 
retreats, for Plato’s Socrates tries to give some positive ideas, as Vlastos has pointed 
out.144 If so, we have reason to connect the pursuit of the universal definition to the 
theory of recollection, simply because the process of gaining the universal definition 
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and the theory of recollection appear in the same dialogue, i.e. Meno. If we consider 
the theory of recollection and the process of gaining a universal definition together, 
then the latter would no longer be a process in the sensible world but rather in the 
other world, for the premise of recollection is that the soul has seen all things and has 
gained knowledge before birth. We do need to investigate which world Socrates 
refers to here. We do not need to know whether it is the world of the Forms that has 
got into the horizon of the Meno, or whether it is underworld or Hades, as the 
dialogue tells us. What we should know is that there is another world that is different 
from the sensible world, which will allow the soul to gain knowledge. Moreover, the 
Meno tells us that the soul “has seen all things here and in the underworld” (81c). 
Whether Socrates uses “has seen” in the sense of a metaphor or not, Plato actually 
treats the method or way of gaining knowledge the same as the process described by 
Socrates. Socrates is no longer an empiricist, since he does not believe that we could 
gain universal definitions through experience and over time. Of course, the process 
of gaining knowledge is still a kind of experience, but it is never an experience in the 
sensible world as we expect. The experience is gained in another world and would be 
brought by the soul into the sensible world. Then, it is not a kind of experience but 
rather a kind of recollection. In addition, knowledge that is gained in the process is 
no longer empirical knowledge, but innate knowledge, namely, it is gained before 
birth. Returning to the question of whether Socrates is an empiricist or an anti-
empiricist: in the sense of being a pursuer of universal definition, Socrates is an anti-
empiricist.  
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The conclusion from the arguments about the definition issue is that Socrates is 
probably an anti-empiricist in Theaetetus and Plato possibly gives his hint on the 
keynote of anti-empiricism of Theaetetus by using the name of Socrates,145 which 
agrees with my analysis of Euclides.  
 
3.4 Theodorus: the Function of Mathematics in Theaetetus 
Theodorus 146  is the fourth person who needs to be discussed. He is a 
mathematician in Cyrene and was teaching mathematics in Athens just before the 
death of Socrates. Although his contribution to mathematics147 has been questioned 
by some scholars,148 it is unmistakable that Plato portrays Theodorus as an expert on 
mathematics. 149  Another point that should be noticed is that Socrates describes 
Protagoras as Theodorus’ “dead friend” (168e) and jokes about him as the “measure” 
of “geometrical proofs” (168e), alluding to Protagoras’ famous saying, 
 
“Man is the measure of all things: of the things which are, that they are, and of 
the things which are not, that they are not” (152a).150  
 
Socrates asks Theodorus to defend Protagoras’ idea,  
 
“Do not go on imagining that it is my business to be straining every nerve to 
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 Socrates is not always the key speaker in all Plato’s late period dialogues.  
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 Vlastos discusses some sources about the historical Theodorus and supplies information about him as a person 
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defend your dead friend while you do nothing” (169a).  
 
Protagoras who is an important figure in the dialogue does not appear in person, but 
the power of his idea is shown through Theaetetus and Theodorus. This strategy of 
casting puts Protagoras in the position of Plato in the sense that both have 
representatives in the text, though all the characters are actually controlled by the 
author of the dialogue, Plato. Protagoras himself is neither an anti-empiricist nor an 
empiricist, for he is a relativist, believing that everything perceived by an individual 
is true, as his famous saying shows. When we consider the character Theodorus, we 
have no idea what position Theodorus stands for. There is in fact a series of questions. 
Does Theodorus agree with Protagoras? Even if he does agree with Protagoras, what 
is the degree of agreement? Does he agree completely or just partly? If we grant that 
he agrees with Protagoras’ idea, how could we define his position on either 
empiricism or the opposite? As the dialogue shows, Socrates treats Theodorus as the 
representative of Protagoras, so whether Theodorus actually agrees with Protagoras’ 
idea is not important. There is some evidence, however, that Theodorus disagrees 
with Protagoras’ philosophy, or at least Protagoras’ idea on geometry. For Waterfield 
reminds us of a piece of testimony from Aristotle,  
 
“…for no perceptible thing is straight or curved in this way; for a hoop touches 
a straight edge not at a point, but as Protagoras said it did, in his refutation of the 
geometers” (Metaphysics, 998a1-4).151  
 
                                                 
151
 See Waterfield (1987) pp. 193-194. 
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Theodorus himself admits,  
 
“It is not I, you know, Socrates, but Callias, the son of Hipponicus, who is the 
guardian of Protagoras’ relicts. As it happened, I very soon inclined away from 
abstract discussion to geometry” (164e-165a).  
 
After Socrates offers his arguments to attack Protagoras’ idea on perception, 
Theodorus even admits, “…Protagoras’ statements are completely untrue” (179b). 
The important issue is whether Theodorus is familiar with Protagoras’ 
philosophy or not, so that he is eligible to defend Protagoras’ philosophy as his 
representative. This seems beyond doubt. Socrates identifies Theodorus as the “dead 
friend” of Protagoras, so Socrates must think that Theodorus is good enough as the 
defender for Protagoras. This kind of ability contains two aspects: one is Theodorus’ 
familiarity with Protagoras’ idea; the other is Theodorus’ intelligence or cleverness as 
a defendant. Text at 170a and 178e shows that Theodorus is familiar with Protagoras’ 
idea. At 170a, Socrates says, “He (Protagoras) says, does he not, that things are for 
every man what they seem to him to be?” and Theodorus replies, “Yes, that is what 
he says”. At 178e, Theodorus admits, “And in fact, Socrates, this at any rate is a 
point on which Protagoras used to make strong claims to superiority over other 
people”. The examples for the second aspect are also easy to find, though most of the 
occasions when Theodorus speaks are like those of interlocutors in the Socratic 
dialogues, just muttering some sentences like “Yes, I agree.”, “Quite true.” or 
“Apparently.” However, at 179e-180b, Theodorus mentions and shows familiarity 
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with the followers of Heraclitus which suggests that he is equipped for presenting 
philosophical ideas.152 
Hence, Protagoras’ position on either empiricism or anti-empiricism becomes 
less important than Theodorus’ position on them. That is why Protagoras, whose 
philosophy occupies the dominant discussion of the perception section, does not 
appear in the framework or prologue of Theaetetus. Referring to the position on 
empiricism or its opposite that Theodorus holds, no sources prove it. There are four 
things relevant to Theodorus. Theodorus is a quite old man with long beard (168e). 
He introduces Theaetetus into the discussion (143e-144d). Therefore, he repeatedly 
prefers Theaetetus to answer Socrates’ questions and arguments (165a-b; 168e; 183d). 
He mainly researches on geometry and other branches of philosophy, as Socrates 
says (145c-d), or more exactly, at 145a, both Socrates and Theaetetus think that 
Theodorus is not only a geometer, but “a master of astronomy and arithmetic and 
music” as well. He has an open mind about Protagoras’ philosophy and wishes to 
keep away from abstract arguments (165a). It seems that Theodorus himself takes no 
position about the options between empiricism and anti-empiricism from his attitude 
to Protagoras’ philosophy, i.e. he is concerned only with the concrete questions of 
geometry. This may be because he is too old to have energy to research other things. 
However, his identity as a researcher of geometry in the Theaetetus is interesting.153 
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 Colvin has explained what “followers of Heraclitus” or in his term, “the comrades of Heraclitus” means. He 
says, “It would be a mistake to think that this term refers to ‘Heracliteans’ in the same way that one might refer to 
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When Vlastos discusses Meno, he points out, “knowledge of geometry is taken as the 
paradigm of all knowledge, including moral knowledge”, 154  Hence, is there no 
special meaning about the identity of Theodorus as a geometer? When we consider 
geometry, even mathematics in a broad sense, three issues immediately appear. The 
first issue is about ideas of the Pythagoreans (including Pythagoras and his 
followers).155  The second one is that this recalls the famous example of a slave 
learning geometry in Meno. The last thing is about mathematics itself in Greece. We 
may consider these three issues together.  
Kahn points out on Pythagorean influence on Plato that “Aristotle claims that 
Plato’s philosophy was profoundly influenced by Pythagorean teaching.” 156  As 
Aristotle has reported,  
 
“…Only the name ‘participation’ was new; for the Pythagoreans say that things 
exist by imitation of numbers, and Plato says that they exist by participation, 
changing the name” (Metaphysics, 987b10-12).  
 
Aristotle believes that Plato  
 
“agreed with the Pythagoreans in saying that the One is substance and not a 
predicate of something else; and in saying that the numbers are the causes of the 
                                                                                                                                          
with Dorter’s idea, for someone A could be very familiar with another one B, but it is possible that A suddenly 
could not even remember B’s name. In addition, the evidences that Theodorus could defend Protagoras and could 
explain Heraclitus’ philosophy (179e-180a) have proved Theodorus’ competence for philosophical discussion. 
See Dorter (1994) p. 70. 
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 Vlastos offers us a brilliant discussion about the relationship between Socratic elenchus and mathematics; 
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 Kahn (2001) p.11. 
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substance of the other things, he also agreed with them…” (Metaphysics, 987b24-25).  
 
He still believes that Plato diverges “from the Pythagoreans in making the One and 
the numbers separate from things…” (Metaphysics, 987b29-30). More importantly, 
Kahn, citing Whitehead’s idea, reminds us that Pythagoras is “the first thinker to 
appreciate the function of mathematical ideas in abstract thought”.157 There are two 
topics about Pythagorean philosophy relevant to my arguments: one is the idea of 
reincarnation; the other is mathematics.  
I do not intend to discuss in detail the Pythagoreans’ idea about reincarnation,158 
but I wish to note the relationship between reincarnation in the Pythagoreans and 
Plato’s thought. Both of them believe in reincarnation, though with some difference 
in detail. On my reading of the order of the dialogues, the first discussion of 
reincarnation in Plato is in the Meno, where Socrates introduces the idea of 
reincarnation by pretending that he heard it from some other wise men and women 
(81a) and defines this idea as a “divine matter” (81a), which he himself thinks to be 
“both true and beautiful” (81a). Importantly, Socrates treats reincarnation as the 
premise of the recollection theory. Then, in order to prove the reincarnation and the 
recollection theory, Socrates asks a slave boy questions on a geometrical problem 
and successfully leads the slave to gain the correct answer to the geometrical 
question by virtue of asking questions. Why does Plato choose geometry as the proof 
of the theory of recollection? The answer to the geometrical question that is treated 
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as a piece of knowledge was seen by the soul of the slave and recollected or regained 
by the slave after a series of relevant questions from Socrates. This answer in fact 
links knowledge, the immortal soul and recollection together. In the Phaedo, when 
Socrates again mentions the immortality of the soul and the recollection theory, he 
uses the latter as a proof of the former. While he does not employ any proof from 
geometry, he introduces the theory of Forms this time. In Republic, Plato claims 
mathematics as the object of mathematical reasoning (διάνοια), which is only 
different from the Forms and intelligence or dialectic (νόησις) by the fact that 
mathematics still needs “visible figures” (Republic, 510d). In the Republic, 
mathematics that is akin to the Forms is about “what happens in geometry and 
related sciences” (511b). It would not be strange if geometry in the Meno has the 
same function in Socrates’ arguments as the Forms in the Phaedo. It is clear that 
geometry is a special discipline to Plato.  
The most important and relevant question is the connection between 
mathematics and empiricism or its opposite. Plato deliberately sets Socrates’ 
interlocutor Theodorus as a mathematician, especially considering that Theodorus’ 
main interest is in geometry, which has a close relationship to a series of important 
theories that Plato holds about epistemology, including the theory of recollection, the 
theory of Forms and the immortality of soul. All these theories stand on the side of 
anti-empiricism. Further, mathematical proof is obtained from deductive reasoning 
and could not be gained through induction. Consider the texts at 147d-148b, where 
Theaetetus reports how Theodorus taught him the irrational numbers and the relevant 
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mathematical notions:  
 
“Theodorus here was demonstrating to us with the aid of diagrams a point about 
powers. He was showing us that the power of 3 square feet and the power of 5 square 
feet are not commensurable in length with the power of 1 square foot…since the 
powers were turning out to be unlimited in number. We might try to collect the 
powers in question under one term, which could apply to them all.” (147d-e). And 
“We divided all numbers into two classes. Any number which can be produced by the 
multiplication of equal numbers, we compared to a square in shape…” (147e).  
 
Theaetetus also introduces the procedure of finding out the notion of “oblong number” 
and the term “length” (148a), which is the same procedure as at 147d-e. It is 
important to see that the basic method that Theodorus employs is to explain the 
notions and express the geometrical ideas by showing and applying a diagram, a 
square.159  
It seems that the whole process of expressing the geometrical idea and 
introducing the notions of mathematics necessarily needs the experience or 
observation of the diagrams. Plato is correct to say that mathematics needs visible 
things in the Republic (510d). However, these visible things just help the learners to 
gain the idea of mathematics and make the abstract mathematical expressions or 
notions or mathematical proofs easier to the learners. That is to say, these sensible 
things do not have any essential influence on the mathematics itself. We could 
employ a diagram, say, a square, to explain the relevant concepts, but the idea 
expressed by the diagram could not be gained merely through observation. The 
diagram itself is a kind of abstract thing. Take as an example a diagram showing 
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 I do not intend to discuss the concrete mathematical question in detail. For discussion about the mathematical 
question itself, see C. C. W. Taylor (1967) pp. 200-201, Thomas, I. rev. edn. (1991) p. 110 and Fowler (1999) pp. 
378-379. 
119 
 
“roundness”, we could not find any perfect roundness in the sensible world not even 
in a drawing of a round shape on paper. The roundness is an abstract thing, separate 
from the sensible things in the world. Roundness is like the abstract ideas. An 
abstract idea could be written by virtue of a human language in a book, an article, or 
even on the ground by using chalk and so could be delivered through the sensible 
world. However, the “ideas” expressed in various ways or methods are not the idea 
itself. They are just the copies of the idea. Roundness is the same for the same reason, 
since roundness could be copied in different ways and the mathematicians could 
employ it to explain the notions or even invent the notion for it, but the mathematical 
ideas relevant to roundness would not necessarily relate to a diagram of it. In this 
sense, we could say, mathematics, in Plato’s mind, when Plato was writing 
Theaetetus, represented a position on anti-empiricism.  
Theodorus who is an important interlocutor of Socrates and one of the 
characters who appears in person in the Theaetetus, is a representative of anti-
empiricism by virtue of his identity as a mathematician. Nevertheless, Theodorus’ 
performance, namely, his speaking, in the dialogue shows at least two things that go 
against this conclusion. Firstly, he is an old man who has no more energy to use on 
any other issue or argument except the concrete geometrical questions or teaching his 
pupils (Theaetetus 146b, 165a). Moreover, he is an open-minded person who is not 
concerned about the philosophical arguments and does not adhere to any 
philosophical school. Surely, Theodorus himself may personally hold no position on 
the side of either Socrates or Protagoras. However, the important thing is why Plato 
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sets a mathematician as an interlocutor of Socrates and a character in the dialogue. 
Plato as a perfect dramatist has no reason to set the cast in his dialogue casually. 
Additionally, mathematics, especially geometry, is a special discipline to Plato. 
Therefore, there is no reason to think that the character Theodorus as the geometer is 
not a kind of symbol. Referring to which kind of symbol Theodorus represents, as 
the evidence has shown, he is a figure symbolizing anti-empiricism.  
My arguments so far have shown how that Euclides, Socrates and Theodorus 
are the representatives of anti-empiricism in Theaetetus. It is now time to investigate 
the last character Theaetetus, after whom the dialogue is named, and what 
philosophical position he holds or what he represents. 
 
3.5 Theaetetus: in what way similar to Socrates? 
Theaetetus is a complicated character in Plato’s dialogues. He appears not only 
in Theaetetus, but also in Sophist and Statesman.160 The fact that he is the main 
interlocutor in the Theaetetus adds to the difficulty of identifying his philosophical 
position. The other difficulty comes from the distinction between the historical 
Theaetetus and Plato’s Theaetetus. Debra Nails reminds us, “It is important to 
distinguish what Theaetetus actually says in the dialogue from the mathematical 
developments attributed to him by later source seeking the origins of what Euclid 
codified in Elements”.161 I will not discuss the historical Theaetetus, for two reasons. 
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 As the same to Theodorus, I will not discuss anything about Theaetetus as a character in the dialogue Sophist.  
161
 See Nails (2002) p.275. Nails also offers us an ample amount of historical facts and details about historical 
Theaetetus.  
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Firstly, most information about the historical Theaetetus is relevant to mathematical 
issues that are not helpful for identifying Theaetetus’ philosophical position in the 
dialogue. Secondly, we do not need to refer to any discussion on history, since the 
information about Theaetetus that Plato gives in the dialogue is sufficient. 
Since we do not have sufficient evidence and information on Theodorus, his 
identity as a mathematician is important to define his philosophical position. But this 
does not apply to Theaetetus, for he is the main interlocutor in the Theaetetus. 
Moreover, the whole dialogue starts with his death and is named after him. Since this 
dialogue is a memorial for him,162 it is appropriate that the dialogue gives us some 
more information about him.  
Theaetetus as a person is interesting. Theodorus describes his appearance in the 
following way “he is not beautiful at all, but is rather like you, snub-nosed, with eyes 
that stick out” (143e). Maybe Theaetetus’ appearance is not worth praising, but his 
disposition is quite good, according to Theodorus’ introduction:  
 
“I have never yet seen anyone so amazingly gifted. Along with a quickness 
beyond the capacity of most people, he has an unusually gentle temper; and, to 
crown it all, he is as manly a boy as any of his fellows. I never thought such a 
combination could exist…this boy approaches his studies in a smooth, sure, effective 
way, and with great good-temper…” (144a).  
 
This quotation points out Theaetetus’ two essential characters, namely, he has a quick 
mind with a good and gentle temper. His quickness refers to “retentive” quality 
(144a), compared to “minds that are sluggish, somehow -- freighted with a bad 
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memory” (144a). Surely, we have no evidence to say that Plato’s emphasis on good 
memory refers to the theory of recollection. Nevertheless, it could still be a clue 
alluding to the recollection theory. The fact that Theaetetus is set as a mathematician 
and geometer by Plato would lead Plato’s readers who are familiar with Meno to 
think about the theory of recollection, since here Plato uses an example of 
geometrical learning to prove the recollection theory.  
After this description and the introduction about Theaetetus from Theodorus, 
Socrates supplements and summarizes:  
 
“I want to see for myself what sort of a face I have. Theodorus says I am like 
you. But look. If you and I each had a lyre, and Theodorus had told us that they were 
both similarly tuned, should we have taken his word for it straight away? Or should 
we have tried to find out if he was speaking with any expert knowledge of music 
(µουσικός)?” Theaetetus replies, “Oh, we should have inquired into that.” Socrates 
continues, “And if we had found that he was a musician, we should have believed 
what he said; but if we found he had no such qualification, we should have put no 
faith in him.” (144e) 
 
There is a turning point here, for two reasons. Firstly, Theaetetus’ appearance and his 
identity are summarized by Socrates, which is important for identifying Theaetetus’ 
philosophical position or what kind of symbol Theaetetus is. Secondly, this is a 
transition from a common conversation to a philosophical investigation of 
knowledge. I will discuss the nature of the transition in the next section. But for now 
will concentrate on the philosophical position of Theaetetus. 
Socrates follows Theodorus’ description that Theaetetus has the same 
appearance as his, i.e. “not beautiful at all”, but “snub-nosed, with eyes that stick out” 
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and makes a joke “I want to see for myself what sort of a face I have” (144d). At 
144d-e above, Socrates employs a lyre analogy to describe the similarity between 
himself and Theaetetus.163 This lyre analogy has two advantages. One is that since 
the analogy follows Theodorus’ conclusion that both Socrates and Theaetetus are 
similar, then it gives the impression that Socrates only uses it to refer to the similarity 
between Socrates and Theaetetus in appearance. The second advantage is that 
Socrates immediately turns the similarity between him and Theaetetus in appearance, 
as Theodorus suggests, to a spiritual similarity between them. Socrates employs this 
hypothetical analogy to posit a similarity between him and Theaetetus, imagining 
they each have a lyre which Theodorus has said are “similarly tuned” (144e). 
Whether the judgement about the lyres is true or not is to be determined by whether 
Theodorus is an expert of music (144e). Similarly, whether Theodorus’ view that 
Socrates is similar to Theaetetus in appearance is reliable is said to depend on 
whether Theodorus is an expert on drawing (144e-145a). But the similarity between 
Socrates and Theaetetus in appearance seems not true, for Theodorus is not an expert 
on drawing. However, in the following text, Theaetetus admits immediately that 
Theodorus is a geometer and an expert on “astronomy and arithmetic and music” in 
response to Socrates’ questions (145a). Again, Theaetetus confirms that he was 
learning geometry, astronomy, music and arithmetic from Theodorus (145c-d). These 
facts show that Theodorus is qualified as an expert on music as well as in 
mathematics. Therefore, if Theodorus compares the lyre of Socrates and the lyre of 
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Theaetetus, the lyre analogy could be true, for if Theodorus is an expert on music, we 
would be justified in believing him. Even if Theodorus only wishes to point out the 
similarity between Socrates and Theaetetus in appearance, Socrates wisely turns their 
physical similarity to spiritual similarity by virtue of Theodorus’ description of 
Theaetetus. Socrates deliberately makes this move and the lyre analogy is only the 
first stage. The second stage of the move is mentioning “good and wise” at 145b, 
where Socrates again makes a hypothesis: “Suppose he (Theodorus) said one of us 
was good and wise…” (145b). Socrates needs the second hypothesis, for Theodorus 
not only introduces Theaetetus’ appearance, but also praises Theaetetus’ good 
qualities or personality, so the second hypothesis supplements the lyre analogy and 
completes it.  
Socrates’ strategy of making a move from a physical similarity to a spiritual 
similarity between him and Theaetetus is successful, since Theodorus is an expert on 
music, even though Socrates imposes this move on Theodorus. Nevertheless, is the 
similarity between Socrates and Theaetetus in appearance not true, only because 
Theodorus is not an expert on drawing? Theodorus never tries in the Theaetetus to 
link Socrates and Theaetetus together in regard to their the characters or personalities. 
All that Theodorus claims is the similarity in appearance between Socrates and 
Theaetetus. Theodorus only mentions the similarity at one place, when he introduces 
Theaetetus to Socrates for the very first time, where he says, “He is not beautiful at 
all, but is rather like you, snub-nosed, with eyes that stick out” (143e). 
As the texts have shown, Theodorus does not employ the lyre analogy to 
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describe the similarity, so Socrates’ claim that Theodorus is unqualified to use the 
analogy is unfair. What Socrates could do is just doubt whether he himself is eligible 
to use the analogy, rather than Theodorus. We could not help to asking is whether 
Socrates’ hesitation about the analogy is relevant to the similarity between him and 
Theaetetus in appearance. This question is important, because if the answer is a 
positive one, then Socrates may actually doubt the similarity of appearance between 
them. Or if the answer is a negative one, then Socrates’ hesitation is not relevant to 
the similarity between him and Theaetetus. That is to say, he does think that both of 
them are physically similar. Socrates’ hesitation about the “tune” analogy conveys 
Socratic doubt on whether Theodorus has any expert knowledge of music (144e). 
Theodorus does not use the analogy, but Socrates himself does. Further, if the 
analogy is not used by Theodorus and what Socrates wishes to find out is just 
whether “he was speaking with any expert knowledge of music” (144e), then his 
hesitation is irrelevant to the similarity, even if Theodorus is not an expert of music. 
Though he cannot speak with any expert knowledge of music, the similarity is still 
there. Hence, Socrates cleverly introduces a new topic from the analogy that he 
himself employs. If so, Socrates as he has admitted actually accepts the similarity 
between himself and Theaetetus. What makes Socrates hesitate to accept the analogy 
of the tune is the analogy itself, i.e. the analogy could not be applied to the similarity, 
for there is no expert of music among them. Therefore, the denial of the analogy does 
not make the similarity impossible.  
In sum, Socrates does not deny that he is similar to Theaetetus in appearance 
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and his “tune” analogy is not relevant to the physical similarity. This summary does 
not help to identify Theaetetus’ philosophical position or to confirm what 
philosophical symbol Plato wishes Theaetetus to be. However, two issues need to be 
further considered. Firstly, why does Plato choose Theaetetus who is physically 
similar to Socrates as the main interlocutor in the dialogue? Secondly, even though 
the“tune” analogy is not relevant to the similar appearance between Socrates and 
Theaetetus, is it meaningful in itself? Or, in other words, does the analogy itself 
deliver some information that could help us to identify Theaetetus’ philosophical 
position?  
The first question definitely has an answer, but, unfortunately, we will never be 
sure about it, since we are not Plato. What we could do mostly is to make a deduction 
or a guess from the information or evidence we have. We need to consider two issues 
carefully, i.e. the death of Theaetetus and the physical similarity between him and 
Socrates.  
At the beginning of the dialogue, Euclides says to Terpsion that he just came 
from the country (142a), where he met Theaetetus (142a) who is nearly dead (142b). 
Theaetetus, as Euclides reports, was “taken to Athens from the camp at Corinth” 
(142a). Moreover, Euclides mentions Theaetetus’ behavior in the battle which won 
other people’s praises (142b). The setting of the beginning of the dialogue gives its 
readers an impression that it is a memorial for Theaetetus. Why does Plato make 
such a setting? This kind of memorial setting for the beginning of a dialogue is rare 
in Plato’s dialogues. An important question is, “Is it a coincidence that Euclides 
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praises Theaetetus’ behavior in a battle just like Socrates’ bravery described in other 
dialogues?” Laches reports on Socrates’ action in the retreat from Delium: 
 
“I have seen him elsewhere keeping up not only his father’s reputation but that 
of his country. He marched with me in the retreat from Delium, and I can tell you 
that if the rest had been willing to behave in the same manner, our city would be safe 
and we could not then have suffered a disaster of that kind.” (Laches 181b).  
 
Alcibiades in Symposium supplies more details about Socrates’ behavior in the same 
retreat:  
 
“And if you would like to know what he was like in battle-- this is a tribute he really 
deserves…during the very battle, Socrates single-handedly saved my life!… (220d-e) 
You should also have seen him at our horrible retreat from Delium (221a)…Even 
from a great distance it was obvious that this was a brave man, who would put up a 
terrific fight if anyone approached him (Symposium 221b).”  
 
The question of whether this parallel is a coincidence becomes more significant 
when Theodorus introduces Theaetetus to Socrates and emphasizes the similarity 
between them. From the information in the dialogue, Plato seems deliberately to 
emphasize the similarity between Socrates and Theaetetus. Socrates and Theaetetus 
are similar with each other in appearance and have the same behavior in the battle. If 
we now consider the meaning of the analogy of the tune which seems to refer to 
some abstract quality, then it seems that the analogy would lead its readers to think 
about the similarities between Socrates and Theaetetus, not only in appearance, but in 
characters or personalities as well. 
Plato deliberately emphasizes the similarity between Socrates and Theaetetus 
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through the setting and opening conversation. This makes us consider whether Plato 
is implying that Theaetetus also shares the same philosophical position as Socrates or 
whether he is treated at least as a symbol of Socrates, namely, a representative of 
anti-empiricism. Further, Theaetetus as a geometer, or at least a student of geometry, 
may also be a symbol of anti-empiricism. If we combine these two considerations, 
we could say that Theaetetus is a symbol of anti-empiricism. He is deliberately 
chosen as the main interlocutor by Plato in the Theaetetus, this symbolism is 
important. 
All the persons who appear in the dialogue are deliberately selected by Plato as 
characters to show that the keynote of the dialogue is anti-empiricism, rather than 
empiricism.  
 
Conclusion 
All the five characters who appear and have the conversation in the dialogue 
either have their own philosophical position of anti-empiricism or are selected by 
Plato as symbols of anti-empiricism. All the information about their identity and their 
ideas in history constructs an allusion, namely, Plato suggests at the outset that the 
keynote of the whole dialogue is anti-empiricism. Commentators on this dialogue, 
such as Burnyeat, Sedley and McDowell, do not discuss this in their commentaries.  
The arguments about anti-empiricism of the characters in the Theaetetus will 
still produce doubt, since it is possible that the selection of those characters is just a 
coincidence. Further, when Plato starts his first investigation of what knowledge is 
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by discussing whether knowledge is perception, it seems impossible to say all his 
theories and ideas in that discussion are anti-empirical. To resolve this apparent 
contradiction, it is time to consider Plato’s examination of knowledge as perception.  
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Chapter Four Theaetetus on Sense-perception 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I will deal with the issue of perception in the Theaetetus.164 In 
chapter three, I have suggested that the setting of Theaetetus alludes to anti-
empiricism. Nevertheless, it is still possible to wonder why Plato creates such a 
setting for Theaetetus, especially when we start considering the first definition of 
knowledge in Theaetetus, i.e. knowledge is perception.165 The discussion between 
Socrates and his interlocutors about knowledge as perception seems hardly to anti-
empiricism. However, I will argue: (1) the failure of the definition of knowledge as 
perception shows that Plato’s philosophical position could not be empiricism; and (2) 
the investigation of knowledge as perception could be a useful supplement for 
understanding the outline of Plato’s anti-empirical epistemology in the Meno and 
Phaedo.  
Socrates and his interlocutors, Theaetetus and Theodorus, discuss the possibility 
of knowledge as sense perception as their first attempt to define “knowledge”. 
Although they finally realize that sense perception cannot be a part of the definition 
of knowledge, the whole discussion of knowledge as sense perception is still worth 
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 “αἴσθησις” (perception) is ambiguous in Plato’s philosophy. Allan Silverman believes “only in the Timaeus 
does Plato clearly say what kind of capacity aisthesis is… according to the Timaeus, aisthesis is a non-cognitive 
capacity of the irrational soul whose objects are limited to the so-called special sensibles, e.g. colours, tastes, 
sounds, etc”. See Silverman (1990) p. 148. 
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 Theaetetus enumerates knowledge as geometry and cobbling at 146c-d. I do not consider it as Theaetetus’ first 
definition of knowledge as some scholars think, since Theaetetus has not realized what kind of definition that 
Socrates wishes to pursue.  
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analysing, since Socrates describes a process of how we could gain knowledge 
through sense perception.  
The strategy in this chapter is to follow the progress of the conversation 
between Socrates and his interlocutors. In the first section 4.1, I will consider how 
Theaetetus enumerates various kinds of knowledge, and why Socrates refuses to 
accept Theaetetus’ answer. Protagoras’ “Man is the measure of all things”, and the 
Socratic criticism of it, which can be divided into three stages, will also be discussed. 
Protagoras’ theory and Socrates’ responses to it will be considered in the next three 
sections, namely, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. Particularly, Socrates in his criticism employs as 
an example how to see colour, which is important for understanding Socrates’ ideas 
on sense perception. I will investigate in detail the process of perceiving colour. 
Although “man is the measure of all things” is closely relevant to and nearly the 
same as “knowledge is sense perception”, Socrates realizes that both “man is the 
measure of all things” and “knowledge is sense perception” depend on how “motion” 
is understood. 166  Therefore, the criticism of both of these propositions is not 
sufficient unless he and his interlocutors consider Heraclitus’ “All things are in 
motion”.167 That will be dealt with in section 4.5. In the last section of this chapter 
4.6, I will briefly explain why perception cannot be a part of knowledge for Socrates.  
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 As I have discussed in chapter three, the keynote of the Theaetetus is anti-empiricism. Therefore, in the next 
chapters on Theaetetus, I will assume that this is clear and will not emphasize or repeat this any longer. My 
interpretation comes from and is similar to Burnyeat’s understanding. Burnyeat calls it “Reading B”. See 
Burnyeat (1990) p.9. Holland confirms that Plato in Theaetetus attacks theories of empiricism by analysing the 
texts at 184b-186e. Holland (1973) pp. 97-116, especially section one. 
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4.1 Theaetetus’ primary answer on the nature of knowledge and Socrates as 
midwife 
At Theaetetus 144e, Socrates emphasizes the similarity between him and 
Theaetetus. The quotation on the expert in music at 144e is a natural transition from a 
common conversation to a philosophical investigation for knowledge.  
Nevertheless, before diving into the texts at 144e, it is important to go back to 
the texts at 144c to consider the context. When Socrates asks Theodorus about 
Theaetetus’ family, Theodorus says he does not remember it and bids Socrates, “… 
But look and see if you recognize (γιγνώσκεις) him.” Socrates replies,  
 
“Yes, I know (γιγνώσκω) him. He’s son of Euphronius of Sunium -- very much 
the kind of person, my friend, that you tell me his son is… But I do not know (οἶδα) 
the boy’s name” (144c).168  
 
I am not interested in the history of Theaetetus’ family, but the vocabulary in the 
quotation should be noticed. The concepts of “recognize” and “know” are used in a 
common way in this quoted text, for everyone would chat with each other like that in 
ordinary life. Socrates says that he knows the boy, namely Theaetetus, but does not 
know the boy’s name at that moment. He did know some facts, i.e. Theaetetus is the 
son of Euphronius of Sunium and some other information about Theaetetus’ father. 
So far, the conversation still stays in casual, ordinary terms and is not on the 
philosophical level. There is no reason to assume that Socrates or Plato wishes to use 
the word “know” as part of a developing philosophical investigation. 
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 All the quotations of the text of Theaetetus are translated by M. J. Levett, revised by Myles Burnyeat. See, 
Burnyeat (1990) pp. 259-351. See also, Cooper (1997) pp. 158-234.  
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After this description and the introduction about Theaetetus from Theodorus, 
Socrates replies,  
 
“I want to see for myself what sort of a face I have. Theodorus says I am like 
you. But look. If you and I each had a lyre, and Theodorus had told us that they were 
both similarly tuned, should we have taken his word for it straight away? Or should 
we have tried to find out if he was speaking with any expert knowledge of music 
(µουσικός)?”  
Theaetetus replies, “Oh, we should have enquired into that.” (144e) 
 
After this, Socrates continues,  
 
“And if we had found that he was a musician, we should have believed what he said; 
but if we found he had no such qualification, we should have put no faith in him” 
(144e).  
 
As I have argued in chapter three,169 the analogy of tuning here is irrelevant to the 
similarity between Socrates and Theaetetus in their physical nature and appearance, 
though it suggests that Theaetetus has the same characteristics or personality as 
Socrates or he is a philosophical symbol of anti-empiricism. Therefore, the analogy 
of music creates a smooth transition to a new topic, from a common conversation to 
a philosophical investigation. Two things need to be noticed in the quotation. Firstly, 
although Socrates does not use “γιγνώσκω” and “οἶδα” in the text of 144e, he uses 
the word “µουσικός” to refer to a person with expert knowledge of music. The term 
“µουσικός”, unlike the words “γιγνώσκω” and “οἶδα” at 144c which are used in a 
very vague way, is used in a very rigorous sense. The usage of the words “γιγνώσκω” 
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and “οἶδα” at 144c could refer to any information or piece of knowledge that already 
exist in a soul or mind. For instance, I tell someone that I know the country of France, 
just knowing one fact about it, e.g. “France is a European country”, even if I have no 
idea about the fact that its language is French or have no other information about it. 
In an extreme example, I just know the name of “France” and know nothing else 
about it but when someone mentions France, I could still say, “Oh, I know that 
country”. But there is a third possibility between “I know …” and “I do not know (I 
am ignorant) …”. The rigorous usage of “know” or “knowledge” is not being used at 
144e, since the terms are used in a looser sense. Nevertheless, does Plato or Socrates 
realize the third possibility in Theaetetus? For the moment, I put the question aside 
and concentrate on the passage that follow.  
Following Socrates’ comment at 152c, expert knowledge must be not only 
unerring but changeless as well. In English, we use “know” in at least two ways, the 
broad sense and the narrow or rigorous sense. The former, broad sense, refers to any 
information, principle, or piece of knowledge a person has. This is the usage of 
“know” at 144c (and other places in the text, such as 145a and 145d170). In contrast, 
the latter, narrow sense, refers to some principle or knowledge that never changes, or, 
in other words, is beyond time and will be right forever. There are two kinds of usage 
of the word “know” (and “knowledge”) in the opening texts of Theaetetus as well. 
The broad sense which is used in common life and can refer to any information or 
principles in our mind or soul, and the narrow sense which specifically refers to some 
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 At 145d-e, knowledge and wisdom is said to be identical. David Sedley offers an analysis on this text. See 
Sedley and Brown (1993) pp.125-149+151. 
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“eternal” or changeless principles, such as mathematics, geometry or algebra.171 
Since Theodorus and Theaetetus are concerned with the specialist expertise of 
geometry, Plato’s readers would find the transition of different usage of knowledge at 
144e natural. Moreover, 144e is the first time in Theaetetus that Socrates begins to 
pursue the usage of knowledge as the knowledge of a skill. The idea at work here is 
that once a person has gained the knowledge of a skill, he or she will be unerring in 
their expertise or skill. 
According to the texts, Theaetetus does not notice the trap that Socrates uses 
when he employs the analogy of the tune. Theaetetus like interlocutors in other 
dialogues, tries to enumerate various species of knowledge, when he is facing the 
Socratic question, What do you think knowledge is?”. Thus, he responds,  
 
“I think that the things Theodorus teaches are knowledge -- I mean geometry 
and the subjects you enumerated just now. Then again there are the crafts such as 
cobbling, whether you take them together or separately. They must be knowledge, 
surely.” (146c-d) 
 
Socrates refuses to accept his answer,  
 
“…I asked you for one thing and you have given me many; I wanted something 
simple, and I have got a variety.” (146d).  
 
Socrates’ objection leads us to think about his objection to Meno,  
 
                                                 
171
 The knowledge on these subjects is treated as changeless or right in antiquity, but wrong in modern times. 
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“I am looking for one virtue, I have found you to have a whole swarm of them” 
(72a).172  
 
Both Theaetetus and Meno try to count various kinds of something when they are 
asked to give a definition. It is a familiar response for those people who have no 
philosophical training and therefore do not understand the Socratic requirement of a 
universal definition. Additionally, Socrates changes the topic to a philosophical 
investigation suddenly and Theaetetus obviously is not ready for it. In such a 
situation, it is not strange that Theaetetus makes the same mistake as Meno.  
The two usages of knowledge are mixed together in the texts until Socrates asks 
Theaetetus “what on earth is knowledge?” (145e). Form this point onwards, 
knowledge in the narrow sense dominates the rest of the dialogue.  
At first, Theaetetus still understands “knowledge” in the broad sense, so he 
gives Socrates his answer to what knowledge is (146d), “the cobbling”, mathematics, 
geometry and music all are knowledge. Ironically, Socrates claims that this answer is 
really a “generous” answer (146d) and then he refuses to accept it by using the 
following argument: 
(1) Cobbling = knowledge of making shoes (146d) 
(2) Carpentering = knowledge of making wooden furniture (146e) 
(3) This is not the answer to the question “what is knowledge?”, but the answer 
to “how many are the branches of knowledge?” (146e)173 
                                                 
172
 Cornford has noticed this, by saying “It is significant that this introductory conversation runs closely parallel 
with the first part of an earlier dialogue, the Meno.”See Cornford (1935) p.27.  
173
 P. T. Geach thinks that Socrates in such a case is asking a general criterion for a thing. He argues that this 
method has problems and calls it “the Socratic fallacy”. Cf. Geach (1966) pp. 33-34. M. F. Burnyeat has a 
discussion about “the Socratic fallacy” in Theaetetus 146c-147c. See Burnyeat (1977) pp. 381-393. 
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Socrates here, however, not only shows that Theaetetus’ answer is not the right 
answer to his question, but also reminds his readers that he is currently discussing 
knowledge in the philosophical sense, namely the narrow sense. 
Socrates immediately points out that if someone does not know what knowledge 
is, he will not know the knowledge of a skill either. In order to make his points 
meaningful to Theaetetus, Socrates gives him an example, just as he offers Meno 
three definitions in the dialogue Meno. At 147a-b, Socrates raises the question “What 
is clay?” and observes that it would be absurd to imagine that  
 
“…the person who asked the question would understand anything from our 
answer when we say ‘clay’, whether we add that it is dollmakers’ clay or any other 
craftsman’s. Or do you think that anyone can understand the name of a thing when he 
does not know what the thing is?”  
 
The same principle can be applied to cobbling and any other subject that Theaetetus 
has mentioned in his answer. After this claim, Socrates offers an example of the 
answer to “what is clay?” to show the standard or criterion of the answer of the 
question “what is knowledge?” that he wants. Socrates says: clay “is earth mixed 
with liquid” (147c). This definition is not fitting to the formula “knowledge = true 
opinion + an account of the reason why” which is discussed at Meno, since clay “is 
earth mixed with liquid” does not show which part of it belongs to true opinion and 
which part of it is the account of the reason why. Rather it is closer to the definition 
of Theaetetus’ first definition of knowledge, “knowledge is perception”. Everyone 
could conclude that clay “is earth mixed with liquid” by perception. Maybe, as 
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Socrates has claimed a little earlier, his definition of clay is just “a short and 
commonplace answer” (147c). Then the definition of the clay may be used only to let 
Theaetetus gain his own “short and commonplace answer” about “what is 
knowledge?”174 
Enlightened by Socrates, Theaetetus himself now describes his discovery about 
two kinds of powers: one is “a square” or “equilateral number”; the other is “oblong 
number” (148a). Socrates praises this and points out that he wants Theaetetus “in the 
same way to give one single account (ἐνί λογῳ προσειπεῖν) of the many branches of 
knowledge” (148d). Indeed, Socrates’ usage of “knowledge” is so rigorous that 
Theaetetus admits he “never hear(s) anyone else state the matter in the way that you 
(Socrates) require” (148e).  
After the first attempt at the definition of knowledge, Socrates does not 
immediately ask Theaetetus for his second answer. Rather he interrupts the topic and 
gives us an interlude on his method or skill of midwifery (149a-151d). Comparing 
this with the structure of the dialogue Meno shows that both dialogues have the same 
compositional structure. For after Meno offers a list of virtues, the dialogue Meno is 
also interrupted in the same way – in that case by the so-called Meno’s paradox. 
After supplying an explanation of Socratic midwifery, Theaetetus turns its direction 
to the three definitions of knowledge which are the main body of the dialogue. 
Similarly, after Meno’s paradox, Meno completely turns into the discussion of 
epistemology. However, there is also a difference in structure between these two 
                                                 
174
 Lesley Brown thinks that the texts of Socrates rebuts Meno’s definition of virtue at Meno 79 and Theaetetus’ 
definition of knowledge at Theaetetus 146-147 reflects the priority of whole over parts when Socrates pursues 
definitions. See Brown (1994) pp. 232-234. 
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dialogues. Before Meno’s paradox, Meno not only enumerates different kinds of 
virtue but also offers other definitions of virtue. But after the paradox, he has no 
opportunity to define virtue any longer. Theaetetus is different. Theaetetus offers his 
three definitions after the interlude of midwifery and the whole dialogue thereafter 
relates to those three definitions.  
The interruption of midwifery has the same structural position as Meno’s 
paradox and is a turning point in Theaetetus. Since Socratic midwifery is a 
complicated issue,175  I intend to quote and discuss only those sentences that are 
necessarily and relevant to my arguments here.  
Socrates introduces his midwifery as following: 
 
“…Then do you mean to say you have never heard about my being the son of a 
good hefty midwife, Phaenarete?”... “You know, I suppose, that women never 
practise as midwives while they are still conceiving and bearing children themselves. 
It is only those who are past child-bearing who take this up”… “She [Artemis] did 
not, it is true, entrust the duties of midwifery to barren women, because human 
nature is too weak to acquire skill where it has no experience”… “[T]here is not in 
midwifery the further complication, that the patients are sometimes delivered of 
phantoms and sometimes of realities, and that the two are hard to distinguish. If there 
were, then the midwife’s greatest and noblest function would be to distinguish the 
true from the false offspring…” (149a- 150b) 
 
Another difference that Socrates observes is that: 
 
“I attend men and not women, and that I watch over the labour of their souls, 
not of their bodies…” (150b) 
 
                                                 
175
 Sedley reminds us to notice the distinction between “a Socratic surface” and “Platonic undercurrent”. Further, 
he summarises ten facts about Socratic midwifery. See Sedley (2004) pp. 30-37. The midwifery also relates to 
other issues in Platonic and Socratic philosophy. One of them, for example, is the relationship between this skill 
and Socratic claims to know nothing. Irwin and Vlastos have important discussions on this topic. See, Irwin 
(1995) pp. 17-19 and pp. 27-30. Vlastos (1994) pp. 39-66.  
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The passage (149a-151d)176  is famous as Socrates’ midwifery. It is an important 
interlude in Theaetetus, for it shows that gaining knowledge is no longer the task of a 
single agent relating to an object of knowledge. Rather, the process of gaining 
knowledge needs the third factor, namely, the midwife. This third element will help 
us to understand Socrates’ discussion on knowledge as perception in Theaetetus, 
especially the process of how eyes perceive the colour white. This third element also 
helps us to understand the example of Meno’s slave gaining the answer to a 
geometrical question in Meno. Meno does not present Socrates as midwife, but he 
actually is and we now understand that the process of recollection also needs a 
midwife for helping the agent to recollect.  
To Socrates’ himself, he is barren of wisdom, meaning that he has no knowledge. 
For Socrates treats wisdom as knowledge: “So knowledge and wisdom will be the 
same thing” (145e). The midwifery passage seems to supply a framework for how we 
get knowledge. The framework is summarized as follows: 
Step one: there is an agent and a midwife. 
Step two: the agent produces opinions about something by means of the help 
from the midwife. 
Step three: the midwife and the agent together check the production of the agent, 
i.e. the agent’s opinion about something. 
Step four: if the production is a “wind-egg”, then they return to the step one. If 
the production is a good and reasonable one, then they continue to the next step. 
                                                 
176
 Here, its significance of historical Socrates and the problems about the some difficult sentences could be 
ignored. 
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Step five: if the production is checked and agreed on by both the agent and 
midwife, it means the agent gains knowledge of something.177 
 
There are two functions of the midwife in the process of gaining knowledge: the 
midwife needs to lead the agent to produce the agent’s own opinion on something 
and the midwife needs to check whether the agent’s production is a real piece of 
knowledge or just a “wind-egg”. 
 
4.2 Knowledge as sense-perception and Socrates’ first response to Protagoras’ 
theory 
After the interlude of midwifery, Theaetetus offers his first definition. 
Theaetetus claims,  
 
“It seems to me that a man who knows something perceives what he knows, and 
the way it appears at present, at any rate, is that knowledge is simply perception.” 
(151e)  
 
Socrates thinks that this is “a good straight answer” (151e) and asks, “You hold that 
knowledge is perception?” Theaetetus confirms confidently, “Yes” (151e). Socrates 
connects Theaetetus’ first definition to Protagoras’ famous saying, namely, “Man is 
the measure of all things: of the things which are, that they are, and of the things 
which are not, that they are not” (152a).178 Socrates immediately adds a discussion 
                                                 
177
 The relationship between midwifery and the theory of recollection is not dealt with here. Sedley offers us a 
wonderful explanation on it. See Sedley (2004) pp.28-30. 
178
 Socrates presents Protagoras’ idea as a kind of epistemological relativism. However, it is a question whether 
Protagoras himself in history holds the theory of relativism. Lee Yoon Cheol in his PhD dissertation tries to 
reconstruct Protagoras’ ideas in history as “objectivism”. He tries to prove that “Even when Protagoras utilises 
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about the exact meaning of Protagoras’ saying “man is the measure of all things” and 
to explain it gives us an example of the same wind making different persons 
experience various feelings (152a-c). Thereafter, Socrates summarizes, “Perception, 
then, is always of what is, and unerring --- as befits knowledge” (“Αἴσθησις ἄρα τοῦ 
ὄντος ἀεί ἐστιν καὶ ἀψευδὲς ὡς ἐπιστήµη οὖσα.”). 179  Theaetetus agrees, “So it 
appears” (152c). 
This statement on knowledge is very important. As Myles Burnyeat says:  
 
“Plato himself accepts the theories of Protagoras and Heraclitus, subject to 
certain qualifications: in particular the theories must be restricted (as their authors 
did not take care to restrict them) to perception and the world of sensible things. 
Sensible things are, Plato agrees, in a perpetual flux of becoming, and in perception 
each of us has ‘measure’, i.e. an incorrigible awareness, of the sensible qualities 
whose coming and going constitute that flux. But Plato will then argue that this 
                                                                                                                                          
rhetorical sophistry, he appeals to the objectivist use of human logos, universally given to all human beings who 
have a capacity to speak (the ouk estin antilegein doctrine). In this regard, Protagoras is not vulnerable to the 
accusation of self-contradiction, but advocates a certain type of objectivism, namely ‘Protagorean objectivism’, 
holding a coherent ‘epistemological’ - ‘political and ethical’ – ‘linguistic’ position according to which his political 
and ethical ideas are supported by objectivist views of epistemology and the naturalism of language.” See Lee 
(2012) p. 14. 
179
 F. C. White argues that the phrase “ὡς ἐπιστήµη οὖσα” in this sentence should be deleted. The outline of the 
argument of 151 e - 152 c in his mind is like: 
 
A. Theaetetus holds that perception is knowledge. 
B. Protagoras said the same thing but in a somewhat different fashion. 
His form of it was "man is the measure of all things, etc." 
C. Since it is not prima facie evident that what Theaetetus and Protagoras held was in substance the same, an analysis is now given of 
what Protagoras' saying amounted to. It amounted to the double claim that 
i. Perception is "of what is." 
ii. Perception is infallible. 
D. So in Protagoras' view too perception is knowledge. 
E. Therefore Theaetetus and Protagoras both held the same view. (p.221) 
 
If  “ὡς ἐπιστήµη οὖσα” is kept, then “it would make Step C of the passage go as follows”: 
 
i. Protagoras' saying amounts to the claim that perception is "of what is." 
ii. Since perception is knowledge, perception is infallible. (p. 222) 
 
Therefore, steps D and E “become odd to say the least, for you cannot seriously conclude lamely that since inter 
alia perception is knowledge (C ii) then it is knowledge for Protagoras (D), and so Theaetetus and Protagoras held 
the same view (E). The general line of argument in the passage goes to pieces” (p. 222). Then, his “objection all 
along has been to "ὡς ἐπιστήµη οὖσα" as a premiss from which the infallibility of perception is deduced. Further, 
in so far as there is no plausible way of translating it which does not make it such a premiss, I argue that it should 
be frankly deleted.” (p. 224) 
I cannot agree with his argument, since “ὡς ἐπιστήµη οὖσα” refers to both “is always of what is” and 
“unerring”, not solely refers to “unerring”. Moreover, knowledge in the argument of 151 e - 152 c “is always of 
what is, and unerring”, which does not come from the thought of Theaetetus’ “knowledge is perception” and 
Protaigoras’ “man is the measure of all things”, but these two characteristics are assumed without premiss.  
See White (1972) pp. 221-222 and 224. 
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awareness, incorrigible though it be, is not knowledge, precisely because its objects 
belong to the realm of becoming, not being.180 It has been agreed from the start (152c) 
that any candidate for knowledge must pass two tests: it must be always of what is 
and it must be unerring.”181  
 
Although Burnyeat uses the word “tests”, the qualities of being “always of what is” 
and “always unerring” are actually the standards of knowledge. Or maybe we can say 
that these two standards give us a ruler to test whether the object of the test is 
knowledge or not. Further, the word “always” implies that knowledge cannot be in 
the region or realm of becoming. Since in the realm of becoming everything is in 
flux, nothing can always keep itself, which cannot ensure that knowledge is always 
what is. If knowledge is always what is, then the object of knowledge should also be 
always what is.182 The word “unerring” gives a determination of thought, namely, the 
thought must unmistakably grasp the concept of the object. Therefore, we cannot 
hold knowledge about something in vague way. That is why Socrates says in the text 
that we need to abolish words such as: “‘something’, ‘of something’, or ‘mine’, ‘this’ 
or ‘that’, or any other name that makes things stand still” (157b).  
On this account, there is a gap between truth and knowledge. What is true is not 
necessarily knowledge but what is knowledge is always true. What is a fact or an 
affair? When we consider a fact (or affair) and an object, there is a difference 
between them. Take a tree as an example. Let us suppose, there is a tree in the yard 
and there is always a tree in the yard -- this is a fact. Whatever the tree itself becomes 
                                                 
180
 The distinction between “becoming” and “being” is complex in Plato’s philosophy. Robert Bolton gives us a 
good explanation on this issue. See Bolton (1975) pp. 66-95.  
181
 Burnyeat (1990) p.8. 
182
 That is why Plato needs the theory of Forms which ensures that the objects of knowledge, namely, the Forms, 
are changeless.  
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in the various seasons (flourishing in the summer while fading away in the winter) 
and whatever the yard becomes in different times (the yard is dirty or clean etc.), we 
can still say that there is a fact, i.e. “there is a tree in the yard”. For Plato, even if we 
use the right concepts “there is”, “a tree”, “in the yard” to describe the fact, we still 
cannot say that we have here a piece of actual knowledge. For even though the 
statement “there is a tree in the yard” is true, the tree and the environment are 
changing. Next, let us focus on an object that knowledge may refer to. Take tree as 
an example again. Let us suppose, the tree is always in the yard, but in this case, the 
tree and the yard remain the same forever (of course, it is impossible in the sensible 
world). Again, we grasp this by saying “there is a tree in the yard”. Then we have a 
piece of knowledge, for in the later case, “there is a tree in the yard” refers to an 
object which always keep itself, for it uses the correct concepts to describe the object 
which exists always. 
According to the statement of knowledge at 152c, Plato completely removes the 
factors of time and becoming in the domain of knowledge and so actually eliminates 
the factors of moving and change in knowledge. In the Theaetetus, this principle is 
applied as an unshakable principle in Plato’s epistemology. Therefore, in the phrases 
“always of what is” and “always unerring”, the word “always” means forever, eternal 
and changeless. The meaning of “always” matches the nature of Forms well. The 
Forms are always one and changeless, as described in the Phaedo (78d, 80a-b). A 
proposition, description or any type of expression becomes knowledge if and only if 
it refers to the Forms. I think these are the real subtexts or unspoken words of what 
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Socrates says in the text of 152c.183 
Now that the criteria of knowledge for Socrates are clear, let us return to the 
definition “Knowledge is perception”. What does the definition really mean? Does 
Socrates treat what Theaetetus says fairly? 
Socrates thinks that “Knowledge is perception” is a theory from Protagoras 
(152a). 184 
 
“Because he says, you remember, that a man is the measure of all things: of 
those which are, that they are, and of those which are not, that they are not… And he 
means something on these lines: everything is, for me, the way it appears to me, and 
is, for you, the way it appears to you; and you and I are, each of us, a man?” (152a). 
(Translated by McDowell) 
 
When Theaetetus agrees all these points, Socrates continues with an example:  
 
“It sometimes happens, doesn’t it, that when the same wind is blowing one of us 
feels cold and the other not? Or that one feels slightly cold and other very? ...Now on 
those occasions, shall we say that the wind itself, taken by itself, is cold or not cold? 
Or shall we accept it from Protagoras that it is cold for the one who feel cold and not 
for the one who does not?” (152b) (translated by McDowell) 
 
Theaetetus agrees what Socrates says. Then Socrates points out that “appear” is equal 
to “perception” and Theaetetus thinks this is right again (152b). 
Does Socrates understand the key point in Protagoras’ idea here? I do not think 
so, since the quotation, “So perception is always of what is, and free from falsehood, 
                                                 
183
 Burnyeat and Sedley do not notice this in their commentaries on Theaetetus. See Burnyeat (1990) p.10-15 and 
Sedley (2004) pp. 38-49. 
184
 Ugo Zilioli argues that Plato’s Socrates criticises “Protagoras’ relativism and the various epistemological 
theories formulated, more or less completely, by Aristippus, Euclides and Antisthenes, who were the supposed 
founders of Socratic ‘schools’: the Cyrenaics, the Megarians and the Cynics, respectively”, because “they present 
knowledge as based exclusively on perception”. Zilioli (2013) p. 168. 
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as if it’s knowledge.” (152c), could have two different understandings, if we realize 
that it could be applied to different spheres. It could be applied only to the agent or 
could be applied to both an agent and an object. Consider the example of the wind in 
the quotation above. When someone feels a gust of wind, then he is really perceiving 
a wind. This is a fact. Further, feeling or perceiving a wind is actually a process. In 
the winter, if someone goes out from his house and faces a cold wind for nearly one 
hour, at first, he feels slightly cold, but feels very cold in the end. Disregarding 
whether it appears to him very cold or just slightly cold at this moment, the fact is 
that the perception of perceiving the wind is a process, because his feeling changes 
during the time. Let us mark the time that he feels the wind slightly cold as t1 and the 
time he feels very cold as t2. When at t1 he feels slightly cold, this is true, not false, 
i.e. it is a fact to him. Here the definition of ‘cold’ is not the key point. However, the 
line of Socratic thought in the texts seems to be that because someone who feels 
slightly cold at t1 is true to himself. Following Protagoras’ thought, if the wind is 
slightly cold to someone, ‘the wind is slightly cold’ becomes a piece of knowledge, 
since it is a fact. Then the wind shall always keep itself, namely, the wind is always 
slightly cold. In Socrates’ refutation of Protagoras’ ‘man is the measure of all things’, 
the fact ‘the wind is slightly to someone at specific time’ becomes ‘the wind is 
slightly to everyone all the time’. 
This is not the whole example. It is now the right time to consider the concept of 
“cold”. When someone perceives the wind that makes him feel slightly cold at a 
particular time, this is a fact. But where does the feeling of cold come from? There 
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are different ideas among philosophers. John Locke attributes “cold” to the 
secondary quality185 which is produced by the “mind” (or “soul” in antiquity). To 
Protagoras the quality of “cold” obviously belongs to the thing itself.186 In the case of 
the wind, someone perceives the wind, but what he really perceives is a wind and the 
wind in reality is neither cold nor hot. It is definitely true that I think the wind is cold 
while you think the wind is hot or slightly cold or whatever, for cold or hot are 
subjective.187 
Socrates tries to test Protagoras’s theory “man is the measure of all things” to 
see whether this theory will lead to a conclusion of “the wind is cold and is not cold” 
(152b). Protagoras wishes to emphasize that whether the wind is cold or not depends 
on one’s own feeling not other people’s feeling. He emphasizes the important 
position of the human being in any perceiving process. It is hard to image that 
Protagoras would admit, “X is k and is not k” (the wind is cold and is not cold).188 
Take weight as an example. I lift a bag, and feel it is very heavy. It is true to me that 
it is heavy, that is a fact, but maybe someone who has more strength than me may 
think the bag is very light, which is also a fact. It is not that the bag itself is heavy or 
not, rather that the bag has weight that would cause different feelings about the 
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 See Locke (1975) Book 4, chapter 3, §12, pp. 544. 
186
 Whether their theory belongs to idealism or not is not a question here. See Burnyeat (1982) pp. 3-40. 
187
 Cornford makes a distinction between “the sense-object and the physical object” for analysing the wind 
example. This distinction is actually useless, for Protagoras does not refer to the physical object at all as “man is 
the measure of all things” shows. Further, warm or cold of wind could only be judged by someone himself, not 
others. Therefore, what Cornford believes, namely, Protagoras holds that “the wind in itself is both warm and 
cold”, is wrong and impossible. See Cornford (1935) p.33-36. 
188
 Surely, as Burnyeat notes, that “to assert anything is to assert it as a truth”, he asks “isn’t there something 
inherently paradoxical about someone asserting (or believing) that all truth is relative?”. Protagoras cannot avoid 
this dilemma, even if he limits his theory within relativism. See Burnyeat (1990) p. 30 and Cf. Long (2004) pp. 
24-40. 
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heaviness or lightness to different people.189 
The conclusion is that Socrates does not treat Protagoras’ theory well and his 
argument on the perception theory has defects, although he correctly understands 
Protagoras’ intention. Protagoras intends to apply “man is the measure of all things” 
only to the individual, and not to the whole world. However, Socrates deliberately 
extends the application sphere of Protagoras’ theory. In Socrates’ rephrasing of “man 
is the measure of all things”, Socrates extends the application sphere to the whole 
world, including agents and physical objects. His two criteria of knowledge (“always 
of what is” and “always unerring”) are in fact one. The single criterion is removing 
the factor of time, and so eliminating movement, change and process. These two 
criteria of knowledge will definitely contradict the sensible world which is always in 
flux.  
Nevertheless, why does Plato or Socrates mistreat Protagoras’ theory? 190 
Socrates points out at 152e that things that exist are “in process of coming to be, as 
the result of movement and change and blending with one other”. This idea is clearer 
when he borrows Socrates’ interpretation of Homer’s idea, “all things (are) the 
offspring of flux and motion”, to conclude Protagoras’ theory. This brief conclusion 
is the root or reason why Socrates misunderstands or misrepresents Protagoras’ idea. 
If Protagoras is right, then everything is in motion. If everything is in motion, then 
there is no knowledge at all. This is Socrates’ first response to Protagoras’ man is the 
                                                 
189
 E. P. Arthur offers us a similar example: “if I believe that the world is flat then that belief is true for me and, so 
far as anyone can prove, true absolutely. If, on the other hand, someone else believes the world is not flat, his 
belief is likewise absolutely true. For a Protagorean both beliefs are equally true (and true to that Protagorean)”. 
He claims that this idea shows “an essential feature of the Protagorean system”. See Arthur (1982) p. 336. 
190
 T. D. J. Chappell thinks that “Plato fails to convict Protagoras of self-contradiction, he does prove a different 
charge against Protagoras: self-defeat”. See Chappell (2006) p. 111. 
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measure of all things. 
It is complicated when we consider this issue in the sensible world. Socrates’ 
discussion on flux world will help us to understand how we gain knowledge in the 
sensible world and it also leads us to the theory of Forms. Socrates’ discussion on 
flux world will be considered in the section 4.3.  
 
4.3 Socratic second response of Protagoras’ “man is the measure of all things” 
Now I want to pay attention to how the idea of flux is extended between 153d–
156e. At 153d-e, Socrates says,  
 
“Then, my friend, you must understand our theory in this way. In the sphere of 
vision, to begin with, what you would naturally call a white colour is not itself a 
distinct entity, either outside your eyes or in your eyes. You must not assign it any 
particular place; for then, of course it would be standing at its post; it would not be in 
process of becoming.”  
 
This short quotation is the second response to Protagoras’ theory. This short text 
refers to the problem of colour, but Socrates is really talking about the qualities of the 
objects in a very broad sense. Therefore, let us put the issue of colour aside at the 
moment and focus on the problem at the broad level.  
At 153d-e, Socrates begins to talk about colour which he thinks is neither in the 
observer’s eyes nor in the thing or the object observed. This is a profound 
philosophical question, for this approach does not account for abstract objects or 
experience-independent objects. Regarding the objects of knowledge, we can divide 
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them roughly into two groups: one is the things in experience; the other is the things 
which are experience-independent or abstract objects. The first group is simple: 
everything that could be observed, such as a chair or a pen or a computer, is in this 
group. The second group is more complex, for the objects themselves are not 
involved in the process of perception. Things that are experience-independent and 
not themselves entities include colour or numbers or any other abstract things 
(including goodness and beauty). Socrates’ first response (152a-e) to ‘man is the 
measure of all things’ is to point out that knowledge is impossible in the sphere of 
“the things in experience”. His second response (153d-156e) refers to the region of 
“abstract things”. Protagoras’ idea could not be applied to abstract things. The reason 
why Socrates employs the description on how to perceive colour is to show how 
perception can relate to abstract things and Forms.  
However, Socrates’ first refutation to “man is the measure of all things” cannot 
be applied to the abstract things. For abstract things and Forms neither belong to the 
objects observed nor belong to the observers (154b). They even do not belong to the 
perceptual process. Knowledge on this theory will be limited to a very small range, 
since Protagoras’ theory does not include knowledge about abstract things.  
So far, Socrates’ idea on Protagoras’ theory seems clear. However, the “colour” 
example, which he gives to help Theaetetus understand what he means, is more 
difficult to grasp. Socrates does not give us a clear answer about what kind of entity 
colour is. He just says that colour is “not itself a distinct entity” (153e), i.e. he makes 
a negative statement about colour. Therefore, Socrates is just making clear that 
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colour belongs to the region of Becoming (153e). Surely, Socrates discusses colour 
in the process of perceiving and confirms that “we naturally call a particular colour is 
neither that which impinges nor that which is impinged upon, but something which 
has come into being between the two, and which is private to the individual 
percipient” (153e-154a). We should notice that Socrates in this text only refers to “a 
particular colour” not colour itself. Further, He also clearly says that the particular 
colour is private. 
Two key paragraphs refer to the process of perceiving a colour. The first 
paragraph is at 156a, where Socrates makes a distinction between two motions. 
Motion is an important issue for understanding the process of perception. The reason 
for this is that the whole process of perceiving is a motion and therefore, there would 
be no perception without motion. Socrates’ understanding of motion is a key issue 
for the understanding of perception. 
 
“…everything is really motion, and there is nothing but motion. Motion has two 
forms, each an infinite multitude, but distinguished by their powers, the one being 
active and the other passive. And through the intercourse and the mutual friction of 
these two there comes to be an offspring infinite in multitude but always twin birth, 
on the one hand what is perceived, on the other, the perception of it, the perception in 
every case being generated together with what is perceived and emerging along with 
it…” (156a) 
 
The second paragraph is at 156d-e, where Socrates describes the process of 
perceiving colour to Theaetetus: 
 
“In this event, motions arise in the intervening space, sight from the side of the 
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eye and whiteness from the side of that which cooperates in the production of the 
colour. The eye is filled with sight; at that moment it sees, and there come into being, 
not indeed sight, but a seeing eye; while its partner in the process of producing 
colour is filled with whiteness, and there comes into being not whiteness, but 
white… This account of course may be generally applied; it applies to all that we 
perceive, hard or hot or anything else.” (156d-e) 
 
In these texts, the colour is said to be the product of the eyes and the object.191 
Moreover and more importantly, the colour white is not whiteness itself, but just a 
particular white colour.192 Further, the colour you see is not the colour itself, but only 
a particular colour. If you close your eyes, then you would certainly not see the 
colour any longer, (or, in other words, the colour is eliminated from your sight), but 
this process is not a process of eliminating the colour itself. Take the brown table as 
an example again. If you turn around and do not see the table any more, then you do 
not see the brown colour either. But this is not to say that either the colour brown of 
the table disappears or the brown itself is eliminated. You can easily see the brown 
table again by turning around or see another brown stuff nearby.  
It is not only that Socrates’ description of how eyes perceive colour could be 
applied to every process when the soul gains knowledge, but also that this way of 
thinking about colour could be applied to everything we perceive. Socrates applies 
the same explanation of colour to “all that we perceive, hard or hot or anything else” 
(156e). This means that all the things we perceive could be explained in the same 
way as the colour example. Is it possible to generalize this explanation to everything 
we perceive? Before considering this question, let us first see what Socrates thinks 
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 Ayer calls this kind of discussions as “the argument from illusion”. He gives us an excellent philosophical 
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 C.f. Timaeus 67e-68a, “white is what dilates the ray of sight, and black is what does the opposite” (67e). 
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about colour.  
At 153e – 154a, Socrates gives us a description on what he thinks about colour: 
 
“…black or white or any other colour will turn out to have come into being 
through the impact of the eyes upon the appropriate motion; and what we naturally 
call a particular colour is neither that which impinges nor that which is impinged 
upon, but something which has come into being between the two, and which is 
private to the individual percipient…” 
 
He explains that there are four features or characters of colour: 
(1) The colour is not at any particular place; 
(2) It is neither the sight nor the object; 
(3) It is produced by the eyes in the appropriate motion; 
(4) It is private to each individual. 
 
4.4 Socrates’ third response to “man is the measure of all things” 
The strategy that Socrates employs in responding to Theaetetus’ definition 
“knowledge is sense-perception” is firstly to address Protagoras’ saying “man is the 
measure of all things” which Theaetetus’ definition derives from and closely relates 
to. Having denounced Protagoras’ saying twice, Socrates begins to respond for the 
third time,193 to consider whether “man is the measure of all things” is correct or not. 
This time Socrates focuses on the saying itself. Socrates declares:  
 
“…I was astonished that he (Protagoras) did not state at the beginning of the 
Truth that ‘Pig is the measure of all things’ or ‘Baboon’ or some yet more out-of-the-
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all things”. The texts of this series of arguments come from 161c to 166c in the Theaetetus. 
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way creature with the power of perception. That would have made a most imposing 
and disdainful opening. It would have made it clear to us at once that, while we were 
standing astounded at his wisdom as though he were God, he was in reality no better 
authority than a tadpole -- let alone any other man.” (161c-d) 
 
In this quotation, Socrates ironically uses pig instead of man in the famous saying, 
which would give anyone who supports this saying an impression of indignity.  
Moving on from his interpretation of Protagoras’ saying at 152a, Socrates at 
161d uses a shorter statement to repeat Protagoras’ principle, “only the individual 
himself can judge of his own world, and what he judges is always true and correct” 
(161d). As Socrates points out, if Protagoras is right, namely, if man is the measure 
of all things, then, there are three catastrophic consequences. First, everyone would 
be equal in wisdom and knowledge, which would mean that man, animal and even 
God would have no difference in their level of wisdom, because everyone would be 
correct on his own perception. As long as they have the ability of perception, whether 
they are a man, God or animal, their perceptions are always correct to them. From 
“knowledge is perception”, wisdom as a high level understanding is impossible. 
Secondly, if wisdom is actually impossible, then Protagoras, who claims to be a 
teacher of wisdom, has no reason to teach his pupils wisdom. If he has no wisdom to 
teach, then he does not deserve fees from his students. Thirdly, the combination of 
“knowledge is perception” and “man is the measure of all things” will destroy 
philosophy. As Socrates says, “the whole business of philosophical discussion” is “to 
examine and try to refute each other’s appearance and judgements” (161e). From the 
first consequence, if wisdom is in fact impossible from the ideas of “knowledge is 
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perception” and “a man is the measure of all things”, then everyone is correct and 
wise already, and so philosophical discussion becomes nonsense.  
All these three consequences are actually one thing: if Protagoras is correct, 
there would be no authority of judgements and truth beyond the individual. When 
there is a controversy on something between people, they try to find an external 
authority to persuade each other. The men in conversation or discussion must 
approve the further authority, which could be an irrefutable fact, an order from Gods, 
for instance. Now, from Theaetetus’ and Protagoras’ ideas, there will be no external 
authority at all. Rather everyone himself is the authority of everything. Further, 
Protagoras admits that everyone’s perception is equally true and Theaetetus even 
says that all these perceptions are knowledge.  
To assess Protagoras’s view that all perception is equally true, let us consider an 
example of a table. Someone who sees this table gets a series of perceptions. 
Assuming he sees this table at two different times, t1 and t2, the table appears brown 
to him due to the wood at t1, but yellow due to the sunshine at t2.194 Both these 
perceptions are equally true for Protagoras, according to Socrates’ presentation of 
Plato’s view, which distorts it in some degree. According to Socrates, this is 
solipsism. For it disregards the real colour of the table, while emphasizing the truth 
of the appearance to the watcher. How does the watcher answer the question “What 
colour is the table?” In Socrates’ eyes, Protagoras may say for the watcher that the 
table is both brown and yellow. This is a contradiction, for a table cannot be both 
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brown and yellow in reality. The same explanation could be applied to an example of 
two people who see the same table at the same time, but see it as different colours.  
Socrates does not treat Protagoras’ idea fairly. Protagoras only emphasizes that 
what an individual person perceives is always true to himself, and he is not 
concerned with what the things in reality are. Consider the table example again. The 
table appears to be yellow at t2, so this perception is true to the watcher, for he sees a 
yellow table, not a brown one, though he maybe realizes that the table is in fact 
brown. This fact of the watcher’s experience at t2 shows that there is a big gap 
between sensation and reason. Socrates realizes this gap. At 163e, after he repeats 
Theaetetus’ idea of “knowledge is perception”, Socrates says that “…a man who has 
seen something has come to know that which he saw, according to the statement you 
made just now”. He then uses the example of “memory” to rebut Theaetetus’ idea 
“knowledge is perception” which mixes knowledge and perception. Obviously, 
Socrates does not believe that there is no difference between “what you know” and 
“what you see”. He tries to use the distinction between knowledge and perception to 
refute Theaetetus’ definition of knowledge, namely, that knowledge is perception. 
Now, what Protagoras emphasizes is clear, he just tries to discuss the sphere of 
perception rather than the whole area of epistemology, i.e. the sphere of both 
sensation and reason.  
The result of applying Protagoras’ idea to some concrete event would produce 
difficulties. Socrates now gives us two examples to make the absurdity in Protagoras’ 
saying clear: 
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“Well, now, are we going to agree that when we perceive things by seeing or 
hearing them, we always at the same time know them? Take, for example, the case of 
hearing people speaking a foreign language which we have not yet learned. Are we 
going to say that we do not hear the sound of their voice when they speak? Or that 
we both hear it and know what they are saying? Again, supposing we do not know 
our letters, are we going to insist that we do not see them when we look at them? Or 
shall we maintain that, if we see them, we know them? ” (163b)  
 
The examples are employed for embodying and revealing the absurdity of the saying 
by highlighting the evident gap between perceiving and understanding.  
Socrates  explains to Theaetetus that his criticism “should take a different line” 
(163a) following the criticism that there would be no truth or wisdom, if “man is the 
measure of all things” (162c-163a). It seems that there are two differences between 
the criticism from 162c-163a and the two examples at 163b-c.195 Firstly, the criticism 
from 162c-163a refers to the human being, Gods or even animals, which would be 
equal in wisdom following Protagoras’ “a man is the measure of all things” and 
Theaetetus’ “knowledge is perception”. This actually announces that wisdom is 
impossible. Therefore, the criticism from 162c-163a emphasizes the unacceptable 
consequences of Protagoras’ and Theaetetus’ ideas. The two examples from 163b-c, 
however, try to weaken their arguments because they are in fact counter-examples to 
Theaetetus’ definition. 
Secondly, the examples mainly attack Theaetetus’ definition of knowledge. 
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interpretive knowledge” latter in his article. The first kind of knowledge is “coextensive” with the information 
supplied by senses. The “second kind of knowledge is not coextensive with sense perception”. See Dorter (1990) 
pp. 348-349 and p. 351. 
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Therefore although Theaetetus’ formula stems from Protagoras, Protagoras’ idea is 
not Socrates’ main target. The example of foreign language and the example of the 
letters at 163b only show that “what you perceive” is not the same as “what you 
know”. Between the criticism from 162c-163a and the two examples at 163b, 
Socrates defends Protagoras’ idea on his behalf (162d-e). In this defence, he refers to 
Protagoras’ famous sentence, and says, “…you drag in gods, whose existence or 
nonexistence I exclude from all discussion, written or spoken” (162e). Socrates also 
adds that, 
  
“…you keep on saying whatever is likely to be acceptable to the mob, telling 
them that it would be a shocking thing if no one were wiser than any cow in the field; 
but of proof or necessity not a word. You just rely on plausibility.” (162e)  
 
This defence is actually not a defence at all, for it avoids the attack of the first 
criticism.196 It just emphasizes that we must keep silent on whether Gods exist or not 
and contributes “no one is wiser than any cow” to merely opinion of the “mob”. It 
says the mob would find this view shocking. This defence in fact implies two things. 
The first thing is that Protagoras tries to drag Socrates into a narrower sphere to 
discuss his idea, for he tries to concentrate on what really happens to the individual. 
Protagoras only wishes to focus on the authenticity of “what someone sees is always 
true to himself” rather than to consider what the things themselves really are. 
Protagoras is not concerned with whether a human being or even an animal is equal 
to the Gods in wisdom. “No one is wiser than any cow” this is why he does not 
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explain why the idea “man is the measure of all things” will not lead to this 
ridiculous conclusion that “no one is wiser than any cow”.  
If the defence which Socrates uses on the behalf of Protagoras is not actually a 
defence of Protagoras’ idea, why does Socrates hold this to be a defence and promise 
to give his criticism “a different line” (163a)? Socrates gives us a clue: “You just rely 
on plausibility…So you and Theodorus had better consider whether, in matters of 
such importance, you are going to accept arguments which are merely persuasive or 
plausible” (162e-163a). Unfortunately, this kind of clue is not clear, but only gives us 
a vague meaning. In order to understand why Socrates’ criticism is only persuasive or 
plausible, we need to analyze Socrates’ criticism from 162c-163a again.  
The criticism at 162c-163a is brief, Socrates doubts that if Protagoras’ idea “a 
man is the measure of all things” is correct, then it will naturally lead to a conclusion 
“you are the equal in wisdom of any man or even a god”. (162c) So far, the defence 
is not helpful, but this is not the whole argument, Socrates adds immediately, “Or do 
you think the Protagorean measure isn’t meant to be applied to gods as much as to 
men?” (162c). This is the key sentence that we need to notice. If, in Socrates mind, 
Protagoras does not admit the existence of gods, then the former sentence, namely, 
“you are the equal in wisdom of any man or even a god”, will not be a problem 
anymore. This actually refers to the problem of the sphere or region that Protagoras’ 
idea could be applied to. It also shows that Socrates has realized that “a man is the 
measure of all things” could only be applied to human beings, not all things that have 
the ability to perceive. More strictly speaking, what Protagoras says could only be 
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applied to the sensible aspect of human recognition, not to the whole epistemological 
region. Socrates himself points out the problem of the limited range of Protagoras’ 
idea, and the defence is to show that this problem is actually not a problem at all in 
Protagoras’ mind.  
Although the defence at 162c-163a is not clear, at least in Protagoras’ mind, it is 
not to say that this criticism is not valid. Socrates could use the same argument to 
refute Protagoras’ idea, not using human beings and the gods, but using human 
beings and animals. Socrates could say that “you are the equal in wisdom of any cow” 
rather than “you are the equal in wisdom of any man or even a god”. Maybe 
Protagoras can deny or doubt the existence of the gods that cannot be observed by 
perception, but he cannot deny the existence of animals that also have the ability of 
perception. Even Protagoras, in Socrates’ mind, would have realized this problem, 
for when Socrates speaks for Protagoras, he observes how the idea that “no man is 
wiser than any cow in the field” would be shocking (162e).  
Again, the plausibility question comes back. Why does Socrates’ Protagoras 
think the defence that Socrates makes for him is only plausible or persuasive? This 
reaction forces Socrates to make another argument to refute Protagoras’ idea. What 
does the word “plausibility” mean in the sentence “You just rely on plausibility” 
(162e)? Let us follow the line of Socrates’ argument to analyze it. Socrates’ argument 
is as follows: 
(1) Knowledge is perception. 
(2) If knowledge is perception, then what you perceive is what you know. 
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(3) You will be always correct or true on what you know. 
(4) Hence, what you perceive will be always correct or true to you. 
(5) The same idea could be applied to another person as you. 
(6) Then, another person would be always true on what he perceives. 
(7) With an object X, since both you and other person are correct on what X 
appears to you, you and other person both have knowledge of X. 
(8) If you have knowledge of X, then it means you have wisdom on X, for 
Socrates and Theaetetus agree that wisdom means knowledge. 
(9) If both you and other people have wisdom on X, then you and other people 
are equal in wisdom on X. 
(10) The same argument could be applied to all the objects that you can perceive. 
(11) You are equal to any other man in wisdom. 
(12) “Perception” in the formula “knowledge is perception” could be applied to 
any perceiving subject. 
(13) Then, anything that has the ability to perceive could be the perceiving 
subject. 
(14) Gods and animals have the ability of perception. 
(15) According to (11), gods and animals are equal to any man in wisdom. 
Socrates’ argument completely relies on deduction and the whole argument 
originates from Theaetetus’ definition of knowledge. It seems, then, that the sentence 
“You just rely on plausibility” said by Protagoras in his imagined defence is baffling, 
unless we assume that Protagoras does not follow logic. This is possible. In 
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Theaetetus, Socrates in many different paragraphs tries to prove that Protagoras does 
not follow logic or reason. Texts at 152c are a typical example. Here Socrates claims,  
 
“Well then, in that case are we going to say that the wind itself, by itself, is cold 
or not cold? Or shall we listen to Protagoras, and say it is cold for the one who feels 
cold, and for the other, not cold?”  
 
These questions show that in Socrates’ mind, Protagoras in fact admits that the wind 
is both cold and not cold. But Protagoras does not admit that, he only approves that 
the wind is cold to one person and not cold to the other one. Further, he keeps slient 
on whether the wind itself is cold or not cold, because he thinks that both of the men 
are always correct to judge how the wind appears to them. Protagoras always limits 
his idea to the sphere of sensation, namely, what happens to individuals in the 
sensory world. He is not concerned with the things in themselves that lie beyond the 
individual’s experience or perception. He does not regard the theoretical 
consequences of his idea. This is the main difference between him and Socrates.  
The defence that Socrates uses on behalf of Protagoras seems to show that a 
criticism from logic or deduction is not enough to persuade Protagoras and 
Theaetetus. Another criticism is needed that refutes Protagoras’ idea directly. 
Socrates offers two examples (163b-c), as counter-examples, to show that 
“knowledge is perception” is wrong. These are the examples of foreign language and 
of the letters. These two examples are actually the same, for both of them distinguish 
reason or understanding from sensation or perception.  
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Let us move into a discussion on recollected knowledge. To Theaetetus, 
knowledge is perception, because it seems to him “that a man who knows something 
perceives what he knows, and the way it appears at present, at any rate, is that 
knowledge is simply perception” (151e). It seems that there could be two 
interpretations of the quotation. The first interpretation is what Socrates says in the 
dialogue, namely, what you perceive is what you know. But it could be rephrased as 
follows: a man, who has knowledge of X, is perceiving X which is the object of the 
knowledge he knows.  
The second interpretation could be as follows: a man who has knowledge of X 
is recollecting the knowledge of X, where X is the object he has already known when 
he realizes that he has the knowledge of X or remembers the knowledge of X. If this 
second interpretation could be established, then in Theaetetus’ mind, “perception” 
does not necessarily mean something like “perceive something from outside”, it 
could mean also “realize” or “remember”. The second interpretation is possible. On 
the first interpretation, Theaetetus could just say, “it seems to me that a man who 
knows something perceives something”. Why does he use the phrase “what he knows” 
(τοῦτο ὃ ἐπίσταται)? If the second interpretation is a possible explanation of the 
sentence, then the two examples from 163b-c will no longer be counter-examples. In 
the second interpretation, Theaetetus emphasizes what happens in someone’s mind, 
and he does not refer to the act of perceiving, such as seeing, hearing or touching, but 
just refers to reflection, remembering or memorizing, activities that happen in 
someone’s mind.  
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The second interpretation, though it is possible, may seem risky, because the 
background of this sentence is that Theaetetus tries to give Socrates his own 
definition of knowledge. Consider this example. A asks another person B: “what is 
knowledge?” and B answers: “Knowledge is the knowledge that I am realizing and 
remembering.” Here person A will think B says nothing but nonsense, for B does not 
answer his question and simply gives him a tautology. This means that according to 
the second explanation of knowledge as perception, Theaetetus actually says nothing. 
Nevertheless, the risk of the second one is not serious. To explain why the second 
interpretation is not dangerous, let us consider again the first interpretation. “What 
you know is what you perceive” only shows the relationship between knowledge and 
perception, namely, knowledge is perception, i.e. they are equal or the same thing. 
The second interpretation also shows a relationship, this time between knowledge 
and what you have known. This relationship is odd, for it seems to emphasize only 
that knowledge is the recognition or consciousness when you realize what you have 
known, i.e. knowledge is your “perception” of what you have known. Take the 
foreign language as an example. Following the first interpretation, Socrates could say 
that when an Englishman who does not know Chinese, hears someone speaking 
Chinese, he is certainly hearing the voice of the person who speaks Chinese, but he 
does not know the meaning of the Chinese that the person says. Theaetetus could 
respond to Socrates like this: “Dear Socrates, the example you used just now shows 
that you did not understand my actual idea correctly. Let us correct your example to 
illustrate my idea. An Englishman who knows Chinese understands the meaning of 
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Chinese when he hears someone speaking Chinese. The knowledge of Chinese to 
him is his recognition or consciousness of the meaning of Chinese that has already 
been in his mind. This is what I mean when I give you my definition of knowledge, 
namely, knowledge is perception.” These two interpretations are different on how to 
understand the meaning of “perception”. From the first interpretation, perception 
means, “seeing, hearing or becoming aware of something from outside”, but under 
the second interpretation, perception means “a way of understanding”. 
In the two examples at 163b, Socrates tries to prove that perceiving something 
is different from understanding something. Even if you have heard the sound or 
voice of a foreign language that you do not know, you still do not know the meaning 
of it. The example of seeing the letters that we do not recognize is the same. If you 
are illiterate, then you will not know the meaning of a word, a sentence, a paragraph, 
an article or a book, which are all constructed in words. Even if you see something 
written by words, you would not know the meaning of it. According to this, Socrates’ 
argument is right. 
Nevertheless, Theaetetus’ response to Socrates’ argument is interesting. He 
points out that in the situation of hearing a foreign language or seeing the letters that 
we cannot understand, we could still actually know something, since  
 
“…we both see and know the shape and the colour of the letters; and with the 
spoken words we both hear and know the rise and fall of the voice.” (163c)  
 
Socrates praises Theaetetus’ response as “very good indeed”. However, he notes, 
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“there is another difficulty coming upon us” (163d). Socrates now explains the 
problem:  
 
“Supposing you were asked, ‘If a man has once come to know a certain thing, 
and continues to preserve the memory of it, is it possible that, at the moment when he 
remembers it, he does not know this thing that he is remembering?’… What I am 
trying to ask is, ‘Can a man who has learnt something not know it when he is 
remembering it?’” (163d)  
 
The difficulty that Socrates raises shows two things. Firstly, Socrates does not treat 
Theaetetus’ response seriously. Secondly, the idea expressed in this difficulty is hard 
for Theaetetus to understand. 
Why does the difficulty itself show that Socrates does not treat Theaetetus’ 
response seriously? It is because his difficulty is simply irrelevant to Theaetetus’ 
response. The difficulty is about memory, but Theaetetus’ response is about 
perceiving. Actually, Theaetetus’ response is not helpful for understanding the 
relationship between knowing and perceiving, though he indeed adds some new and 
interesting information. Theaetetus denies that we do not know anything when we 
hear a foreign language or see the unrecognizable letters, since we indeed see or hear 
something. On his view, “we know just that in them which we see and hear” (163b). 
Take the letters as an example, Theaetetus means that when we see the 
unrecognizable letters, we “both see and know the shape and the colour of the letters” 
(163b). Nevertheless, the word “know” that Theaetetus uses here could not refer to 
“knowing” or knowledge” in Socrates’ mind. The understanding that “the letters are 
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red (or black or whatever colour they are)” could not be a piece of knowledge, since 
it does not follow the two criteria of knowledge that Socrates has made clear at the 
beginning of the dialogue, namely, knowledge “must be always of what is and it 
must be unerring” (152c), as Burnyeat rephrases.197 However, Theaetetus could say 
that “the letters are red” is not what he means by knowledge. Rather he could explain 
that what he means is that we could always “know” what we are perceiving. Socrates 
has rebutted this point earlier at 154a, “it does not always appear the same even to 
yourself because you never remain the same as yourself” (154a). That is to say, 
everyone himself is also in flux. Therefore, the proposition that you “know” what 
you are perceiving is also impossible.198 That is why Socrates ignores Theaetetus’ 
response and moves into a new difficulty of flux.  
The idea about memory illustrated by Socrates is difficult for Theaetetus to 
understand. Since Theaetetus seems not to understand the meaning of the question, 
Socrates has to explain what he means. The argument that Socrates gives in the texts 
of 163d-164b can be shown as follows: 
(1) Seeing is perceiving and sight is perception. 
(2) A man who sees something knows what he sees, for knowledge is perception. 
(3) There is such a thing as memory or in other words, memory exists. 
(4) Memory must be the memory of something; that is to say, memory must 
have content. 
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(5) A man who has seen something could preserve the memory of it. 
(6) If he has preserved something in his memory, he could recall it from time to 
time. 
(7) He could recall something even if he does not perceive the thing at the same 
moment. 
(8) From the definition “knowledge is perception”, a man who does not perceive 
something does not know something. 
(9) As a result, “a man who has come to know something and still remembers it 
does not know it because he does not see it” (164b). 
This is one of the criticisms of “knowledge is perception”. From this line of 
argument, knowledge is perception will lead to a ridiculous conclusion, i.e. “we were 
enquiring into the possibility that a man should not know something that he has 
learnt and remembers” (164d). Further, this ridiculous conclusion will produce a 
contradiction, i.e. is it possible for “a man who knows something not to know this 
thing which he knows” (165b)? We could imagine that Protagoras would certainly 
not admit these two conclusions and he will defend his idea while attacking Socrates’ 
argument. Hence, an analysis of Socrates’ argument at 163d-164b is necessary. 
The criticism of “knowledge is perception” at 163d-164b emphasizes that the 
process of learning or knowing also refers to more things besides perception. This 
approach is different from the criticism from 162c-163a which emphasizes the 
disastrous consequences of the definition and the two examples at 163b-c, which 
show that there are counter-examples of the definition. Memory is one of the things 
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that needs to be noticed besides perception. In this argument, Socrates simply points 
out that a person can recall what he has perceived even if the person does not 
perceive at the moment of recalling the thing in his memory.  
Consider the ridiculous conclusions again, “Is it possible for a man who knows 
something not to know this thing which he knows?” (165b). Protagoras in Socrates’ 
mind would answer “no” to this question, for at 165b-c, Socrates on behalf of 
Protagoras says “no” to the question by giving us a vivid and interesting example. 
Socrates asks Theaetetus to consider a situation where a man puts his hands over one 
of Theaetetus’ eyes. 
 
Socrates: “…For what are you going to do when some intrepid fellow has you 
‘trapped in the well-shaft’, as they say, with a question that leaves you no way out: 
clapping his hand over one of your eyes, he asks you whether you see his cloak with 
the eye that is covered -- how will you cope with that?” 
Theaetetus: “I shall say that I do not see it with this one, but I do with the other.” 
Socrates: “So you both see and do not see the same thing at the same time?” 
Theaetetus: “Well, yes, in that sort of way I do.” (165b-c) 
 
This example is a typical kind of sophistry. If someone covers one of your eyes and 
asks you whether you could see his cloak with the eye covered, you will surely 
answer: “No, I cannot see your cloak with the eye covered”. Then how does this man 
conclude that you could both see his cloak and not see it at the same time? It seems 
that this conclusion comes from Theaetetus’ answer, “I shall say that I do not see it 
with this one, but I do with the other”. However, Theaetetus’ answer is just a little 
beyond what the man asks. The man asks whether you could see his cloak with the 
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eye covered, he does not ask whether you could see his cloak. If he asks the latter 
question, anyone will reply, “Yes, I can see your cloak”, even though you or anyone 
else just uses one eye to see his cloak. Nevertheless, he may be dissatisfied with your 
answer and may continue to ask, “I do not care about in what way it happened. I wish 
only to know ‘Whether you both see and do not see my cloak’.” In the dialogue, both 
Theaetetus and Socrates agree that they both see and do not see the cloak. However, 
this question is just word play. When we say that we see something with our eyes, we 
always treat the eyes as a whole or a unit. Then, once we can see something, whether 
we see it with one eye or two eyes, we are still seeing something. Even in the special 
case, using only one eye to see, the saying “I can see something with one eye, but 
cannot see it with other eye” is not itself a contradiction. It will not lead to the 
ridiculous conclusion “I both see and do not see something” for two reasons. Firstly, 
“I can see something with one eye, but cannot see it with other eye” does not lead to 
the contradiction “I both see and do not see something”. The former sentence 
describes the situation of my eyes and it is a description of a fact. In contrast, the 
latter sentence is illogical, because it is impossible that my eyes both see and not see. 
Secondly, the former sentence speaks under conditions. It emphasizes that one of my 
eyes can see something, while the other eye cannot see it. I actually treat my eyes 
separately and describe them respectively, so that even if my eyes are in opposite 
states or have opposite properties, they still have no conflict. The latter sentence, 
however, treats the eyes as a unit and attributes opposite properties or states to them. 
If this analysis is correct, then it is odd that both Socrates and Theaetetus admit the 
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argument in the example of cloak as a valid one.  
If we grant that the argument in the example of cloak is valid, how does the 
same argument apply to knowledge? Or, in other words, how does the principle of 
“you see what you do not see” apply to the principle of “you do not know what you 
know”? In the dialogue, this transition seems simple, because if “you see what you 
do not see” and if “knowing is seeing” (from “knowledge is perception”), then “you 
know what you do not know”. Nevertheless, seeing something is completely 
different from knowing something. In the case of seeing, we can say that I either see 
something or do not see something. There is no third option, i.e. we cannot say that I 
both see and do not see something. But with knowing, the situation is different. The 
difference between seeing and knowing is that seeing is a single activity, but 
knowing is a plural activity. That is to say, knowing something has differences in 
degree. In the case of knowledge of English, both a pupil who knows a little English 
and an expert who researches on English know English, but their knowledge of 
English is different in degree. Take a map as an example for seeing: we may see a 
map clearly or not clearly. But this difference in degree of seeing is not the same as 
knowing, for in the activity of seeing, once you see the map, whether you see it 
clearly or not, you have finished the activity of seeing. Nevertheless, in the activity 
of knowing, you cannot say that once you learn something, the process of knowing 
about this thing has finished. After all, the process of knowing or recognition is more 
complex than the process of seeing. Therefore, it is clear that the argument of seeing 
cannot be applied to the argument of knowing. 
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According to my analysis, the example of the cloak and the argument of seeing 
are problematic. Since both the cloak example and the seeing argument are presented 
by Socrates against Protagoras, we have to doubt that Socrates makes his arguments 
as kinds of sophistry and gives his readers a vague example. Because of the fallacies 
in Socrates’ argument and example, it is easy to imagine that Protagoras could strike 
back.  
That is what happens in the next texts. Socrates again tries to defend Protagoras’ 
ideas,  
 
“Now, to begin with, do you expect someone to grant you that a man’s present 
memory of something which he has experienced in the past but is no longer 
experiencing is the same sort of experience as he then had? That is very far from 
being true. Again, do you suppose he will hesitate to admit that it is possible for the 
same man to know and not know the same thing? Or -- if he has misgivings about 
this -- do you expect him to concede to you that the man, who is in process of 
becoming unlike, is the same as he was before the process began? Do you expect him 
even to speak of ‘the man’ rather than of ‘the men’…?” (166b)199 
 
In this paragraph, there are three arguments. (ⅰ) The experience of something in the 
past that a person is no longer experiencing is different from the present experience 
from memory. (ⅱ) No one will admit that a man cannot know and not know the 
same thing. (ⅲ) The man as the subject of experience is himself in flux.  
These three arguments do not weaken Socrates’ seeing argument and the cloak 
                                                 
199
 Different tranlstions of this text can lead different understandings. C. J. Rowe, M. Welbourne and C. J. F. 
Williams suggest that the actual sense of the text is as follows: “For in the first place do you think that anyone 
will  agree that anyone has a memory of the things  he was experiencing it, (the memory) being the same sort of 
experience as he had when he had (the original) experience, if he is no longer having an experience (unless he is 
still having an experience?”. Therefore, “Instead of failing to account for the connection between the memory and 
the original experience. Protagoras is represented as directly appealing to it, in order to suggest that the man 
remembering a thing perceived is not only still somehow perceiving it, but even still undergoing the same sort of 
perceptual experience as he did when he directly perceived the thing”. I agree with this idea. See Rowe (1982) p. 
305. 
173 
 
example directly, but just remind him that there are more things that need to be 
considered. From the argument (ⅰ), an experience you recall from your memory is 
obviously different from what you were experiencing or perceiving in the past. Here, 
the first argument treats remembering or recollection as a kind of perception. Then 
two propositions, i.e. propositions (7) and (8) above are wrong. Socrates cannot say, 
(A) “He could recall something even if he does not perceive the thing at the 
moment”,200 for the reason that recalling or remembering something from memory is 
also a kind of experience or perception. (B) “From the definition ‘knowledge is 
perception’, 201  “a man does not perceive something” means “he does not know 
something”, is also incorrect, because someone still knows something when he 
recalls something from memory if recalling something is a kind of experience. If 
propositions (7) and (8) are both refuted, then the contradiction, “a man who has 
come to know something and still remembers it does not know it because he does not 
see it”, is also refuted through the first argument.  
In argument (ⅱ), Protagoras, according to Socrates’s defence, actually tries to 
show that he insists on logic and thinks that everyone will treat the contradiction of 
knowing and not knowing as possible. This in fact rebuts Socrates’ criticism of the 
illogicality of his idea. 
In argument (ⅲ), the subject of perception himself is in flux. As a result, the 
series of perceptions are experienced by a series of men, not by the same man at all. 
This is a little similar to the first argument that also emphasizes that every element 
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that is involved in the process of knowing is changing. Although, as McDowell 
argues, “it is plainly irrelevant” to the criticism of 165a-d, this argument (ⅲ) attacks 
Socrates’ third response to “man is the measure of all things” as a whole (163c-164c), 
for it shows that Socrates’ criticism is too simple to stand as a criticism.202  
After these three arguments, Socrates adds another argument that is still on 
behalf of Protagoras:  
 
“‘Show a little more spirit, my good man,’ he will say, ‘and attack my actual 
statement itself, and refute it, if you can, by showing that each man’s perceptions are 
not his own private events; or that, if they are his own private events, it does not 
follow that the thing which appears ‘becomes’ or, if we may speak of being, ‘is’ only 
for the man to whom it appears.” (166c) 
 
In this quotation, Socrates proposes that Perceptions are private. Logically, the 
perception is always true to a perceiver, if “Perceptions are private” is correct. To 
someone who experiences something, what he is experiencing or perceiving belongs 
to him and it can only be known by himself, since no one else will know what he 
perceives. Further, the thing perceived by the man always appears to him as what it is. 
In other words, perception is always true to the man who is perceiving, according to 
“man is the measure of all things”. Maybe this is too odd to understand. Let us take a 
physical phenomenon as an example. A stick in water may appear to be bent, but it is 
actually not. Although the stick itself is not bent, the perception that the stick in the 
water is bent is true to the perceiver. That is to say, the sensation could be false 
according to the fact, but in itself it is always true to the man who has the sensation. 
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The issue comes back to the question of the sphere of Protagoras’ idea. What 
Protagoras emphasizes is in fact limited to perception and does not refer to reason or 
understanding. Protagoras himself also admits that everyone will consider that both 
knowing and not knowing something is possible (166b). Therefore, Socrates’ 
criticism of “man is the measure of all things” is in fact another issue and is 
irrelevant to what Protagoras’ thought. 
Socrates offers us a series of arguments to attack Protagoras’ theory in his third 
response to Protagoras’ idea that “man is the measure of all things”. The series is: (1) 
no external authority at 161c-d; (2) the two examples at 163b; (3) the cloak example 
at 165b-c; (4) three arguments at 166b. Unfortunately, none of these arguments is 
perfect. The arguments either distort or are irrelevant to what Protagoras’ thought. 
Socrates finally realizes at the end of these arguments that he cannot rebut “man is 
the measure of all things”, unless he rebuts “all things are in motion” to which 
Protagoras’ thought closely relates.  
 
4.5 Investigation on “all things are in motion” 
After Socrates defends Protagoras on his behalf, Socrates and his interlocutors, 
Theaetetus and Theodorus, gradually realize the importance of motion. Therefore, 
the motion issue reminds them to think about the doctrines of Heraclitus and 
Parmenides. Heraclitus insists, “All things are in motion”;203 Parmenides “Unmoved 
is the universe”. Socrates proposes that they must now examine these doctrines (181b) 
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to show why they are wrong. He begins (181c-d) by considering what motion is and 
identifies two forms of motion. 
 
Socrates “…Now it seems to me that the proper starting-point of our criticism is 
the nature of motion; what is this thing that they are talking about when they say that 
all things are in motion? I mean, for example, are they referring to one form of 
motion only, or, as I think, to two, [181c]…Tell me, do you call it ‘motion’ when a 
thing changes from one place to another or turns round in the same place?” [181d] 
Theodorus: “I do, yes.” 
Socrates: “Here then is one form of motion. Then supposing a thing remains in 
the same place, but grows old, or becomes black instead of white, or hard instead of 
soft, or undergoes any other alternation; isn’t it right to say that here we have motion 
in another form?” 
Theodorus: “Unquestionably.” (181c-d) 
 
Why is the nature of motion a proper starting-point of the criticism of Heraclitus and 
Parmenides?  
In order to answer these questions, going back to the text 178b-c is needed, 
Socrates, there, gives us a criticism of “man is the measure of all things”’, by 
referring to prediction.204 Socrates makes a distinction of two kinds of predictions, 
one is from an ordinary man; the other is from an expert who is an authority in a 
special field. Taking heat as an example, as Socrates says in the context, a man 
without any knowledge on heat predicts that he will get a fever; but a doctor predicts 
that he will not. The event in the future, in Socrates’ mind, will confirm that the 
doctor’s prediction is right. Further, predictions are also different among the experts. 
“In any question of what will be in tune or out of tune” (178d), the judgement of a 
musician is superior to that of a teacher of gymnastics. Then Socrates points out that 
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these two kinds of predictions are actually “about what was going to be and seem to 
be in the future” (179a). Obviously, a prediction from an ordinary man or an expert 
in his unfamiliar field is the latter, a matter of what seems, while a prediction from an 
expert is the former one, a matter of reality. If there are two kinds of predictions, then 
“man” cannot be the measure of all things. Rather an expert who has specific 
knowledge in his field is the measure of the things in question in a specific discipline. 
Further, as Socrates defends on behalf of Protagoras, “only the individual himself can 
judge of his own world, and what he judges is always true and correct”. In other 
words, “man is the measure of all things” ensures or is the premise for “knowledge is 
perception” (161d). Now, the former one is problematic and the latter one seems to 
be as well.  
In Socrates’ argument of prediction, prediction is in fact something referring to 
the future. Therefore, it involves time. In antiquity, time is always a close friend to 
motion. Aristotle defines time as a “feature of change that makes number applicable 
to it” (Physics, 219b2)205 and “a number of change in respect of before and after” 
(Physics, 220a24). Change is undoubtedly the most important feature of motion. It is 
reasonable for Socrates to see the nature of motion as a proper starting-point of his 
investigation of the theories of Heraclitus and Parmenides.206 
There are two difficulties in Socrates’ arguments on the nature of motion. The 
first difficulty is about the predictions between two experts in the same field. Let us 
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assume that there are two doctors facing a patient and they hold opposite predictions 
of what will happen to this patient. When Socrates faces this situation, what will he 
say? Socrates would say that one of the doctors is wrong and he is wrong because 
either he does not have the knowledge or he does not apply his knowledge correctly. 
This explanation is unacceptable. For according to Socrates’ own idea, a man could 
be called as a doctor only if he has knowledge of medicine, i.e. all the knowledge of 
medicine. If Socrates denies that one doctor has knowledge in the case, he in fact 
denies that one of the doctors is a doctor at all. Moreover, knowledge in Theaetetus, 
has two criteria, namely, “always of what is” and “unerring” (152c). These two 
standards, especially the latter one, ensure that once a man has knowledge, he will 
never make mistakes. How is this possible? Even if I have knowledge in a specific 
field, it is still possible for me to make mistakes when I apply the knowledge to a 
particular item or event. As Aristotle says,  
 
“By universal knowledge then we see the particulars, but we do not know them 
by the kind of knowledge which is proper to them; consequently it is possible that we 
make mistakes about them, but not that we should have the knowledge and error that 
are contrary to one another: rather we have universal knowledge but make a mistake 
in regard to the particular.” (Prior Analytics, Book two, Chapter 21, 67a25-30).  
 
Borrowing Ryle’s terminology, the knowledge of “know what” is different from 
knowledge of “know how”. Socrates does not have such a distinction between 
knowledge of “know what” and of “know how” and thinks that as long as you have 
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knowledge of “know what” you could perfectly know how to apply it. 207 
Nevertheless, it seems that Socrates has no reason to insist on this and there is no 
explanation of the distinction in Theaetetus.  
The second difficulty of Socrates’ argument is more complicated. It links to 
Protagoras’ philosophy. In Socrates’ argument, a man without specific knowledge is 
not authoritative in a particular field of knowledge. Consequently, “not every man’s 
judgement is true” (179c). Protagoras who is under such a criticism, however, would 
insist on his theory by saying that his theory does not refer to anyone except the 
percipient himself. Protagoras’ point is that everything that the percipient perceives is 
true for himself and the judgements the percipient makes are true for himself as well. 
In other words, Protagoras’ theory is true in the relationship between what the 
percipient perceives and what judgement he makes from his perception. Moreover, 
“man is the measure of all things” does not refer to the future, since every judgement 
refers to what is happening to himeself. “All things” in “man is the measure of all 
things” cannot mean everything, but has tense limitation. It is irrelevant to prediction.  
In Protagoras’ mind, every judgement is only valid once, i.e. the judgement is 
always true that a percipient makes on what he perceives now for himself. If it is, 
then how would Protagoras account for the prediction that is a common phenomenon 
in life? He would acutely point out that there is no prediction at all, or, in other words, 
everyone could make a prediction without any specific knowledge. In his eyes, 
prediction which is a statement refers to events in the future and so is an expression 
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of emotion. We could easily find examples in language that have the same grammar. 
In English, there is no future tense. That is why we employ “will” to construct a 
future tense in English. Maybe we could label Protagoras’ ideas as “fragmentation”. 
Let us consider the text of 152a-c, where Socrates offers a summary of Protagoras’ 
thought. At the beginning of the summary, Protagoras is said to think that “Man is the 
measure of all things: of he things which are, that they are, and of the things which 
are not, that they are not” (152a). Socrates gives a further explanation of “man is the 
measure of all things”: “as each thing appears to me, so it is for me, and as it appears 
to you, so it is for you” (152a). Then, Socrates uses the wind as an example to 
illustrate the meaning of Protagoras’ thought. Finally, Socrates links “appear” to 
“perceive” (152b). If Socrates’ interpretstion of Protagoras’ thought is correct, then 
“perception” is the key point, since perceiving cannot happen in the past or in the 
future, but only can happen at present. 
Disregarding the difficulties in Socrates’ criticism, the reason he gives is just a 
part of the story. In a long explanation of Heraclitean’ theory (179e-180d), Socrates 
mentions Parmenides’ philosophy that “all things are one, and that this One stands 
still, itself within itself, having no place in which to move” (180e). Here, both of 
these two extremely opposite theories are dealing with motion and the main 
divergence between them is the question “Does motion exist?”. Therefore, 
investigation on the nature of motion becomes a key issue to examine the correctness 
of these two theories, namely, “all things are in motion” and “man is the measure of 
all things”.  
181 
 
Although the nature of motion is a proper starting-point, i.e. for criticizing these 
theories, the relationship between motion and “knowledge is perception” is still not 
clear. Socrates just mentions in the text, that “we shall have to consider and test this 
moving Being, and find whether it rings true or sounds as if it had some flaw in it” 
(179d). One possible answer is, as Sedley says, “universal flux was introduced in the 
first place as the necessary condition of perception’s infallibility”. 208  Protagoras 
insists that every judgement is only valid once, i.e. the judgement is always true that 
a percipient makes on what he perceives now. This is actually cutting off perception 
in time into fragments and admitting that the thing perceived in time1 is different 
from itself in time2. Socrates finds it is necessary to investigate the nature of motion, 
so that we could test Protagoras’ philosophy more effectively.  
At 181c, Socrates presents two kinds of motion, alteration and spatial movement. 
After the distinction of the two forms of motion, Socrates immediately turns to using 
motion to explain how we get perception (QA).  
 
 “As we were saying, they [the people who allege that all things are in motion, 
181d] hold that the genesis of things such as warmth and whiteness occurs when 
each of them is moving, together with a perception, in the space between the active 
and passive factors: the passive factor thereby becoming percipient, but not a 
perception, while the active factor becomes such or such, but not a quality…” (182a)  
 
This quotation (QA) is too abstract to understand, though the terms, such as “the 
active factor”, “the passive factor” and “space” have appeared earlier in Theaetetus 
(cf. 156a, 156e. 159d); therefore, let us analyse the specific example given by 
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Socrates (QB): 
 
 “So I will talk about particular cases. What I mean is that the active factor 
becomes not warmth or whiteness, but warm and white; and so on… [182b] It is by 
the association of the two with one another that they generate perceptions and the 
things perceived; and in so doing, the active factor becomes such and such, while the 
passive factor becomes percipient.” (182a-b) 
 
Socrates says that he “will talk about particular cases”. These so-called “particular 
cases” of warmth and whiteness are not helpful for understanding Socrates’ idea on 
how a percipient (the passive factor) gains a perception from the motion that happens 
between the passive factor and the active factor. Let us come back to 156a where 
Socrates gives a difficult explanation on “everything is in motion”.  
At this point, Socrates explains three elements of motion, i.e. the active factor, 
the passive factor and the offspring of them, which are distinguished by their powers 
(QC): 
 
 “…everything is really motion, and there is nothing but motion. Motion has 
two forms, each an infinite multitude, but distinguished by their powers, the one 
being active and the other passive. And through the intercourse and mutual friction of 
these two there comes to be an offspring [156b] infinite in multitude but always twin 
births, on the one hand what is perceived, on the other, the perception of it, the 
perception in every case being generated together with what is perceived and 
emerging with it.” (156a-b) 
 
In order to help Theaetetus understand this idea, Socrates gives him an example of 
colour (QD): 
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“Thus the eye and some other thing --- one of the things commensurate with the 
eye --- which has come into its neighbourhood, generate both whiteness and the 
perception which is by nature united with it (things which would never have come to 
be if it had been anything else that eye or object approached). In this event, motions 
[156e] arise in the intervening space, sight from the side of the eye and whiteness 
from the side of that which cooperates in the production of the colour. The eye is 
filled with sight; at that moment it sees, and there comes into being, not indeed sight, 
but a seeing eye; while its partner in the process of producing colour is filled with 
whiteness, and there comes into being not whiteness, but white…” (156d-e)209 
 
(QD) mentions a larger number of things in the process of how the eyes perceive 
whiteness from an object: eyes, whiteness, perception, object, motion, intervening 
space, sight, colour and white. Socrates leaves “some other thing” and “one of the 
things” unexplained, but these two terms are easily understood. When you are 
watching something, you are seeing many things at the same time, though you pay 
your attention to the object you want to watch. Therefore, Socrates says that the eyes 
and some other thing generate perception, but, particularly, one of the things and the 
eyes produce the whiteness. Therefore, we could paraphrase (QD) as follows: when 
you are watching something, you are actually seeing many things at the same time; 
your eyes and this thing produce a perception; especially, the object you are watching 
and your eyes generate both a perception and the whiteness. How do your eyes and 
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the thing produce the perception and the whiteness? The perception and the 
whiteness are generated by a motion between the eyes and the thing, which happens 
in the intervening space. More exactly, the motion that makes your eyes full of white 
is generated by the sight of your eyes and the whiteness. The whole perceiving 
process could be divided into two parts. Firstly, your eyes meet the thing you are 
watching, which produces a perception and the whiteness -- “Whiteness”, here, as 
McDowell points out, cannot refer to “whiteness in general”, for if it is, then the 
“whiteness can be seen only once”. That is to say, it must be “taken to refer to a 
particular instance of whiteness”210. Secondly, after the whiteness has been produced, 
it produces white colour by making a motion with your sight. Sight, here, should be 
understood as a capacity of the eyes. Therefore, it is not sight that becomes white, 
rather the seen object, e.g. the stone, becomes white, for your sight is just a capacity, 
not an entity. Further, your eyes become white or your eyes are full of white, not 
whiteness, because whiteness just exists in the intervening space between your eyes 
and the object. Let us jump out of the whiteness case and generalize this particular 
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case. We could find immediately that the whiteness in the specific case is actually “a 
particular instance of whiteness”. 
Two kinds of perceptions emerge. When you as a percipient perceive something 
and pay attention to a specific thing, these things, the particular item perceived and 
you generate together some perceptions that we could call “perception1”. Further, 
you and the perceptions produced in “perception1” produce some other perceptions 
that could be labeled as “perception2”. There are two differences between these two 
kinds of perception. (1) The “perception1” refers to a quality as general, although it is 
a particular image of the general quality in question. In contrast the “perception2” 
refers only to a quality produced in a specific occurrence. Briefly speaking, the 
“perception1” could refer to a quality in general, but the “perception2”could only 
refer to “being such and such”. (2) The “perception1” has the ability with the 
percipient to generate other perceptions, namely, the “perception2”, while 
“perception2” has no such ability. Moreover, “perception1” and “perception2” are not 
unrelated. Rather “perception2” makes the percipient get such and such of a quality 
in question which is in the “perception1”. Consider the whiteness case again. A 
motion between your eyes and the objects produces some perceptions (“perception1”) 
that are “a particular instance of a quality in general (such as hardness, greatness or 
beauty)” and the whiteness in which you are interested. Next, your eyes along with 
the whiteness together generate white (a particular image of the “perception2”) which, 
consequently, makes your eyes full of sight (153e3).  
Is the quality “whiteness”, the whiteness itself, i.e. a Form? It is impossible, for 
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two reasons. (1) The quality in general is just “a particular instance” of the quality, 
not the quality itself. (2) Forms, as described in Phaedo (87a) and other dialogues, 
must be changeless (always what it is), one, and divine. Therefore, Forms could not 
be generated in every process of perceiving. At most, we could say that the quality in 
the process of perception participates in the Forms. Then, based on these two reasons, 
the quality in question could not be a Form in any way. Therefore, “white” would be 
a better term than whiteness.211 
Having considered thoroughly (QD), next, let me analyse (QC): “Everything is 
really motion, and there is nothing but motion.” This quotation is too abstract to 
understand, but now, with the help of (QD), it should be easier to grasp. (QC) or the 
quotation that follows is the proposition that Socrates is investigating: “Motion has 
two forms, each an infinite multitude, but distinguished by their powers, the one 
being active and the other passive” (δύναµιν δὲ τὸ µὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν) 
(156a). Socrates divides motion “by their powers”, one being active and the other 
being passive. Nevertheless, what does the phrase “distinguished by their powers, the 
one being active and the other passive” actually mean? Does it mean, as McDowell 
proposes, “the point of talking about changes, rather, than, say, changing things is 
probably that the latter would imply”?212 What does the word “latter” mean? “Latter” 
refers to “changing things”. According to McDowell’s understanding of the sentence, 
he translates “δύναµιν δὲ τὸ µὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν” into “the one having the 
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power of acting and the other the power of being acted on”.213 Cornford would agree 
with McDowell, for his translation is “but they differ in that the one kind has the 
power of acting, the other of being acted on”.214 The key element in this sentence is 
“τὸ ἔχον”. “τὸ” and the ending “-ον” shows that the person of these two words is 
neuter. If it is neuter, it could not refer to “motion”, for “ἡ κίνησις” (motion) is 
feminine. Thus, “the one having the power of acting” must refer to the percipient 
“that has ability to perceive” and “the other the power of being acted on” must refer 
to the object.  
Next, let us consider the “offspring” of the active and passive factors in (QC): 
“And through the intercourse and mutual friction of these two there comes to be an 
offspring infinite in multitude but always twin births, on the one hand what is 
perceived, on the other, the perception of it, the perception in every case being 
generated together with what is perceived and emerging with it.” The intercourse 
between the percipient and the object has an offspring that is infinite in number but 
always twins, i.e. perceptions and qualities.  
With these explanations in place, (QB) and (QA) are easy to understand. When 
Socrates says at (QB): “So I will talk about particular cases. What I mean is that the 
active factor becomes not warmth or whiteness, but warm and white; and so on…” 
He is explaining that the object comes to be warm and white, rather than whiteness 
and warmth, for whiteness and warmth could only appear in the motion that happens 
in the intervening space between the percipient and the object. When he goes on to 
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say in (QB), his point is: 
 
“It is by the association of the two with one another that they generate 
perceptions and the things perceived; and in so doing, the active factor becomes such 
and such, while the passive factor becomes percipient.”  
 
This statement, namely (QB), is a repeat of what (QD) and (QC) have said. The only 
thing still to explain is the phrase “such and such”. This phrase means, in full, “being 
of such and such a quality”, namely, being in a state of having a quality, such as 
being  white or hard or soft or so on.  
The final explanation is now that of (QA). The text says: 
 
“As we were saying, they hold that the genesis of things such as warmth and 
whiteness occurs when each of them is moving, together with a perception, in the 
space between the active and passive factors: the passive factor thereby becoming 
percipient, but not a perception, while the active factor becomes such or such, but not 
a quality…”  
 
This quotation is consistent with the three quotations above. “The passive factor” is 
the percipient.  The passive percipient is not itself a perception, but rather is full of 
perception of a quality, as (QD) has mentioned. 
In sum, all these four quotations (QA-QD) are about how a percipient perceives 
an object in the sensible world. There are actually two processes in this event of 
perception. The first step is a motion, which is generated by a percipient and an 
object. This process produces perceptions, which I call “perception1” and qualities. 
The second step is another motion, which is a result of the percipient and the 
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qualities. This second process creates another kind of perception, which is called 
“perception2”. At this point, “perception1” seems problematic, because it is not 
essential, not even necessary, to the whole process. If the motion in the first step 
produces qualities, then the “perception1” becomes redundant. Socrates who 
particularly picks out “whiteness” and other qualities from perceptions 
(“perception1”) intends to emphasize that they are not Forms. Qualities, not in 
general, but a special instance of the qualities themselves, are the “perceptions1”. 
After an investigation of the three elements of motion which are “distinguished 
by their powers” (156a). A second discussion about “All things are in motion” 
appears at 182c-182d. This time, because of “All things are in motion”, nothing is 
durable. The “whiteness” in the discussion of (QA)-(QB) is also changing.  
 
Socrates: “…We must ask them this question: ‘According to you,215 all things 
move and flow; is not that so?’” 
Theodorus: “Yes.” 
Socrates: “…They both move and alter?” 
Theodorus: “That must be so…” 
Socrates: “Now if they were only moving through space and not altering, we 
should presumably be able to say what the moving things flow?…” 
Theodorus: “That’s all right.” (182c) 
Socrates: “But since not even this abides, that what flows flows white; but 
rather it is in process of change, so that there is flux of this very thing also, the 
whiteness, and it is passing over into another colour…since that is so, is it possible to 
give any name to a colour which will properly apply to it?” 
Theodorus: “I do not see how one could, Socrates.” (182d) 
 
A good interpretation of this quotation comes from T. Irwin’s analysis of change 
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in Plato’s philosophy. He makes a distinction between self-change and aspect-change. 
First, he identifies what self-change is. He claims:  
 
“The Theaetetus presents one view of flux; everything undergoes constant local 
movement and qualitative alteration (181b8-182c8), constantly gaining properties it 
previously lacked and losing properties it previously had. Let us call this kind of 
change self-change (s-change): x s-changes iff at time tl x is F and at time t2 x is not-
F, and x itself is not in the same condition at t2 as it was at tl (e.g., at tl it is hot, and at 
t2 it has become not-hot, by becoming colder than it was).”  
 
Irwin also identifies another kind of change, i.e. aspect-change in Plato’s philosophy,  
 
“things with compresent opposite properties --- the road up and down, the 
straight and crooked writing, the food which is good (for some people) and bad (for 
others) (Heracleitus, B59-61). Let us call this aspect-change (a-change): x a-changes 
iff x is F in one aspect, not-F in another, and x is in the same condition when it is F 
and when it is not-F (e.g., x is big in comparison with y, small in comparison with 
z).”216  
 
Under Irwin’s distinction, we could discover that both spatial movement (i.e. 
mechanical movement) and alteration, according to the text of 182c-d, are “self-
change”, while “aspect-change” does not appear in the quotation of 182c-d.  
It is worth noting that there is a small difference between alteration and spatial 
movement. A thing which is in spatial movement is at the same time in the motion of 
alteration, since all things are in motion and then the thing itself in spatial movement 
is also changing. Nevertheless, a thing that alters itself is not necessarily in a spatial 
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movement. So we could conclude that all things are involved in the motion of 
alteration while not everything is in mechanical movement. Socrates introduces this 
property at 181d, such as “grows old, becoming black instead of white, or hard 
instead of soft, or undergoes any other alteration”.  
If all things are always in alteration, according to the doctrine “everything is in 
motion”, why does Socrates only consider the situation where things “were only 
moving through space and not altering”? On passage 182c-183b, McDowell points 
out,  
 
“…the neatest way of interpreting the argument of this passage is, I think, to 
regard it as answering a question which might be expected to have occurred to the 
reader about the change which is engaged in by the offspring mentioned in the theory 
of perception, i.e. by qualities and kinds of perception”.217  
 
McDowell’s point is that when Socrates discusses the “offspring” of the percipient 
and the object, i.e. of the perception and the qualities, (namely perception1, 
perception2 and qualities), he obviously treats the qualities and the perceptions as 
things that stand still.  
The agreement of Socrates, Theodorus and Theaetetus can only be consistent, if 
the qualities and the perceptions as things that stand still. Inconsistency, however, can 
be avoided, because, on the one hand, the necessary condition for a percipient to gain 
perceptions from objects is that there is something that stands still. But on the other 
hand, it is impossible for anything to stand still or keep itself still, according to the 
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theory “everything is in motion, there is nothing but motion”. Take whiteness as an 
example, when a motion generated by a percipient and an object produces qualities, 
particularly whiteness, the whiteness itself (though whiteness here is not whiteness in 
general) is in flux and “passing over into another colour” (182d). It is impossible “to 
give any name to a colour which will properly apply to it” (182d). In other words, 
“everything is in motion” actually makes everything mix together, which 
consequently makes everything one undifferentiated thing.  
Another consequence of the idea that “everything is in motion”, is that it also 
abolishes knowledge and language, if we believe both “everything is in motion” and 
“knowledge is perception”.  Socrates makes this point clear at 183a: 
 
“If all things are in motion, every answer, on whatever subject, is equally 
correct, both ‘it is thus’ and ‘it is not thus’ --- or if you like ‘become’, as we do not 
want to use any expressions which will bring our friends to a stand–still.” (183a)  
 
In the following discussion, I will try to defend the doctrine “everything is in motion” 
or correct this doctrine in order to make it more acceptable on behalf of Heraclitus or 
Homer or whoever. To keep things simple, I shall only discuss the whiteness case. 
The core point in Socrates’ argument is that the whiteness itself is also in flux, so that 
whiteness is “passing over” into another colour. It is this claim that will make the 
whole process of perception impossible. We have at least three refutations to offer 
against this claim. First, the word “whiteness” that Socrates employs is a vague word. 
As we all know, there are different kinds of whiteness from the aspect of brightness. 
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Pure white, ivory and grayish-white are all usually called “white” in a vague way, 
though in the strictest scientific sense, white is colourless. Hence, even if the 
whiteness itself is in flux in the process of perception (for instance, it increases or 
reduces its brightness and becomes pure white or grayish-white), we could still 
perceive whiteness. We still need to consider the eyes of the percipient and the object. 
People have different powers of sight. How could Socrates ensure that everyone has 
the same vision? Even if we disregard the diseases of eyes and other particular cases, 
such as illusion and vision in the dream, everyone is still different in their power of 
sight. Therefore, even if the whiteness itself does not alter, the appearance of 
whiteness could still differ for different people. Moreover, the colour is in fact light. 
Therefore, the appearance of a colour is influenced by the light. In the same 
circumstance, but in a different perspective or in a different condition of the light, the 
object would emerge as a different colour. In a word, even if “everything is in motion” 
is a wrong theory, Socrates’ criticism is not a good one.  
Second, if “everything is in motion”, how could Socrates make a clear 
distinction between one colour and another colour? Let us consider the process of our 
perception. The whole process is uninterrupted. In the process of white becoming 
gray then black, it seems that there is no absolute boundary of white, gray and black. 
What “everything is in motion” does is to make every moment of our perception 
become definite. If a percipient perceives white at t1, those who advocate “everything 
is in motion” will claim that the percipient absolutely gains a perception of white at t1, 
though they may insist that the perception itself is also in motion. How is this 
194 
 
possible? The issue will become extremely complicated and even insoluble in the 
next step, for it refers to mathematics and the problem of time (similar to Zeno’s 
arrow paradox). Briefly speaking, both the advocates of permanent flux and Socrates 
might admit that change, whether it is a spatial movement or an alternation, needs 
time.  
The last refutation refers to the question “is there whiteness?” Socrates and 
Plato will admit the existence of whiteness, but Heraclitus or other philosophers may 
not. Heraclitus could avoid Socrates’ criticism by denying the existence of whiteness.  
In this section, in order to investigate the meaning of “all things are in motion”, 
Socrates discusses the nature of motion and the relationship between the nature of 
motion and “knowledge is perception” through the process of how we gain 
perception. Nevertheless, if everything is in flux, i.e. nothing stands still, then the 
previous discussion on the nature of motion becomes unreliable.  
 
4.6 Perception has no share of knowledge 
After the investigation of “all things are in motion”, Socrates now tries to expel 
perception from the region of knowledge.218 If Socrates’ attacks on Protagoras’ “man 
is the measure of all things” and Heraclitus’ “all things are in motion” only rebut 
“knowledge is perception” indirectly, then “perception has no share of knowledge” is 
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the final and direct attack Theaetetus’ “knowledge is perception”. In Socrates’ view, 
“man is the measure of all things” is just a rephrase of “knowledge is perception”. At 
152c Socrates asserts that knowledge should be always of what is and always 
unerring. Therefore, if knowledge is perception, then perception should also be 
always of what is and always unerring. Further, if “man is the measure of all things”, 
then “everything is in motion”, because if something could appear as something A to 
one person, while the same thing could appear as something B to another person, 
then everything would be in the process of becoming. According to Socrates’ 
arguments, “everything is in motion” and “man is the measure of all things” are 
wrong. Therefore, he agrees that perception is not a part of knowledge. 
Socrates admits the existence of being and truth. As both Socrates and 
Theodorus agree, being is the thing “which the soul itself reaches out after itself” 
(186a)219 and it is impossible “for someone who does not even get at being to get at 
truth” (186c). To understand this idea, we should return to the text at 185c-d. In this 
section, Socrates leads Theaetetus to the region of judgment which is beyond the 
region of sensation and is relevant to language. 
  
Soc. …Now through what does that power function which reveals to you what 
is common in the case both of all things and of these two --- I mean that which you 
express by the words “is” and “is not” and the other terms used in our question about 
them just now? What kind of instruments will you assign for all these? Through what 
does that which is percipient in us perceive all of them? 
Theaet. You mean being and not-being, likeness and unlikeness, same and 
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different; also one and any other number applied to them. [185d] And obviously too 
your question is about odd and even, and all that is involved with these attributes; 
and you want to know through what bodily instruments we perceive all these with 
the soul. (185c-d) 
 
Socrates wants to know through what kinds of function, “being and not-being, 
likeness and unlikeness, same and different, one and any other number, odd and 
even”, could be avoid to us. Does the soul gain them through the “bodily powers” or 
does it “consider [them] alone and through itself” (185e). 220  Both Socrates and 
Theaetetus admit that things such as being, likeness and the same are all things which 
“the soul itself reaches out after by itself”, i.e. the reflective use of the mind (186a).  
In contrast, Socrates mentions the natural ability of human beings, namely the 
perception ability. He says:  
 
“And thus there are some things which all creatures, men and animals alike, are 
naturally able to perceive as soon as they are born; I mean, the experiences which 
reach the soul through the body.” (186b-c) 
 
These are the perceptual uses of the mind. The next step brings the two uses 
together: 
 
“But calculations regarding their being and their advantageousness come, when 
they do, only as the result of a long and arduous development, involving a good deal 
of trouble and education.”  (186c) 
 
In this quotation, Socrates emphasizes that both animals and human beings have 
perception ability, while the reasoning or calculation ability needs to be developed 
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over a long time. After this, Socrates immediately points out that it is impossible to 
get knowledge without reaching the truth as well (186c). Socrates seems not to 
consider human beings who have no reasoning ability as human beings at all. For 
there is a time difference between a human being born and reaching the truth, if a 
human being needs his reasoning ability to get the truth.  
Based on the reasons above, Socrates concludes that it is impossible to gain 
truth from experience:  
 
“Then knowledge is to be found not in the experience but in the process of 
reasoning about them; it is here, seemingly, not in the experience, that it is possible 
to grasp being and truth.” (186d)  
 
If this is true, then perception “has no share in the grasping of truth, since it has none 
in the grasping of being”. Therefore, perception “has no share in knowledge either” 
and “perception and knowledge could never be the same thing” (186e).221 Socrates 
admits this is “a little progress”. His conclusion therefore is that  
 
“…we shall not now look for knowledge in sense-perception at all, but in 
whatever we call that activity of the soul when it is busy by itself about the things 
which are”. (187a) 
 
Socrates’ expression in this argument is not clear, because it would mislead its 
readers to think that truth or knowledge does not gain any information from 
perception. If someone were to ask Socrates, “Is this statement a piece of knowledge: 
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‘a bachelor is an unmarried man’?” Socrates will properly admit that it is a piece of 
knowledge. But knowing the meaning of “bachelor”, as a premise of such a piece of 
knowledge, is actually based on perception of this specific phenomenon. Moreover, 
some information or just facts that would be admitted as knowledge are constructed 
completely by perception, e.g. “There was a football match last Sunday night”.  
Socrates in this argument is emphasizing that truth and knowledge could not be 
a product of perception, but rather are the product of the activity of reasoning alone. 
Socrates tries to have a better understanding of what the implications of perception 
are, though perception has no share of knowledge. 
 
Conclusion 
As the whole chapter shows, Theaetetus’ first attempt to define knowledge as 
sense perception fails. This result of failure matches the conclusion in chapter three, 
namely, the keynote of the Theaetetus is anti-empiricism. Protagoras’ “man is the 
measure of all things” is not in the category of empiricism, since it belongs to 
relativism.222 Nevertheless, Protagoras’ principle approves the function of perception 
in gaining knowledge and even treats “knowledge” and “perception” as the same 
thing, which Socrates cannot tolerate. Additionally, Protagoras’ idea states that sense 
perception is infallible. If Socrates insists on the two standards of knowledge at 152c, 
he must reject Protagoras’ “man is the measure of all things”.223 
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Socrates’ two criteria of knowledge, namely, knowledge should always be of 
what is and should be unerring, have made perception as a part of knowledge 
impossible. Nevertheless, as part of this investigation, Socrates describes the process 
of how to gain perception in detail and the description gives us a hint of how to 
understand “knowledge” finally when we connect it to the relevant theories about 
epistemology, such as the theory of recollection. The description of the perceiving 
process reveals that Socrates tries to describe the process of perception using 
scientific explanation instead of the method of myth, analogy, simile or story.  
From a negative perspective, Theaetetus’ first definition of knowledge, i.e. 
knowledge is perception, fails because of Socrates’ strict standards of knowledge and 
his anti-empiricist philosophical position. Nevertheless, from a positive perspective, 
Socrates’ arguments in his discussion of “knowledge is perception” strongly 
supplement the epistemological outline in the Meno and Phaedo. That is especially 
true of Socrates’ description of how eyes perceive colour, which could be applied to 
explain how we perceive things in sensible world. The process of perceiving colour 
also help us to imagine how the soul “consorts with” Forms in the realm of Forms. 
The conclusion of the whole discussion about perception in Theaetetus, namely, 
perception cannot be a part of knowledge, enhances Socrates’ philosophical position 
of anti-empiricism.224 The conclusion also leads both Theaetetus and us to turn our 
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attention to the region of reasoning. This area of judgement and reasoning is the 
context for Theaetetus’ second definition of knowledge, “knowledge is true opinion”, 
the topic of chapter five. 
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Chapter Five Knowledge as True Judgement in Theaetetus 
 
Introduction  
In chapter four, we saw how Socrates rebuts Theaetetus’ first definition of 
knowledge, namely, knowledge is perception. Socrates concludes at the end of his 
discussion about perception that perception could not be a part of knowledge. 
Theaetetus then turns his eyes from the sensible region to the region of abstract 
reasoning. Theaetetus proposes that knowledge is not perception but true opinion. 
Although both Socrates and Theaetetus attempt to seek knowledge without 
perception, they will find out soon that the question of whether judgement is true or 
false has a relationship to sense perception. Socrates introduces the wax block 
analogy and the aviary example. The wax block analogy claims that there is a block 
of wax in everyone’s soul and the things that “we have seen or heard or thought of 
ourselves” are all imprinted on the block. What we know comes from the things that 
can be seen as imprinted on the block. The aviary example offers Plato’s readers a 
picture of how the soul operates when it makes a judgement, whether this judgement 
is true or false. The soul is then later described as an aviary with different kinds of 
“birds”. Socrates does not make clear where those “birds” come from but emphasizes 
that the aviary is empty when each person is a child. I will argue that the aviary 
example needs perception and it connects to the recollection theory. If both the wax 
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block analogy and the aviary example need perception, are they therefore empirical 
theories? 
Although the wax block analogy and aviary theory need perception, they could 
be a supplement to Plato’s epistemological outline in the Meno and Phaedo, and 
therefore they have a two-fold function. On the one hand, they are employed to 
illustrate how the soul operates to make a judgement in the sensible world. On the 
other hand, they can be seen as demonstrating how the soul operates to gain 
knowledge when it “consorts with” Forms. The discussion about Theaetetus’ second 
definition of knowledge, i.e. knowledge is true judgement, fails in the end.  
What needs to be noticed is that the wax block analogy and the aviary example 
are introduced under the discussion of the question, “How is false judgement 
possible?”. 225 Indeed, as in the discussion of the first definition of knowledge, i.e. 
knowledge is perception, where Socrates concentrates on refuting Protagoras’ “man 
is the measure of all things”, rather than the definition itself, Socrates in his 
discussion of “knowledge is true judgement” does not consider the definition 
immediately, but tries to understand how false judgement is possible. If we consider 
the relationship between “know” and “not know”, especially when we consider that 
knowledge is unerring, the existence of false judgement seems impossible. Therefore, 
Socrates turns to the relationship between being and non-being in order to locate 
false judgement. The result of this argument is that false judgement is “other judging” 
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(189c-191a). Nevertheless, false judgement as “other judging” is also unreliable, 
since knowledge cannot be wrong. In order to consider how false judgement is 
possible, Socrates introduces the “wax block” analogy. He emphasizes that every 
soul has a wax block inside and the imprints on the block that are produced by sense 
perceptions or thoughts are knowable to us, though every block is different. The 
introduction of the wax block analogy changes the direction of the arguments. False 
judgement no longer arises from the wrong correspondence between sense 
perceptions and thoughts, but rather from the wrong exchanges between different 
sense perceptions and between different thoughts. Nevertheless, this could not 
explain why some false judgements are about something that only exists between 
notions, such as when someone mistakenly thinks “7+5=11” (196a).226 Further, if 
someone knows both 5 and 7, how could he falsely judge “7+5=11”?227 Socrates 
realizes that they will never gain the answer until they know what knowing is. This is 
the starting-point of the aviary example (196a-b). The example is employed to 
explain how false judgement happens when someone has knowledge, since Socrates 
makes a distinction between having knowledge and possessing knowledge. False 
judgement happens when someone tries to use knowledge rather than when he only 
possesses knowledge. Then, false judgement becomes something of an interchange 
between pieces of knowledge and happens in the behavior of applying knowledge. 
But what follows this conclusion destroys the conclusion itself, for the existence of 
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 R. S. Bluck rejects the idea that “knowledge cannot be a matter of ‘acquaintance’ of any kind, being 
necessarily propositional” in Theaetetus, because “the Greek word δόξα is not necessarily to be associated with 
propositions”. See Bluck (1963) p. 259. 
227
 It is still possible that someone who knows “7”, “+”, “5” and “=”, but he still does not know 7+5=12 or he 
gains 7+5=12 by “truly guess”. Cf. Ryle (1990) p. 24. 
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false judgement is produced by having knowledge rather than from want of 
knowledge, i.e. it is knowledge that makes the soul judge falsely, or that makes the 
soul ignorant. 
The interlocutor, i.e. Theaetetus, fails to explain how false judgement is possible. 
Therefore, he proposes to consider directly knowledge as true judgement. Socrates 
rejects this definition by employing the counter-example of the art of orators and 
lawyers. This art could make people judge truly without knowledge, and if this 
phenomenon is possible, then true judgement is not knowledge.  
In this chapter, I will first discuss knowledge, perception and the wax block 
analogy (section 5.1), because the wax block analogy connects knowledge, 
perception and judgement. My key question will be whether the block receives 
knowledge and perception themselves or only their images. However, Socrates 
discusses the wax block analogy in two different places in Theaetetus (191c-e, 194b-
195a). In order to make my argument coherent, I have to depart from the order of 
Plato’s texts and illustrate both discussions of the wax block analogy together in this 
chapter. Section 5.2 will deal with the aviary example which is another key theory to 
my whole project, for both it and the wax block analogy can be read as 
supplementing what happens when a soul “consorts with” the Forms to gain 
knowledge and how the soul operates a system within itself to make regaining 
knowledge possible. When Plato supplies his epistemological outline in Meno and 
Phaedo, he does not explain these two processes clearly. The Theaetetus material 
adds important information. In section 5.3, “how is false judgement possible?” will 
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be discussed. This question is important, since it helps us to understand how true 
judgement is possible, especially when we realize that the wax block analogy and the 
aviary example are introduced through the discussion of how false judgement is 
possible. 
 
5.1 Are knowledge and perceptions or their images on the wax block?  
After the failure of Theaetetus’ first definition of knowledge, “knowledge is 
perception”, Socrates insists on seeking what knowledge is rather what knowledge is 
not. He therefore turns his eyes away from sense perception: “We shall not now look 
for knowledge in sense-perception at all, but in whatever we call that activity of the 
soul when it is busy by itself about the things which are” (187a). In response to 
Socrates’ comment Theaetetus calls that activity “judgement”. The next text is as 
follows: 
 
Socrates: “…Now look back to the beginning, Wipe out all that we have said 
hitherto, and see if you can see any better from where you have now progressed to. 
Tell me again, what is knowledge? 
Theaetetus: “Well, Socrates, one can’t say that it is judgement in general, 
because there is also false judgement --- but true judgement may well be knowledge. 
So let that be my answer. If the same thing happens again, and we find, as we go on, 
that it turns out not to be so, we’ll try something else.” (187a-b) 
 
This quotation shows the second definition of knowledge that Theaetetus offers, 
namely, knowledge is true judgement. However, there is a huge gap between 
Theaetetus’ first definition of knowledge (“knowledge is perception”) and the second 
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(“knowledge is true judgement”), for perception belongs to the region of sensation, 
while judgement belongs to the region of reasoning. This gap seems odd. In order to 
understand this oddness, let us come back to the text of 184c: 
 
Socrates: “Is it more correct to say that the eyes are that with which we see, or 
that through which we see? Do you hear with the ears or through the ears?” 
Theaetetus: “Well, I should think, Socrates, that it is ‘through which’ we 
perceive in each case, rather than ‘with which’.”  
Socrates: “Yes, my son. It would be a very strange thing, I must say, if there 
were a number of senses (αἰσθήσεις) sitting (ἐγκάθηνται) inside us as if we were 
Wooden Horses, and there were not some single form, soul or whatever one ought to 
call it, to which all these converge -- something with which, through the senses, as if 
they were instruments, we perceive all that is perceptible.”  
 
Both Sedley and McDowell comment on this short text. McDowell claims: 
 
“But if we say that it is our eyes which see and our ears which hear, we seem to 
preclude ourselves from saying that there is some one thing which both sees and 
hears: something which, as it were, collates the information yielded by the exercise 
of the different senses. And, as Socrates says, it would be strange to be precluded 
from saying that”.228  
 
Sedley follows the same view:  
 
 “A large part of the passage229 is devoted to establishing the precise relation 
between the senses, considered as that via which we perceive… and the soul, viewed 
as the subject of all judgements”.230  
 
Both of these interpretations are correct, though they are vague and explain the text 
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 McDowell (1973) pp. 185-186. 
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 184b3-187a3. 
230
 Sedley (2004) p. 105. 
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in a broad framework. In order to understand them more deeply, we need to consider, 
“Why does Socrates speak like that? Why does Socrates object to the idea of a 
number of senses ‘sitting inside us as if we were Wooden Horses’?”. 231  Two 
questions arise from the expression “if there were a number of senses sitting inside 
us as if we were Wooden Horses”. First, what is the meaning of the word “us” and 
second does the word “us” refer to the soul or to the body? These two questions 
could be considered as a single question, “What things are in the soul?” 
These questions cannot be answered until we begin to consider the wax block 
analogy. When Socrates introduces the wax block analogy, he points out that there is 
a wax block in everyone’s soul and therefore “the things we have seen or heard or 
thought of ourselves” are “imprinted on the wax block” (εἰς τοῦτο ἀποτυποῦσθαι, 
191d). We immediately realize that the question “What things are in your soul?” 
becomes another question “What things are imprinted upon the wax block?” Socrates 
indeed speaks in the wax block analogy of “a thing you know” (ὃ µέν τις οἶδεν, 192a) 
as something where “you possess the record of it in your soul” (µνηµεῖον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, 
192a). Socrates employs the phrase “in your soul”, for what you remember and know 
(ὃ µὲν µνηµονεύειν τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι) are the things on the wax block. Further, 
Socrates claims in the aviary example, “…there are pieces of knowledge covering all 
numbers in his soul” (198b). Socrates also uses terminology of items “in his soul” 
when he claims that someone “knows so long as he possesses them though he may 
not have them ready at hand in his soul” (ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, 200c). Moreover, when 
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Socrates describes the soul as an aviary, Theaetetus uses the same language when he 
observes that “perhaps we ought to have supposed that there are pieces of ignorance 
also flying about in the soul” (ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, 199e). The phrase “in the soul” in these 
quotations in the aviary example should be understood as “in the aviary”, since 
according to the analogy, only what is in the “aviary” could be known. Socrates in 
the aviary example always claims only that what we know are in the aviary, in 
contrast to the wax block analogy where he points out that both perceptions and 
thoughts are imprinted upon the block (191d).  
Socrates’ application of the wax block analogy in the region of knowledge or 
reasoning only seems straightforward, because this analogy is introduced to explain 
how it is possible “to learn something you did not know before” (191c) and why 
false judgement appears. If these are the functions of the analogy, then it could only 
be valid in the discussion of judgement, knowledge or reasoning. However, what 
Socrates says about the wax block does not match his purpose. Socrates asks 
Theaetetus whether it is possible for someone to learn something that they did not 
know before.Theaetetus answers him without any hesitation: “Surely it is” (191c). 
Socrates wishes him to suppose, “We have in our soul a block of wax”. Later, at 194d 
and 194e, Socrates borrows Homer’s term and calls this wax block the “heart of the 
soul”. Socrates also points out that different people have different types of wax 
blocks. The blocks, he says, are, 
 
“…larger in one person, smaller in another, and of purer wax in one case, dirtier 
in another; in some men rather hard, in others rather soft, while in some it is of the 
proper consistency” (191c-d).  
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The function of this wax block, or the “heart” of our soul, is described as follows:  
 
“We make impressions upon this of everything we wish to remember among the 
things we have seen or heard or thought of ourselves; we hold the wax under our 
perceptions and thoughts and take a stamp from them, in the way in which we take 
the imprints of signet rings.” (191d)  
 
In this quotation, Socrates claims that the imprint of “perceptions and the thoughts” 
would appear on the wax block. Two things need to be noticed. First, there are things 
imprinted upon the wax block, namely, there is something in our soul. Second, the 
stamps or imprints of what “we have seen or heard or thought” and wish to 
remember are all on the block. The only difference between people is that the 
imprints may be different in degree. Nevertheless, how could the imprints of 
perceptions be on the wax block? This question is important, since nothing is 
perceptible or sensible in the process of recollection, according to the outline of 
epistemology in Meno and Phaedo and Socrates rejects that perception is a part of 
knowledge at the end of his discussion about knowledge as perception in Theaetetus 
(187a). 232  If imprints of perceptions are on the wax block, then is perception 
knowledge? What puzzles me here is not that thought is imprinted but that perception 
is imprinted. 
As the quotation at 191d shows, what Socrates says is contradictory. On the one 
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 According to David Sedley’s report, “Anon. [the Anonymous commentator] regards the Meno as the key text 
for understanding Plato's theory of knowledge, including that presented in the Theaetetus, and he has little 
difficulty in, for example, interpreting Socratic midwifery in the latter dialogue as the dialectical encouragement 
of others’ recollection of innate knowledge”. See Sedley (1993) p. 129. 
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hand, Socrates tries to limit the imprints that appear on the wax to the region of 
knowledge and memory (“whatever is impressed upon the wax, we remember and 
know as long as the image remains in the wax”) (καὶ ὃ µὲν ἂν ἐκµαγῇ, µνηµονεύειν 
τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἕως ἂν ἐνῇ τὸ εἴδωλον αὐτοῦ). On the other hand, Socrates himself 
claims that the imprints of the perceptions and thoughts would be on the wax.233 
Think about the analogy of the “signet rings” (191d). Socrates tries to make his 
interlocutor understand by using the analogy of taking the imprints of signet rings. 
How do we put an imprint on a ring? The craftsman needs to know what would 
appear on the ring, i.e. a piece of paper or whatever which has the picture or 
sentences or whatever that the ring owner requires. Then the craftsman carves an 
imprint on the ring according to the reference. Then the ring owner imprints the ring 
on the wax. What will appear on the wax block is not “perceptions and thoughts” as 
Socrates has said, but just an image or imprint of them. There is something on the 
wax block, but it is not the perceptions or the thoughts, rather the image of them. The 
perceptions and the thoughts themselves are always in other regions (somewhere, but 
not in your soul), even if no one perceives or knows them. They could be perceived 
or known by God, as Berkeley would say.234 Again, they are not on the wax block, 
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 Burnyeat points out, “What Locke has and Plato lacks is the notion, so important in the modern philosophical 
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deliberate or accidental) does important work for Plato in enabling him to explain falsity”. I agree with Burnyeat 
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in Theaetetus, though it could be used for explaining how the soul operates to gain knowledge by consorting with 
Forms, which is why it could be a kind of anti-empiricism as well. See Burnyeat (1990) pp. 100-101 and Woolf 
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 Berkeley believes, “You will perhaps say that matter, though it is not perceived by us, is nevertheless 
perceived by God, to whom it is the occasion of exciting ideas in our minds”. See Berkeley (1996) pp. 55-56.  
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but stay somewhere else, maybe in another world, as Popper would insist.235 
This reading is clarified further at 191d-e. After Socrates employs the analogy to 
help his interlocutor to understand, he continues:  
 
“Whatever is impressed upon the wax we remember and know so long as the 
image remains in the wax; whatever is obliterated or cannot be impressed, we forget 
and do not know.” (191d-e).  
 
“You see,” someone might say, “Socrates, here, emphasizes the image again, that is 
to say, only images would appear on the wax block, not the perceptions and the 
knowledge.”236  
This is an interesting account of how memory relates to perception. Socrates 
emphasizes what would be imprinted upon the wax block is the imprints of 
perception and thought. He also says,  
 
“We may look upon it (the wax block), then, as a gift of Memory (τῆς 
Μνηµοσύνης), the mother of the Muses.” (191d).  
 
Socrates also uses the word “remember” (µνηµονεῦσαι, µνηµονεύειν) twice in the 
text of 191d-e. Beginning at 163e, Socrates and Theaetetus talk about memory at 
length: 
 
Socrates: “But you do say—don’t you?--that there is such a thing as memory?” 
Theaetetus: “Yes.” 
“Memory of nothing? Or of something?” 
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 I refer to his theory of three worlds. See Simkin (1993) p. 47. 
236
 Bostock mentions “image presented by perception”, but does not discuss about it. See Bostock (1998) p. 178.  
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“Of something, surely.” 
“That is to say, of things which one has learnt, that is, perceived – that kind of 
‘something’?” 
“Of course.” 
“And what a man has once seen, he recalls, I take it, from time to time?” 
“He does.” (163e) 
 
Socrates confirms three issues on memory with Theaetetus in the quotation. (1) You 
cannot memorize nothing, so you must remember something, namely, your memory 
needs contents. (2) The content of your memory is the kind of thing you have learnt 
or perceived. If the kind of thing you have learnt or perceived is the content of your 
memory, what you have learnt or perceived should be “in your soul”, otherwise, it 
seems that the process is no longer a process of memorizing. This refers to the third 
issue. (3) As Socrates has said, once a man has perceived or learnt something, he 
recalls these things “from time to time”. This means that if a man has memory of 
what he has learnt or perceived, even if a man does not learn or perceive those things 
any longer, he could still recollect these things from time to time, i.e. a number of 
times.  
In order to make these three issues clear, let us consider a concrete example. 
Imagine you are seeing a red apple on a desk. According to Socrates’ idea at 182a-b, 
your eyes and the red apple produce a motion that makes an image of redness. Then 
there is another motion produced between redness and your eyes. Finally, your eyes 
are full of red, because of the second motion. This is the process of how to gain a 
perception. As you gain the perception of red, according to the wax block analogy at 
191c-e, you make an impression or imprint of the red on the wax block. The problem 
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is: what exactly is imprinted upon the wax block? It is the image of the perception of 
the red imprinted on the wax block. Having noted the perception of the red, you turn 
around or shut your eyes and do not see the red apple any more. You now try to recall 
the memory of the red apple. Because you have made an impression of the red apple 
on the wax block, you could easily regain it. The key point here is that what you 
regain is just the image of the perception on the wax block, not the perception itself, 
because you do not see the red apple, then you do not have the perception of the red 
apple anymore. What you have now is only the impression of the apple on the wax 
block. As Socrates claims at 194d: 
 
“Men with such souls learn easily and remember what they learn; they do not 
get the signs out of line with the perceptions, but judge truly”.  
 
The things on the wax block, including what you remember and learn, belong to the 
region of reasoning. 
This explanation seems reasonable and knowledge is said to be the imprints of 
perceptions and thoughts, i.e. knowledge is the image. However, there is still a 
problem here. How could knowledge be the images of peceptions and thoughts? Take 
the moon as an example. The moon in the sky has many reflections in different lakes, 
i.e. there are many images of the moon, but only one real moon. If the moon is 
replaced by the knowledge and lakes are replaced by the souls in the example, then 
knowledge cannot be the images of the perceptions and thoughts. 237  Because 
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He does not make a distinction between the images of knowledge and knowledge itelf. I do not agree with him. 
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knowledge itself cannot be participated in different souls, otherwise, knowledge 
cannot keep itself complete. Let us take another example to illustrate this argument. 
The number “one” could exist everywhere, on a balckboard or in a book, but it is 
only image of number one itself. In other words, all these number one participate in 
number one itself. The relationship between sensible things and the Forms is 
presented. Sensible things participate in Forms, but Forms cannot be in every 
sensible thing.238 To the same reason, knowledge cannot be in different souls, but 
only images of knowledge are in the souls. 
Consider the problem in the wax block analogy. All the things on the wax block 
are the images of the perceptions and thought. Let us consider a short quotation at 
186a-b: 
 
Socrates: “Now in which class do you put being? For that, above all, is 
something that accompanies everything.” 
Theaetetus: “I should put it among the things which the soul itself reaches out 
after by itself.” 
Socrates: “Also like and unlike, same and different?” 
Theaetetus: “Yes.” 
Socrates: “What about beautiful and ugly, good and bad?” 
Theaetetus: “Yes, these too; ….” 
Socrates: “Not so fast, now. Would not you say that it is through touch that the 
soul perceives the hardness of what is hard, and similarly the softness of what is soft?” 
Theaetetus: “Yes.”  
 
In this quotation, Socrates distinguishes two kinds of judgements that the soul could 
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reach. One is the judgements that soul could make by itself, such as those about 
being, like, unlike, beautiful, ugly, good and bad. The other is the judgements that the 
soul could make by working with body, such as hardness and softness. A judgement 
“Socrates is ugly” could be made by the soul itself, for this judgement of the 
perception is not a property of something, since the view is a reflection, a judgement 
about the person. “Socrates is ugly” is a subjective judgement, in contrast, “The chair 
is hard” is an objective judgement about the chair’s property, which cannot be 
reached by the soul itself, but the soul needs to gain the judgement by lifting or 
moving the chair working with the body. In these two kinds of judgements, the 
concepts, “being”, “like”, “unlike”, “beautiful”, “ugly”, “good”, “bad”, could not 
come from perceptions. Rather they are already in an individual’s soul when this 
person makes a judgement. This fact leads us to consider the recollection theory and 
the theory of Forms.239 An image of the Forms comes from the Forms. Perceptions 
are only stimulations or reminders for recollecting Forms again. Moreover, the 
imprint of perceptions and thoughts on the wax block are not knowledge, but only 
images of knowledge in an individual’s soul. If knowledge itself is in an agent’s soul, 
then knowledge will vanish when this person dies. That is impossible. Moreover, if 
knowledge is in an agent’ soul, then it is affected by the nature of that soul and can 
be distorted by it. 
Nevertheless, even if only images of knowledge are on the block, Socrates 
never says that the soul knows directly from the things on the wax block. Socrates 
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 Richard Robinson would not agree with my conclusion here. He rejects the idea that the recollection theory 
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admits: 
 
“Whatever is impressed upon the wax we remember and know so long as the 
image remains in the wax; whatever is obliterated or cannot be impressed, we forget 
and do not know” (191d).  
 
However, how could the soul know the things imprinted upon the wax block? 
Another element should be added to explain why the soul could “read” or “see” the 
things on the wax block. Socrates does not mention what this element is in 
Theaetetus. Nevertheless, Socrates mentions that the soul “sees” everything in our 
world and the underworld in Meno (81c) and he also uses the phrase “soul’s eyes” in 
Republic (508a) and Parmenides (132a). Moreover, in the aviary example in 
Theaetetus, there is “someone” to grasp “birds”. Whatever the additional element is, 
there is an element. The soul does not know the things on the wax block directly. 
Perceptions are not directly relevant to what the soul knows, even the perceptions 
that have been imprinted on the wax block. Further, the perceptions imprinted on the 
wax block cannot be known at all, for perception is not knowable. Consider the 
example “Socrates is beautiful”. The perception of Socrates’ appearance cannot tell 
an agent whether Socrates is beautiful or not. The perception of Socrates’ appearance 
can only give you a picture or image. When the agent makes a judgement, “Socrates 
is beautiful”, this judgement goes beyond the perception of Socrates’ appearance, i.e. 
all cannot come from perception. The perception of Socrates only stimulates the soul 
to produce the “beautiful” imprint in the soul, but cannot produce the imprint, since 
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“beautiful” is not in the perception of Socrates.  
In addition, perceptions cannot be on the wax block, even if “…the things we 
have seen or heard or thought of ourselves” on the block (191d). After this sentence, 
Socrates immediately adds, “…we hold the wax under our perceptions and thoughts 
and take a stamp from them” (191d). Then, to return to 184d, where is the 
perceptions “sitting inside us”? The answer is alluded to by Socrates at 186b-c: 
 
Socrates: And thus there are some things which all creatures, men and animals 
alike, are naturally able to perceive as soon as they are born; I mean, the experiences 
which reach the soul through the body (ὅσα διὰ τοῦ σώµατος παθήµατα ἐπὶ τὴν 
ψυχὴν τείνει). 
 
Socrates admits that all creatures, i.e. human beings and animals, naturally have the 
ability of perception from birth. Moreover, Socrates identifies the “παθήµατα” 
(experiences) which “stretch” or “extend” to the soul through the body as 
“perception”.240 Socrates seems to suggest that the perceptions are stretching through 
the body to reach the soul. At 184d-e, Socrates asks Theaetetus: 
 
 “I want to know if it is with one and the same part of ourselves that we reach, 
through our eyes to white and black, and through the other means to yet further 
things; and whether, if asked, you will be able to refer all these to the body… Tell me: 
the instruments through which you perceive hot, hard, light, sweet -- do you consider 
that they all belong to the body? Or can they be referred elsewhere?”  
Theaetetus: “No, they all belong to the body.”  
 
This paragraph shows that Socrates leads Theaetetus to agree that the functions of the 
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body is to perceive perceptible things. Accordingly, as the argument at 185c-186b 
shows, the soul makes the judgements on “being”, “like” and “ugly” by itself, 
namely, the soul has the ability of reasoning. Then, the functions of the soul and of 
the body are different. So far, it has been proved that the body has the ability of 
perception. Nevertheless, how could the perceptions/senses be “sitting inside” (184d) 
in the soul through the body? Consider the process of gaining perception that 
Socrates describes at 156b, 156d-e and 182a-b.  
At 156a-b, Socrates gives us three kinds of perceptions.  
 
“Motion has two forms, each an infinite multitude, but distinguished by their 
powers, the one being active and the other passive. And through the intercourse and 
mutual friction of these two there comes to be an offspring infinite in multitude but 
always twin births, on the one hand what is perceived, on the other, the perception of 
it, the perception in every case being generated together with what is perceived and 
emerging along with it. For the perceptions we have such names as sight, hearing, 
smelling, feeling cold and feeling hot; also what are called pleasures and pains, 
desires and fears; and there are others besides, a great number which have names, an 
infinite number which have not.”. 
 
The first kind of perception comes from outside and relates to the properties of 
objects, e.g. sight, hearing, smelling, feeling cold and feeling hot. The second kind of 
perception comes from inside which are the feelings, e.g. pleasures and pains, desires 
and fears. The first and the second categories of perceptions fit the definition of 
perception that Socrates gives at 186b-c, namely, “the experiences which reach the 
soul through the body”. Of course, it would be odd to us to regard fear and desire as 
a kind of perception, but if we treat them as things produced by the environment 
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through the body, it seems that we could understand it perfectly well. What needs to 
be noticed is sight, exemplified in the first category, for Socrates immediately uses it 
as an example in the text of 156d-e: 
 
“Thus the eye and some other thing -- one of the things commensurate with the 
eye -- which has come into its neighbourhood, generate both whiteness and the 
perception which is by nature united with it… In this event, motions arise in the 
intervening space, sight from the side of the eye and whiteness from the side of that 
which cooperates in the production of the colour. The eye is filled with sight; at that 
moment it sees, and there comes into being, not indeed sight, but a seeing eye; while 
its partner in the process of producing colour is filled with whiteness, and there 
comes into being not whiteness, but white…” 
 
It is the motion that is produced by the eyes and the whiteness that makes the eye see 
the colour white. This shows that the colour of white (not whiteness) exists in your 
eyes, or more broadly in the body. If we follow up this line of argument, we could 
say that all the perceptions are in the body, though they belong to and sit inside 
different bodily organs. I could give some texts as evidence for this conclusion. At 
184e, Socrates leads Theaetetus to give this answer, that “the instruments through 
which you perceive hot, hard, light, sweet” “all belong to the body”. At 184e-185a, 
Socrates leads Theaetetus to admit that “what you perceive through one power, you 
cannot perceive through another”.241  That is to say, eyes, ears, tongue and such 
organs all belong to the body and, further, the senses of sight, hearing, and taste 
belong to the body as well. Although the perceptions need the body, the word “body” 
here is still vague. This word is just an abstract word to cover everything that relates 
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to the body. The things that relate to the body could be divided into three categories. 
The organs are the first category; the senses or the functions of the organs are the 
second; and the perceptions are the third. 
Following what Socrates says, I have clarified that only images of knowledge 
and perceptions are on the wax block. According to Socrates, what someone 
remembers and knows are the things that appear imprinted on the wax block. 
Socrates emphasizes the imprints that are on the wax block and that the soul could 
make a judgement through these things, i.e. perceptions and thought. Nevertheless, 
we have only discussed what the imprints on the wax block are and the wax block 
analogy itself has not yet been considered.  
The wax block analogy starts with a question, “Is it possible to learn something 
you did not know before?” (191c). This question immediately refers us back to 
Meno’s paradox, i.e. that learning or inquiry is impossible. Differently from the 
theory of recollection, Socrates wants Theaetetus to suppose that there is a wax block 
in everyone’s soul and wax blocks are different: 
 
“Now I want you to suppose, for the sake of the argument, that we have in our 
souls a block of wax, larger in one person, smaller in another, and of purer wax in 
one case, dirtier in another; in some men rather hard, in others rather soft, while in 
some it is of the proper consistency” (191c-d).  
 
Socrates reveals three things in his analogy of the wax block. (1) The soul is not a 
block of wax, rather there is a block of wax inside the soul. (2) We do not know what 
exactly the words, “larger”, “smaller”, “purer”, “dirtier”, “hard” and “softer”, refer to. 
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However, the vocabulary does show that different souls have different kinds of wax 
blocks. The block of wax is different in different souls. Hence, because of the 
difference between the wax blocks, the souls are different. The souls in Theaetetus 
where souls are said various because of the different wax blocks in different souls are 
no longer the same as the souls in the Meno and Phaedo where soul is assumed to be 
completely reasonable and every soul is same in such sense.242  (3) Socrates does not 
give up the theory of recollection, since when someone collect what has been on the 
wax block, he has recollected the things, for the things are already there. Consider an 
example, when someone perceives a tree and realizes that it is a tree. The concept 
“tree” must have been in his soul or must have known to him. The situation that 
happens in the wax block analogy is the same as the idea in the example. Moreover, 
the only thing on the wax block is the images of knowledge and all these images are 
passively controlled by the perceptions and the thoughts -- if the things on the wax 
block are the imprints of the perceptions and thoughts, then thoses things or the 
imprints can only wait for the percptions and the thoughts to come. Interestingly, 
after he introduces the idea that “we have in our souls a block of wax” (191c), 
Socrates immediately mentions “Memory, the mother of the Muses” (191d). He 
claims he wax block is a gift of Memory. When we learn something new, we accept 
something new and this is a passive process. After we have learnt something and it is 
has become a piece of our knowledge, then it also becomes part of our memory. 
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 Plato does not offer a comprehensive theory about soul in both Meno and Phaedo. In the Meno, every word 
about soul relates to epistemology (Meno 81b-d and 86a). In the Phaedo, though soul is tried to prove to be 
immortal, but Plato does not mention the tripatite theory of the soul as in the Republic (435e-438b), rather he 
mentions how the soul recollect knowledge and tries to persuade his interlocutors to keep away from the bodily 
elements which disturb the soul to gain knowledge, when epistemology is discussed in the Phaedo (73b-76d and 
79c-d). 
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When we try to use this piece of knowledge, we are trying to recollect it from our 
memory. Memory is a necessary part of the analysis of knowledge.  
The point on memory stands whether the wax block analogy is an empiricist 
theory or not. Nevertheless, what does the wax block analogy signify for empiricism 
in this text? Wax block analogy is presented as partly empirical. Socrates admits that 
the perceptions are the sources of imprints of the wax block, namely, perceptions are 
the sources of knowledge, according to the wax block analogy: 
 
 “We make impression upon this of everything we wish to remember among the 
things we have seen or heard or thought of ourselves; we hold the wax under our 
perceptions and thoughts and take a stamp from them, in the way in which we take 
the imprints of signet rings” (191d).  
 
A wax block that receives the images of perceptions is inside my soul. This is the 
first part of the wax block analogy and this part is empirical, because it relates to 
perceptions received via the body. But there is another part of the theory which is 
anti-empirical. Something of the soul (the added element) is as it were watching the 
block. Uninterruptedly, everything that is on the wax block is accessible to me. All 
the “imprints” come from either my perceptions or my thoughts. Socrates makes it 
clear that our perceptions derive from what “we have seen or heard”.243 Further, 
Socrates points out “Whatever is impressed upon the wax we remember and know so 
long as the image remains in the wax; whatever is obliterated or cannot be impressed, 
we forget and do not know” (191d-e). Socrates obviously admits that all the things 
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 Hume repeats nearly the same idea in his book two thousand years later. See Hume (1975) pp. 17-24. 
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on the wax block are knowledge. All the things that cannot be accessed through the 
block have either been forgotten or are unknowable. It is in fact a description of how 
the images of perceptions become knowledge. The things that we have seen or heard 
are imprinted on the wax block in our soul; once the imprints are on the block, they 
become knowledge. Let us consider the phrase “what we have seen or heard”. Does 
this phrase refer to the Forms? Or does it purely refer to the images of sensible things? 
If the things we know on the wax block are images of knowledge, they come from 
the Forms and are recollected through memory. If they refer to Forms, then they are 
the images of knowledge about the perceptions.  
This proves again that the things on the wax block cannot be perceptions 
themselves or knowledge itself (but the imprint of the perceptions and the images of 
knowledge), for souls could not “hear” the Forms or really see them either. Indeed, 
Socrates mentions in the Meno that souls “see” and then learn everything either here 
or in Hades (81c). Socrates describes this learning only by the metaphor “see” and 
not by metaphors of other faculties of organs involved.244 Further, in the Phaedo, the 
soul when it works alone is presented as passing “into the realm of what is pure, ever 
existing, immortal and unchanging” (79d), though Socrates does not mention how 
exactly the soul gains knowledge or wisdom in this realm. In the Parmenides, 
Parmenides uses “the soul’s eye” to describe how the soul consorts with the large 
itself. (132a)245 In the Republic, Socrates claims, “When the soul’s eye is fixed on 
objects illuminated by truth and reality, it understands and knows them, and its 
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 He uses “touch” the Forms or “grasp” them in various places, but to me, “seeing” can be a kind of activity of 
“touching” or “grasping”, i.e. touching/grasping to me are ways of speaking about seeing.  
245
 Parmenides indeed links the soul’s eyes to “the large itself and the other large things” (132a).  
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possession of intelligence is evident” (508d)246 All these texts have shown that the 
soul only uses its faculty of seeing or sight to gain the knowledge from the Forms.  
The design of the wax block analogy contains a negative factor that could 
destroy the theory itself. First, the whole theory makes the soul too inactive. It seems 
that the soul only passively accepts the images from perceptions, but making 
judgement needs the soul to be active. Second, the second part of the theory actually 
alluds that the soul needs an element to “see” or gain by whatever means the things 
on the wax block, though the text of Theaetetus does not tell us what that element is. 
Further, Socrates also does not make clear in the wax block analogy how this 
element works or how the soul makes judgements on the things on the wax block, no 
matter whether the judgements are true or false. It is because of this gap that Socrates 
introduces the aviary example. Socrates in the aviary example answers in some 
degree the problem of how the soul knows the things on the block. This answer is 
produced or made possible by the switch of metaphors between the wax block and 
the aviary. 
 
5.2 The aviary example 
The second way that Socrates tries to explain how the soul operates to gain 
knowledge is the aviary example. The aviary example also illustrates the distinction 
between having knowledge and possessing knowledge, as part of the explaination of 
                                                 
246
 The translation comes from Desmond Lee. I change the “mind’s eye” into “soul’s eye” in my translation. The 
Greek text does not use “soul’s eye”, but according the the context, “soul’s eye” is not a wrong translation. See 
Lee (2007) p. 234.  
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knowledge. The soul in this alternative example has an aviary. Now, knowledge and 
perception no longer create imprints on the block of wax, but every piece of 
knowledge becomes one of the various kinds of “birds” in the aviary. Socrates 
explains: 
 
“Now let us make in each soul a sort of aviary of all kinds of birds…Then we 
must say that when we are children this receptacle is empty; and by the birds we 
must understand pieces of knowledge” (197d-e).  
 
A question arises. Since Socrates admits that when we are children, the aviary is 
empty, does he disconnect the theory of recollection from this example? Cornford 
thinks that this example does connect to the theory of recollection, even if Socrates 
claims that the receptacle is empty when we are children. 247  Sedley treats the 
example of aviary an idea about what kind of thing knowledge is, rather than what 
knowledge is.248 Actually, to suppose his position, he argues that there is a distinction 
between potentiality and actuality and that Socrates tries to apply this distinction to 
knowledge for the first time.249 Under Sedley’s interpretation, knowledge becomes 
potentiality as it is in Aristotle’s philosophy.  
Before I examine whether the aviary example has connection with recollection 
theory, I want first to confirm that I agree with Sedley’s idea, but also to explain why 
Sedley’s interpretation of the aviary example by the distinction between potentiality 
and actuality is not necessary for many reasons. First, let us consider the concept of 
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 Cornford (1935) pp. 135-136.  
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 Sedley (2004) p. 140. 
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potentiality and actuality in Aristotle’ philosophy.  
 
“For (ⅰ) each thing is called whatever it is, when it is the thing actually more 
than potentially [the wood or the seed, the matter, is not a table or a lettuce --- though 
it may have the potentiality of being one --- until it has actually been put together or 
has actually germinated and grown]. Further, (ⅱ) men come to be from men, but not 
beds from beds. That is precisely why people say that the nature of a bed is not the 
shape but the wood…” (Physics, Ⅱ, 1. 193b7-10)250  
 
Aristotle makes it clear that a thing in itself is actual, not potential, though it could 
potentially be something else. The nature of an actual thing determines what other 
thing it could become. Take a human being as an example, a baby as an actual thing 
is potentially an adult human being, which is determinate by its nature. Aristotle 
employs the notions of potentiality and actuality to describe the process of change.251 
Then, let us consider the aviary example, compared to Aristotle’s concepts of 
potentiality and actuality. Pieces of knowledge in the aviary example are analogized 
as birds in the aviary, or the soul’s eyes or whatever the added element is by which 
the soul catches the “birds”, for Socrates does not make it clear when he repeatedly 
uses no subject in the Greek texts (the translation necessarily adds “he” for the 
completeness of the texts). The only difference between you having the birds and 
possessing them is whether you “take” one of the birds or let it go. 252 According to 
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 Translation comes from J. L. Ackrill. See Ackrill (1981) pp. 35-36. Aristotle surely has a different 
understanding about potentiality and actuality in De anima 2.1 (412a21-28) and 2.5 (417a21-29), but this fact has 
shown that using terminology “potentiality” and “actuality” to interprete the aviary example will lead ambiguous.  
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 Cf. Lear (1988) pp. 60-83. 
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hand relation toward what he knows, a necessary condition for knowledge that Socrates tackles in the Jury 
passage of Apology”. Although I am not interested in the connection between Apology and Theaetetus in this 
thesis, Zina Giannopoulou reminds us that knowledge should be actual to knower according to the wax block 
analogy and the aviary example. See Giannopoulou (2013) pp. 17-18. 
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Aristotle, the potentiality should finally become actuality, 253  we cannot say that 
having knowledge is a process of becoming actuality, since a thing X which is 
potentiality of something Y should not be Y itself, otherwise X is actually Y itself 
and this is irrelevant to the potentiality and actuality. Lastly, a thing, in Aristotle’s 
mind, if it is in the process of change, should be both a potentiality and an actuality. 
A baby is the actuality of an infancy and is the potentiality of an adulthood. 
Compared to the birds in the example of aviary, birds are only the actuality of 
themselves not the potentiality of other things. The idea of potentiality and actuality 
could not be applied to the birds in the aviary example. All these four points have 
shown that the distinction of potentiality and actuality could not be applied to explain 
the aviary example. We cannot say that I actualize the birds into birds or make the 
birds into actuality when I catch the birds. Hence, Sedley’s interpretation of the 
aviary example by using potentiality and actuality should be avoided, since actuality 
has various meanings in Aristotle’s philosophy. 
Now the question whether there is a connection between the aviary example and 
recollection needs to be consided. There is a connection between the aviary example 
and the theory of recollection, as Cornford believes. Socrates admits that the aviary 
in us is empty when we are infancy and this has shown that the aviary example 
relates to the recollection theory, for according to the recollection, we lose or forget 
all we learnt when we were born. 
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 Cf. On the Soul, 2.1, 412“a22-23”: “…there are two kinds of actuality, corresponding to knowledge and to 
reflecting (θεωρεῖν)”.  
228 
 
“When anyone takes possession of a piece of knowledge and shuts it up in the 
pen, we should say that he has learned or has found out the thing of which this is the 
knowledge; and knowing, we should say, is this” (197e).  
 
Indeed, this definition of knowledge or knowing is a repeat of the definition of 
knowing at 197b, namely knowledge is “the possession of knowledge”.  
For clarity, Socrates makes his argument for the definition of knowing by giving 
Theatetetus a puzzle of arithmetic, since Theaetetus is a mathematical learner. 
Socrates says he wants Theaetetus to think of this as arithmetic: “a hunt for pieces of 
knowledge concerning everything odd and even” (198a). Theaetetus agrees to think 
in this way. Next, Socrates explains “teaching” as “when a man hands them over 
[pieces of knowledge concerning everything odd and even] to others” (198b) and 
“learning” as “when he gets them handed over to him” (198b). Further, Socrates calls 
“knowing” the experience of “when he ‘has’ them through possessing them in this 
aviary of ours” (198b)254. To “Possess” something is different from to “have” it, as 
Socrates argues at 197b-d. The main difference between “possessing” and “having” 
is application. Someone possesses a coat, which does not mean he has the coat. If he 
puts the coat on, namely, when he applies what he possesses, he has the coat. That is 
to say, “Having” is “possession” plus application. Socrates changes the explanation 
of knowing from “the possession of knowledge” (which he posits at 197b and 197e) 
to “the having of knowledge” which is claimed at 197b to be held by some other 
people. This change becomes clearer when Socrates applies at 198b those 
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 The translation comes from Levett and Burnyeat; however, it here seems not precise, for it should be “in 
his/that aviary” rather than “in this aviary of ours”, according to the Greek text.  
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explanations to the arithmetical puzzle. In McDowell’s mind, 
 
“The puzzle is that this description of the person in question [i.e. the 
arithmetician] makes it look as if his undertaking is the evidently pointless one of 
trying to discover something which he already knows”.255 
 
After introducing the example of the mathematician who knows all numbers, 
Socrates continues, “Then, it looks as if this man were considering something which 
he knows as if he did not know it” (198c). Socrates’ argument at 198c is strange and 
unpersuasive. Firstly, how and why does Socrates conclude that this man is 
“considering something which he knows as if he did not know it”, even though he 
claims this by implication? Even if this man as an arithmetician knows everything 
about odd numbers and even numbers, this does not ensure that he has the knowledge 
of counting. Assume there are five cups on a table, even if the man knows the 
number “five” and would immediately and correctly apply “five” to everything that 
is “five”, he does not know the number of those cups on the table until he sees them. 
The fact that he knows the number “five” is irrelevant to his knowing the number of 
the cups on the table. That means, it is not the case that a man considers something 
which he knows as if he did not know it. Rather, he is considering something X 
which he knows and the X could correctly be applied to or could be the answer to a 
question Y he does not yet know.  
Further, Socrates at 198c emphasizes the application of knowledge. He actually 
treats knowing as “the having of knowledge”, not as “the possession of knowledge”, 
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nevertheless, Socrates certainly does not think that knowing is the having of 
knowledge, since under such a definition, false judgement would surely be produced, 
as the argument at 199a-b shows, here Socrates admits, 
 
 “it is possible for him to ‘have’, not the knowledge of this thing, but another 
piece of knowledge instead.”  
 
Hence following 197b-197e, knowing should be “the possession of knowledge” 
which means that knowledge is ready to use at any time, though it is not actual being 
applied.  
Lastly, we should consider what “knowledge” (198a-b) concerning everything 
odd and even means. “Everything” seems to say that the knowledge of arithmetic 
includes the knowledge of the numbers themselves. If so, then we could ask an 
arithmetician, “What is one itself?” However, it definitely is not a question that an 
arithmetician could answer, but rather a philosophical question. This is important, for 
it links to the question, “Does Socrates allude to the Forms in his argument by 
employing the phrase?” Actually, Socrates has no such an intention. An arithmetician 
who “has completely mastered arithmetic” “knows all numbers” in Socrates’ mind 
(198b). Even if this is the case, we should continually ask, “How could an 
arithmetician gain the knowledge of odd and even, if nothing is beyond experience?” 
Arithmetical knowledge, or knowledge of mathematics, is different from the 
knowledge of history or literature. We cannot find the general principles of 
mathematics through experience or observation; therefore, it must refer to something 
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beyond experience. Even though Socrates does not insist the definition of knowing as 
having knowledge, how does an arithmetician gain the knowledge of arithmetic? The 
answer is that Socrates does not offer an answer to solve this question, rather he uses 
it only to raise the puzzle and criticize the aviary example. A second question arises: 
how could “knowing” be having knowledge through possessing knowledge in the 
aviary example? Let us consider the simple answer only. For the second question, as 
I have argued, Socrates does not hold this definition of knowing but rather the 
opposite.  
In the aviary example, all the birds in the cage are pieces of knowledge; 
therefore, false judgement cannot be anything other than an interchange of pieces of 
knowledge. If false judgement is a matter of a wrongly interchange of pieces of 
knowledge (199c), two things follow. Firstly, it is not want of knowledge but 
knowledge itself that would lead to false judgement; secondly, “he judges that this is 
something else and that the other thing is it.” (199d) It is impossible and “utterly 
unreasonable”, however, to think of false judgement as a matter of an interchange of 
pieces of knowledge. The reason for the impossibility is,  
 
“…it means that the soul, when knowledge becomes present to it, knows 
nothing and is wholly ignorant. According to this argument, there is no reason why 
an accession of ignorance should not make one know something, or of blindness 
make one see something, if knowledge is ever going to make a man ignorant” (199d).  
 
Theaetetus responds to this difficulty by proposing “there are pieces of ignorance 
also flying about in the soul” (199e) and the ignorance makes someone judge falsely 
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if he catches a piece of ignorance. However, Theaetetus’ solution cannot be a real 
answer to the difficulty, since someone who “grasps” a piece of ignorance would not 
think he is judging falsely (200a). Theaetetus’ proposal becomes again the argument 
that making false judgement only happens in the aviary of the soul, as Socrates has 
discussed at 196b-196c.256 McDowell thinks that Theaetetus’ proposal is “obscure”, 
for there are two interpretations of the phrase “a piece of ignorance”. It could be a 
false belief and it also could be a confused concept.257 Although I agree with him, 
McDowell does not grasp the key point. Theaetetus’ proposal makes ignorance into a 
kind of entity or reality. Socrates could certainly make pieces of knowledge into 
entities, because there is really something that is knowledge. Nevertheless, how 
could ignorance be a kind of entity? Ignorance is only a state of want of knowledge; 
therefore, it could not be a true state in any way. Actually, ignorance in Theaetetus’ 
proposal is like the concept “non-being” in Sophist, where non-being, i.e. that which 
is not, is not something “contrary to that which is, but only something different from 
it” (Sophist 257b).258 Ignorance in Theaetetus’ proposal is not something contrary to 
knowledge, but something different from knowledge. Ignorance is no longer a state 
for Theaetetus, but it becomes a kind of entity -- ignorance and errors are now birds 
in the aviary.  
Theaetetus’ proposal fails in the end, since his proposal will lead to the very 
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 McDowell thinks that the mistake of this argument is “the possibility of taking anything to be something other 
than what it is in doubt.” However, the argument at 187e-188c only refers to the mistake that happens between 
perception and knowledge, but the argument at 187e-188c refers to the mistake that happens between notions 
inside the soul. McDowell (1973) p. 225. 
257
 McDowell (1973) p. 225. 
258
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problem that the wax block analogy and the aviary example were introduced to solve, 
i.e. how someone knows something that he does not know (200b).  
As the discussion about the wax block analogy and the aviary example shows, 
the long investigation of how false judgement is possible fails. It is now time to 
consider how false judgement is possible as a whole, since this question will help us 
to understand how true opinion is possible. Especially, true opinion is defined as 
knowledge in Theaetetus’ second definition of knowledge and is one of the two parts 
that constructs Theaetetus’ third definition of knowledge, i.e. knowledge is true 
opinion with an account in the rest of the Theaetetus. 
 
5.3 Investigation on “What is False Judgement?” and “How is it possible?” 
Let us consider the false judgement issue by analysing what Socrates says at 
195c-d. This will help us to consider how a false judgment is possible. The text says: 
 
“I am afraid of what I may say if someone asks me: ‘So, Socrates, you’ve 
discovered false judgement, have you? You have found that it arises not in the 
relation of perceptions to one another, or of thoughts to one another, but in the 
connecting of perception with thought?’ I believe I am very likely to say ‘Yes’, with 
an air of flattering myself upon our having made some beautiful discovery. (195c-d) 
 
The whole passage is actually the question “How is false judgement possible?” 
Before we enter into the discussion of this question, it is better to make a 
distinction between different kinds of knowledge. Socrates denies that perception can 
234 
 
be a part of knowledge. 259  At the end of the discussion about knowledge as 
perception, he concludes,  
 
“We shall not now look for knowledge in sense-perception at all, but in 
whatever we call that activity of the soul when it is busy by itself about the things 
which are.” (187a)  
 
Knowledge in Socrates’ mind is something regarding what is, which the soul reaches 
by itself. When Socrates refers to the things that the soul reaches by itself, he actually 
uses the words, “is” and “is not” (185c), “being” and “non-being”, “likeness and un-
likeness”, “same and different”, “one and any other number applied to them” and 
“odd and even” (185c-d, also 186a), further, “beautiful and ugly”, “good and bad” 
(186a). Therefore, Socrates actually gives us three regions that knowledge covers: 
knowledge in the region of value, knowledge in the region of comparison and 
knowledge in the region of being. We should pay attention to the difference between 
knowledge in the region of comparison and a comparative judgement that refers to 
the region of perception. Take a table as an example to explain this. Someone says, 
“This table is heavier than that one”. This is a comparative judgement that refers to a 
property of the subject of the sentence. Another man says, “This table is more 
beautiful than that one”. Surprisingly, Socrates considers this sentence as a piece of 
knowledge in the region of comparison and value. This is because the “heavier” 
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 That does not mean there is no relationship between knowledge and perception. In the wax block analogy, 
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example is comparative but relates to perception. Then, we observe that not all 
judgements in the three regions constitute knowledge. Further, a piece of knowledge 
could cover one, two or all these three regions, because the “more beautiful” example 
covers comparison and value. Moreover, grant the sentence “This table is heavier 
than that one” is true, i.e., it is a true judgement. Then, not all true judgements are 
knowledge according to Socrates’ argument about the things that the soul reaches by 
itself. In sum, if not all true judgements are knowledge, judgement is not knowledge. 
 If judgement is not knowledge and only a part of true judgements is knowledge, 
and if Theaetetus agrees with all of Socrates’ arguments, as the text shows, then it 
seems odd that Theaetetus as a mathematician still defines knowledge as true 
judgement (187b). He defines knowledge as true judgement even after the argument 
about the things that refer to the soul working by itself (185c-186b) and Socrates’ 
argument that we should not seek knowledge in perception (187a). Why does 
Theaetetus agree with what Socrates says, especially considering that Theaetetus is a 
learner of mathematics which requires an ability to reason at a high level? We will 
never know why, but maybe Theaetetus follows what Socrates has said before 
Socrates asks him to offer the second definition of knowledge. Before Theaetetus 
proposes his second definition, Socrates denies that knowledge has any relationship 
with perception. Then, Theaetetus turns to the region of reasoning to seek the 
definition of knowledge. In addition, he realizes that “there is also false judgement” 
(187b), and so he claims that knowledge is true judgement. Obviously, Theaetetus 
ignores the distinction between the things that the soul reaches by itself and the 
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things that the soul reaches through the body. 
 Socrates does not discuss “knowledge as true opinion” directly, but he firstly 
considers the question “Is there false judgement?” or “Is false judgement possible?” 
Both Socrates and Theaetetus agree that false judgement does exist. When 
Theaetetus gives his second definition of knowledge (187b), “false judgement” 
appears for the first time in the dialogue. Although this phrase is mentioned by 
Theaetetus, Socrates does not deny its existence. Socrates claims, 
 
 “There are two forms of judgement, true and false; and your definition is that 
true judgement is knowledge?” (187c).  
 
Socrates continues at 188a: 
 
Socrates: “Now isn’t it true about all things, together or individually, that we 
must either know them or not know them? I am ignoring for the moment the 
intermediate conditions of learning and forgetting, as they do not affect the argument 
here.” 
Theaetetus: “Of course, Socrates, in that case there is no alternative. With each 
thing we either know it or we do not.”  
Socrates: “Then when a man judges, the objects of his judgement are 
necessarily either things which he knows or things which he does not know?” 
Theaetetus: “Yes, that must be so.” 
Socrates: “Yet if he knows a thing, it is impossible that he should not know it; or 
if he does not know it, he cannot know it.” 
Theaetetus: “Yes, of course.” (188a-b) 
 
In this short quotation, Socrates and Theaetetus discuss three things -- judgement, 
object and ability. Socrates leads Theaetetus to agree that there are true judgements 
and false judgements. Then, accordingly, someone either knows or does not know the 
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object that his judgement judges. Further, if someone knows an object, it is 
impossible that he does not know it; if he does not know, it is impossible that he does 
know it. 
The key point here is whether someone knows or does not know an object. The 
problem, however, is whether the cases of learning or of forgetting (which, as 
Socrates has said, are the two situations between knowing and not-knowing) are 
exceptions to the principle “with a thing we either know it or we do not”. This 
question is a little complicated. Socrates gives us three regions that knowledge 
covers -- region of being, of comparison and of value. The other strong principle is 
that knowledge has no relationship with perception. But there is one question left 
unanswered, since the region of being seems problematic -- “is”, “is not”, “being” or 
“not being” (185c-d). The question is not clear, so let us clarify it by unfolding it. 
Take the table as an example again. “This is a table” is a judgement about the being 
of the table. “This is a table” is different from the judgement “The table is heavier 
than that one” or the judgement “This table is more beautiful than another one”, both 
of which we have discussed above.260 The difference between the former judgement 
and the last two judgements is that the first judgement is a judgement that the soul 
reaches through using the body, but at the same time, it refers to the region of being 
that the soul reaches on it own, namely, it is a piece of knowledge. However, as we 
have shown, that is impossible, since knowledge has no relationship with perception. 
Then, we need to consider when Theaetetus agrees that the soul reaches ‘being’ and 
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 John McDowell discusses 188a-c through an analysis of “Russell’s doctrine that all true sentences of the form 
‘x is y’, where ‘x’ and ‘y’ hold places for names, are tautological”. See McDowell (1969-1970) p. 183. 
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‘not-being’ by itself (185d-e), what the sentence means. If ‘being’ and ‘not-being’ 
here have no relationship with perception, then they cannot refer to anything in our 
sensible world, otherwise, they must relate to perception.  
However, how can a judgement that contains “is” or “is-not”, “being” or “not-
being” not have a relationship with perception? We should consider two different 
cases here. One case is numbers and the second is the Forms. In the case of numbers, 
it is hard to say where they “are”. Surely, the distinction between the numbers 
themselves (the forms of the numbers) and the images of the numbers is still 
important here. The images of the numbers, such as the symbol “one” in a flag, is 
certainly not the one itself or the oneness, i.e. the Form of One. Hence, when we say 
that “this is one”, we need extra information for judging whether this sentence is a 
piece of knowledge about one. “Extra information” refers to the concrete situation 
from which the speaker makes such a judgement -- when the speaker is seeing a 
symbol of “one”, in another sense, this judgement is not a piece of knowledge, 
because the soul does not reach the judgement by itself. But rather the soul makes 
this judgement through sight. In another situation, when a logician thinks the law of 
identity or tautology, “one is one”, then it is definitely a piece of knowledge, for the 
soul gains it by itself, not by virtue of any perception. Let us consider another more 
complex example. Someone is seeing two boards both of which have the symbol 
“one” imprinted. Assume a man speaks a sentence, “This one is the same as that one”, 
as he points to the symbols on the two boards. Then, is this sentence an expression of 
a piece of knowledge? Firstly, we should know the object to which the word “one” in 
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the sentence refers. If the “one” refers to the board, then it is not a piece of 
knowledge. However, if it refers to the oneness, we should consider two different 
kinds of oneness, i.e. the Oneness or the form of One and the impression or symbol 
of Oneness. In the former situation, the statement is a piece of knowledge, but in the 
latter situation, it is not. This is not the whole story. Maybe the man is thinking about 
the law of identity, by means of the symbols on the two boards? If that is the case, on 
the one hand, “The ‘one’ in one board is the same as the ‘one’ in the other board” 
which can be simplied as “A=A”. “A=A” is a piece of knowledge, because it is the 
law of identity and this law itself is not dependent on perceptions.261 On the other 
hand, the statement is not a piece of knowledge, because, as Socrates has said, the 
speaker makes this sentence or judgement by his perceptions of those symbols on the 
two boards, no matter whether the speaker realizes that what he says is actually the 
law of identity. In this situation, it seems difficult to judge whether the sentence 
“This one is the same as that one” belongs to knowledge or not. 
Further, consider another case. Let us grant that there is a mountain called Anti–
Olympia in Greece. If an old Greek told his descendants, “The earthquake will not 
happen if there is not a deep hole at the top of Anti–Olympia.” Grant that, the 
relationship between the hole and the earthquake is true. Moreover, let us assume 
that Anti–Olympia is a high mountain and much too high for the descendents to 
climb. Further, assume that the earthquake did happen. It is reasonable for the 
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 C. J. F. Williams points out that “Plato wants to insist that every false belief is a belief that something which is 
not A is A” (p. 291). Then, “every case of false belief as being describable by statements of the form ‘x believes 
that something which is not A is A’” (p. 292). I think, Plato believes that all false judgmenets have the mistake 
“not A is A” through his discussion about the false judgement. See Williams (1972) pp. 291-292. 
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descendants to make a judgement, saying, “There is a deep hole on the top of the 
Anti–Olympia, because the earthquake happened”. The problem is that no one could 
give any evidence to prove that there is a hole. The sentence “There is a deep hole at 
the top of Anti–Olympia” is a necessary condition for explaining the earthquake, but 
it is not a piece of knowledge, for a piece of knowledge cannot be claimed without 
any supportive evidence. When Socrates claims, “Everything is either what we know 
or what we do not know” (188c), that is not correct, for there are unlimited 
judgements that could not be labeled simply “know” or “not know” when the facts or 
evidences lack.262 Moreover, if knowledge is completely irrelevant to perceptions, it 
is difficult to imagine any evidence to support or prove the piece of knowledge.  
Socrates supplies the definition of “false judgement” at 189b-c,  
 
“We say that there is false judgement, a kind of ‘other-judging’, when a man, in 
place of one of the things that are, has substituted in his thought another of the things 
that are and asserts that it is.”  
 
Although Socrates does not make it clear, according to the absurd verbalization of 
false judgement that he discusses in the text, there are two kinds of false judgement. 
One kind refers to the object, such as “A cow must be a horse” (190c); the other does 
not refer to an object, but only makes a mistake within the soul and its reflection, 
such as “Two must be one” (190c) or “The ugly is beautiful” (190d).  
Consider the cow and horse example carefully. There are only four possible 
situations in the example. (1) I know what a cow is and I know what a horse is; (2) I 
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 David Barton has the same conclusion. See Barton (1999) pp. 166-167. 
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only know what a cow is; (3) I only know what a horse is; (4) I neither know what a 
cow is nor know what a horse is. According to Socrates, the first situation cannot 
produce false judgement, for “if he knows a thing, it is impossible that he should not 
know it” (188a-b). Further, the situation (4) cannot produce false judgement, since 
“if he does not know it, he cannot know it” (188b). If someone does not know what a 
cow is and what a horse is, how can he make a judgement about a cow and a horse, 
even though he is facing a cow or a horse? Obviously, it is impossible; therefore, he 
naturally cannot make a false judgement on a cow and a horse. Both Socrates and 
Theaetetus agree, it is impossible that  
 
“…a man who knows neither Theaetetus nor Socrates should take it into his 
head that Socrates is Theaetetus or Theaetetus Socrates” (188b).263 
 
The situations (2) and (3) are nearly but not exactly the same as situations (1) and (4). 
Assume that I know either what a cow is or what a horse is. A false judgement cannot 
be produced, because if I do not know either what a cow is or a horse is, how can I 
even make a false judgement about either a cow or a horse?264 
It seems from analysing the four situations that false judgement is impossible. 
How is this possible? Socrates realizes that they need to “take up a different line of 
enquiry” (188c). From “knowing and not-knowing” (188c-d), they turn to “being and 
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  C. J. F. Williams carefully analyses the general form of the example “Socrates is Theaetetus” in this quotation, 
namely, “every false belief is a belief that something which is not A is A” by using Quine’s idea of “referential 
opacity” and Hume’s idea of identity. See Williams (1972) pp. 289-302. 
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 This question refers to mismatch. George Rudebusch disagrees with the idea that “Plato there comes close to 
but just misses finding a successful explanation of false belief”. He notes: “It seems to me indisputable that Plato 
did understand the general form of Frege’s solution and, understanding it, rejected it. I shall argue that the general 
form of Frege’s solution is to explain a mistake as a mismatch, but that Plato rejects this form of solution on the 
grounds that mismatching is as mysterious as mistaking”. See Rudebusch (1985) p. 526. 
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not-being” (188d). Socrates comments on the judgement of which is not,  
 
“Perhaps the simple fact is this: it is when a man judges about anything things 
which are not, that he is inevitably judging falsely, no matter what may be the nature 
of his thought in other respects” (188d).  
 
However, this line of thought is impossible, for it is not possible to judge something 
which is not. Judgement means you are certainly judging something and this 
something could not be non-being, since “a man who is judging something which is 
not is judging nothing” (189a) and “a man who is judging nothing is not judging at 
all” (189a). Nevertheless, we need to consider what “something which is not” means. 
In Socrates’ view, something which is not equals nothing, for “a man who is judging 
something which is not is judging nothing” (189a). This idea is strange. Consider a 
famous example, the Golden Mountain. 265  When someone is judging something 
about the Golden Mountain, he is judging something and the Golden Mountain is 
“something which is not”. More exactly, the Golden Mountain does not exist and 
something which is not could be understood in two senses. It could refer to absolute 
non-existence and could also refer to something that does not exist in reality but 
could be the object of a judgement, a proposal, an idea or a piece of knowledge, 
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 Cf. Russell (1905) pp. 479–493. In Terry Penner’s view, modern philosophers have a distinction between 
names and objects, but Plato has no such a distinction. He notes:  
“Where moderns insist on a difference of logical type between what is said and what is named, Plato seems 
(sufficiently) true statements quite as much taking us to existing state of affairs in the real world as adequate 
(sufficiently true) name take us to real things in the real world. And where moderns treat empty names by fiat, 
and false statements in terms of postulated ‘intentional’ entities called propositions, Plato treats both empty names 
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antecedently to any ‘intentional’ entities. Similarly, where moderns introduce a special logic for psychological 
contexts and tell us that existence is not a predicate in the course of its introducing a plethora of new ‘intentional’ 
entities such as propositions and meanings to be what is referred to – instead of real objects and states of affairs – 
in psychological contexts, and when doing extensional logic, Socratic-Platonic Ultra-Realism  will say that the 
problems lie not in psychological contexts, but with that single fault we call, alternatively, ‘falsity’ or non-being – 
whether in extensional contexts or in psychological contexts”.  
See Penner (2013) pp. 219-220. 
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namely, it could exist in the region of thought. Socrates obviously ignores the second 
possible meaning of the phrase “something which is not”266 and directly considers 
the equality of something which is not and nothing. In addition, we should consider 
the question how there could be a judgement about something which is absolutely 
non-existent. “Absolute non-existence” has shown that this kind of thing could not 
even be the object of a judgement, because it does not exist at all and has no way to 
become the object of a judgement. Hence, how could the situation of “a man who is 
judging nothing” (189a) be possible? Further, how could the phrase “something 
which is not” be possible? If something is something, it could not be nothing and 
could not be something which is not. It is not strange when Socrates says, “it is not 
possible to judge what is not, either about the things which are or just by itself” 
(189b). Socrates asks in conclusion, “False judgement, then, is something different 
from judging things which are not” (189b) and Theaetetus gives an unconvincing. 
McDowell tries to explain this conclusion by attributing “is not” to the negative 
of a judgement.267 Take Socrates as an example to illustrate what McDwell means. A 
judgement “Socrates is beautiful”268 is not true, because the property “beauty” does 
not belong to Socrates. McDowell’s interpretation is not helpful, since the whole 
argument is under the discussion about “being and non-being”. Socrates’ discussion 
is about the range or sphere of judgement, namely, the object of judgement, but 
McDowell’s explanation is irrelevant to that, since it considers the relationship 
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 Indeed, though Plato does not consider in the Theaetetus the second situation of “something which is not”, he 
does have a brilliant discussion of it in the Sophist. “It seems that when we say that which is not, we do not say 
something contrary to that which is, but only something different from it.” (Sophist, 257b) See Sophist 237c-241d 
and 256d-260d. 
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 McDowell (1973) pp. 200-202. 
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 This example imitates an example from McDowell. See McDowell (1973) pp. 198.  
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between judgement and fact.  
If it is impossible to make a judgement about something which is not, it has 
been shown that false judgement could not be judgement on something which is not. 
Therefore, this actually manifests the failure of the approach of “being and not-being” 
for seeking how false judgement is possible. Contrary to the result of this approach, 
false judgement does exist. So how is false judgement possible? Socrates and 
Theaetetus start another attempt to answer this question and Socrates points out false 
judgement is a kind of “other-judging”. He explains: 
 
“We say that there is false judgement, a kind of ‘other-judging’, when a man, in 
place of one of the things that are, has substituted in his thought another of the things 
that are and asserts that it is. In this way, he is always judging something which is, 
but judges one thing in place of another; and having missed the thing which was the 
object of his consideration, he might fairly be called one who judges falsely” (189c).  
 
Additionally, Socrates explains his “picture” of the soul thinking – it is that in 
thinking the soul “talks with itself about the objects under its consideration” (189e). 
So this idea leads him to his view on false judgement: 
 
“…in my view, to judge is to make a statement, and a judgement is a statement 
which is not addressed to another person or spoken aloud, but silently addressed to 
oneself…  So that when a man judges one thing to be another, what he is doing, 
apparently, is to say to himself that the one thing is the other” (190a).  
 
Someone who makes a judgement can make a judgement of “one thing is the other”, 
for Socrates repeatedly uses phrases like “to himself” and “to oneself” in the 
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expression. The reason for this is that Socrates has turned to another approach for 
seeking how false judgement is possible. The new approach is to explore the 
possibility of the false judgement that is a kind of error that occurs between ideas. 
Theaetetus’ response to this approach is to observe that “when a man judges ‘ugly’ 
instead of ‘beautiful’, or ‘beautiful’ instead of ‘ugly’, then he is truly judging what is 
false” (189c). Socrates pretends that he is not able to absorb Theaetetus’ “truly false” 
idea and cleverly changes Theaetetus’ “beautiful instead of ugly” into “the beautiful 
is ugly” (190b). However, as Socrates points out, “No one judges ‘The ugly is 
beautiful’ or makes any other such judgement” (190d-e), since “‘other-judging’ is not 
possible for anyone either when he has both things present to him in judgement or 
when he has only one” (190d-e). The explanation for this is simply that if both of the 
things are present to you, you know these two notions and they are different, so you 
could never make a judgement “the beautiful is ugly”. Or, if only one of them is 
present to you, you could only know one of them, and so could not make a 
judgement on both of them.269  
Two issues in this argument need to be noticed. Firstly, we need to make a 
distinction between Socrates’ idea and Theaetetus’ idea. In order to explain the 
difference, let us consider the example “Socrates is beautiful”. Theaetetus only 
expresses that “beautiful” instead of “ugly” is the mistake of this sentence. 
Nevertheless, what Socrates claims is different. He actually employs a reformulation 
of the same example “beautiful is ugly” and so expresses a completely new idea. The 
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 Cf. Sophist, 263b7-13. McDowell’ explanation misses the point of Socrates’ argument here. He explains how 
the false judgement was produced  through “beautiful instead of ugly”. McDowell (1973) pp. 202-204.  
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difference between them is that Theaetetus’ idea refers to the relationship between 
the fact “Socrates is ugly” and the sentence “Socrates is beautiful”; while Socrates’ 
idea refers to the relationship between notions. “Socrates is beautiful” is a false 
judgement, for the judgement contradicts the fact; while “ugly is beautiful” is a false 
judgement, since the two notions are not the same. From another perspective, we 
could say that Theaetetus’ sentence refers to the fact, the sphere outside of the 
sentence, but Socrates’ sentence does not refer to the outside world of perception and 
only describes the relationship between two notions in internal judgement. Further, 
the difference really exists, for Socrates does not only give us one example, but many 
other examples: “The unjust is certainly just”, “No doubt the odd is even” (190b), “A 
cow must be a horse” and “Two must be one” (190c).  
Secondly, how can “other-judging” be impossible? According to Socrates, 
“other-judging” is impossible in only two situations, namely, both things are present 
to the judge, or only one of them. If both of the things are present to someone, that 
person could not make a false judgement about them, for they are different. If one of 
them appears, the false judgement is also impossible, for the other thing does not 
even appear, so how could someone make a judgement about it? The reason seems 
plausible. Nevertheless, both of the situations seem doubtful, since we could ask 
Socrates, “How does the soul operate, when you set up two such situations?” We 
should ask Socrates, “Is this the operation of the soul as you understand it?” Since 
Socrates has not yet introduced the theory of wax block, this kind of operation of the 
soul is still possible. Nevertheless, an old question arises, how could you know 
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something but not realize that you know it? This question is valid to Socrates, 
because he admits,  
 
“if he has only one of them before his mind in judging, and the other is not 
present to him at all, he will never judge that one is the other” (190d).270  
 
This sentence shows that you would never realize a notion, if it does not appear to 
you or your soul. Hence, the operation of the soul becomes strange. It seems that 
what you know is all in a black room which is invisible to yourself and you could 
only know what you know when it appears to you. The important thing is that 
waiting is the only option for your soul. The whole process is random and you would 
never know what would present itself to you. If my understanding is correct, then in 
such a situation, what you know is no longer what you know, since knowledge is no 
longer accessible to yourself and you cannot use what you know actively, but only 
passively. That means, knowledge is out of your own control: if so, it is not 
knowledge any longer, but like a kind of oracle from God.  
Whatever the errors in Socrates’ argument, his inquiry on false judgement as 
“other judging” ends. My discussion only tries to investigate how false judgement is 
possible from a negative aspect, for the conclusion of this discussion is, “It is 
impossible for a man to be in error through judging that things he knows are the 
things he does not know” (191a-b), which was posited by Socrates and Theaetetus at 
188b-c. This conclusion is valid, since “it made us not know, when we do know, 
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things which we know” (191b). Indeed, how could you know something while 
making a false judgement about something you do know? Nevertheless, at this time, 
Socrates now proposes, “do not let us put the case in that way; let us try another way” 
(191b).  
The other way that Socrates mentions about false judgement as “other 
judgement” is the wax block analogy. At 191e-192d, Socrates lists fourteen 
impossibilities of thinking which would not lead to false judgements and he gives us 
another three possibilities which would make false judgements possible. Socrates 
makes these kinds of judgements clear and McDowell has listed all the cases in 
which false judgement is impossible and all the cases in which false judgement is 
possible, 271  so there is no reason to repeat it. The conclusion about how false 
judgement is possible in the wax block analogy is as follows: 
 
“I am afraid of what I may say if someone asks me: ‘So, Socrates, you’ve 
discovered false judgement, have you? You have found that it arises not in the 
relation of perceptions to one another, or of thoughts to one another, but in the 
connecting of perception with thought?’ I believe I am very likely to say ‘Yes’, with 
an air of flattering myself upon our having made some beautiful discovery.” (195c-d) 
 
Socrates soon finds another situation that could produce false judgement after 
this conclusion. The false judgement still could arise within the thoughts themselves, 
rather than being “a misapplication of thought to perception” (196c). Socrates on 
behalf of one critic takes “five” and “seven” as an example. Assume that “five” and 
“seven” do not refer to any qualified perceptions, such as five or seven people. As 
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“five” and “seven” are all on the wax block, both of them are knowable and 
accessible to someone himself. It seems impossible that someone could make a false 
judgement on “five” and “seven”, even though they do not refer to any other thing, 
but only themselves. That is to say, it is impossible that “one thing he knows is 
another thing he knows” (196b). If that is not the case, then we actually admit that 
“the same man must, at one and the same time, both know and not know the same 
objects” (196b-c). Nevertheless, it is still possible that someone is thinking “five” but 
“seven” on the wax block, i.e. someone “may not know what he knows” (196c). We 
should ask Socrates “Where do the ‘five’ and ‘seven’ come from?” It is obvious that 
they cannot come from perceptions, because you can never find “five” and “seven” 
themselves in the sensible world. What you could find is just five persons, five 
apples or five laptops; however, you could never find the “five” itself in the sensible 
world. If that is so, then the wax block analogy fails to explain where those numbers 
come from. If we generalize this consideration, then we should consider how all the 
things or impressions that come from “what we have seen or heard or thought of 
ourselves” are possibly imprinted on wax the block.  
How could it be possible that someone knows something but does not know he 
knows something? An answer from Socrates may be, “We need to know what ‘know’ 
or ‘knowing’ means” (196d-e). Further, if we do not even know what “knowing” 
means, how could we use vocabulary like “we know”, “we do not know” or “to be 
ignorant of” (196e)? Theaetetus wisely responds to this question by saying “But how 
are you going to carry on the discussion at all, Socrates, if you keep off these words?” 
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(196e). 
Socrates this time does not avoid the difficulty and tries to tell Theaetetus what 
knowing is like (197a). “Knowing”, as Socrates defines it, is “the possession of 
knowledge”, which is different from other people’s definition of knowing as “the 
having of knowledge”. Theaetetus does not understand the distinction between these 
two definitions; therefore, Socrates introduces the example of a coat. In Socrates’ 
mind, “having a coat” means that you not only own the coat, but you wear the coat as 
well, by contrast with “possess a coat” which means that the coat only belongs to you, 
but is not worn by you (197b). In a word, the difference between “having” something 
and “possessing” something is whether something is put into practice. Following the 
distinction between having knowledge and possessing knowledge, Socrates 
introduces the aviary example as the extension of the wax block analogy. In the 
aviary example, “false judgement is going to become a matter of an interchange of 
pieces of knowledge” (199c). However, as has been discussed in section 5.2, if false 
judgement is just the interchange of pieces of knowledge, then this situation cannot 
happen, since if someone knows something, he would not make a mistake about it. 
Here, the two criteria of knowledge, namely, knowledge is always of what is and is 
always unerring, come back (152c). These two criteria ensure the impossibility of the 
explanation about how false judgement is possible in the aviary example.  
The failure of the search for the possibility of false judgement in the aviary 
example makes all the endeavor to find how false judgements are possible go back to 
the beginning. Theaetetus proposes again that they could directly consider 
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knowledge as true judgement, for “judging truly is at least something free of 
mistakes, I take it, and everything that results from it is admirable and good” (200e). 
Socrates does not think so. For objecting to Theaetetus’ suggestion, Socrates 
elaborates an objection about orators and lawyers who have “the art of the greatest 
representatives of wisdom” (201a). However, Socrates does not think that the orators 
and lawyers can teach people, because they do not have any knowledge; rather they 
persuade people. Both Socrates and Theaetetus agree that “persuading” people means 
“causing them to judge” (201b). The art of orators and lawyers makes people form a 
true judgement without knowledge. The strategy that Socrates employs is to use a 
counter-example. If there is an art that can persuade other people without any 
knowledge, then, because of the existence of such an art, it is possible to judge truly 
without knowledge. If it is possible, then true judgement is certainly not knowledge; 
they are different things. If true judgement and knowledge are not the same thing, 
knowledge is not true judgement, as Theaetetus suggests.  
 
Conclusion 
Socrates in the Theaetetus gives a blueprint of epistemology. In particular, he 
describes the whole process of knowing, including how we gain perceptions (by the 
two motions) and how the soul gains perceptions and knowledge (the wax block 
analogy). In this account, Socrates links psychology and epistemology together and 
puts them in a close relationship. 
It is easy to see that “the bulk of PartⅡ(187d-200c) is devoted to a discussion of 
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the question whether false judgement is possible”.272 “But why does Plato devote all 
of this space to this discussion?” This is a question that Plato’s readers cannot help 
asking. McDowell gives two reasons. Firstly, “the main difficulty about false 
judgement discussed in what follows is raised by an argument, set out at 187e-188c, 
one of whose key notions is that of knowledge.” Secondly, “it is plausible that in 
order to be able to understand Theaetetus’ new account of knowledge as being true 
judgement, we must be able to make the sense of the notion of false judgement as 
well”.273 Socrates discusses the role of false judgement, according to Burnyeat, for 
two reasons. Firstly, the failure of the attempts to explain false judgement reminds us 
that there were some errors in the assumptions of those inquiries. Secondly, the 
failure to explain the undoubted fact that false judgements exist: 
 
“would constitute a sort of reductio ad absurdum of Theaetetus’ second 
definition, to be followed by the direct refutation…”274  
 
I agree with these explanations of why Socrates discusses false judgement at length. 
Besides these explanations, I would add that Socrates immediately meets a puzzle 
when Theaetetus suggests knowledge as true judgement, namely, false judgement 
seems impossible. If the puzzle stands, then all judgements are true judgement. This 
could be the direct reason why Socrates emphasizes the importance of seeking how 
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false judgement is possible.  
Among those attempts above, the wax block analogy and the aviary example are 
the most important theories. Both of them fail in the end. In the process of 
investigation of those two approaches, Socrates has given us a relatively complete 
account about how we could gain or learn something in the sensible world. 
Nevertheless, the analogy of the aviary does not explain how those “birds” come into 
the aviary, rather it only refers to how the soul operates in making a judgement. But 
this operation could be seen as a further explanation of the wax block analogy. For in 
the wax block analogy Socrates does not make clear how the soul grasps or recollects 
the knowledge on the wax block. The wax block analogy only refers to the 
perception and thoughts within the soul that are imprinted upon the wax block when 
we wish to remember. Indeed, in the process of the investigation in the Theaetetus, 
Socrates gradually offers us a complete explanation or theory of knowledge in the 
sensible world. Knowledge here would be the wrong word, but Socrates does not 
believe we can find actual knowledge in the sensible world, a disbelief revealed in 
the series of failed attempts to discover what knowledge and knowing are.  
The failures to define knowledge continually prompt us to come back to the 
theory of Forms, the theory of recollection and any other theory that is relevant to 
epistemology and is beyond empiricism. Cornford’s view is correct. Surely, many 
paragraphs in the Theaetetus are similar to the Meno. At the beginning of the 
Theaetetus (146d), Socrates rebuts Theaetetus’ enumeration of knowledge that is 
similar to the situation in the Meno, where Meno gives also a list of virtues (72d). At 
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191c, Socrates nearly repeats Meno’s paradox, “Is it possible to learn something you 
did not know before?” In addition, when Socrates and Theaetetus discuss why 
knowledge is not true judgement, Socrates uses the phenomenon of people making a 
true judgement without knowledge as a result of persuasion to refute “knowledge is 
true opinion”. This refutation reminds us immediately that when Socrates and Meno 
talk about whether virtue is a kind of knowledge (87c), Socrates rejects it on the 
grounds that neither the good men in the city nor the sophists can be teachers of 
virtue, i.e. there is no teachers of virtue. If virtue is knowledge, then virtue should be 
teachable and there must be teacher of virtue. If we cannot find at least one teacher of 
virtue, then virtue cannot be a kind of knowledge. 
The story of the close relationship between Theaetetus and Meno has not 
finished. Theaetetus’ last definition of knowledge, namely, knowledge is true 
judgement with an account, will show further similarity between Meno and 
Theaetetus. In the Meno (98a), knowledge is described as true opinion/judgement (ἡ 
δόξα ἡ ἀληθής/ἡ ὀρθὴ δόξα) plus an explanation of the reason why. In the Theaetetus, 
though the definition of knowledge as true opinion will be rejected finally, the third 
definition of knowledge is as true opinion/judgement plus an account (τὴν µὲν µετὰ 
λόγου ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήµην εἶναι) (201d). Nevertheless, even if the close 
relationship between Meno and Theaetetus is certain, it is still not clear whether 
Socrates insists that his epistemological theories are beyond empiricism. In order to 
understand Socrates’ commitment to anti-empiricism, it is time to consider the final 
definition of knowledge, knowledge as true opinion 
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Chapter Six Theaetetus on True Judgement with an Account 
 
Introduction  
In this chapter, I will deal with Theaetetus’ third definition of knowledge in the 
Theaetetus. After the two unsuccessful attempts of defining knowledge, Theaetetus 
offers his last definition of knowledge, namely, knowledge as true opinion/judgement 
with an account (201d). This third definition of knowledge in Theaetetus has a strong 
connection with the the formula of knowledge in the Meno, i.e. knowledge is ture 
opinion plus an explanation of reason why, but this formula is left without 
explanation. The explanation of that formula will help us to understand Plato’s 
epistemological outline, which will be a supplement to illustrate Plato’s epistemology 
as a whole.  
Theaetetus admits in the dialogue that he heard the third definition, namely, 
“knowledge is true judgement with an account”,275 from an anonymous informant. 
What Theaetetus heard from that informat Socrates calls as a “dream” (201d). The 
difference between the second definition and the third one is the addition of 
“account”, hence, it makes sense that Socrates wishes to make clear what “account” 
means. In the “dream” theory, as Socrates reports, the names of the unknowable but 
perceivable elements are woven together and then become a kind of account of the 
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 Matthews points out, “If knowledge is to be defined in terms of true belief together with an account, not only 
must it be possible to have true belief without an account, it must also be possible to define belief without 
introducing the notion of knowledge”. Matthews (1972) p. 20. 
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knowable complexes (202b). In order to understand the “dream” theory, Socrates 
turns to a premise of the dream theory, i.e. the premise of letters and syllables (202e). 
In this premise, a problem arises. If the syllables are knowable, how could the letters 
which compose the syllables be unknowable? To avoid this difficulty, Socrates 
makes a distinction between sum276 and whole (204b-205a). That is to say, syllables 
or complexes have their own single form (204a), rather than all the letters or 
elements. Then, we have two options, either both of the letters/elements and 
syllables/complexes are knowable or both of them are unknowable (205e). 
Whichever of the two options is correct, what has been said in the “dream” theory is 
wrong.  
The failure of the “dream” theory stimulates Socrates to present three meanings 
of “account” for testing whether the third definition of knowledge is correct. The 
three meanings of account could be labeled as “statement” (206d), “going through a 
thing element by element” (207a-c) and “offering a unique feature or differentiation” 
(208c).  
I will follow Socrates’ arguements about “account” in Theaetetus. In 6.1, I will 
consider the “dream” that both Socrates and Theaetetus have, especially the 
difficulties in what has been said in the dream theory. In 6.2, the model of letters and 
syllables will be discussed and I will also investigate the relationship between whole 
and sum, which is relevant to the model. In 6.3, I will focus on the three meanings of 
account and the problems in Socrates’ arguments. Overall, the chapter will show 
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 Nicholas Denyer translates “sum” as “all of it”. Harte agrees and adopts this translation, since she believes this 
translation could have “the advantage of avoiding the misleading implications of the Burnyeat-Levett translation 
‘sum’…” For coherence, I will continue to use “sum” in this thesis. See Harte (2002) p. 40, note 75.  
257 
 
none of the three fits to the formula that knowledge is true opinion with an account. 
Socrates’ arguments on account are strictly limited to experience and do not refer to 
anything beyond that limitation.  
 
6.1 A Dream Socrates and Theaetetus have 
The failure of Theaetetus’ second definition of knowledge, namely, knowledge 
is true judgement, stimulates Theaetetus to recollect a piece of hearsay. Theaetetus 
said that someone told him something that Socrates had just suggested. Theaetetus 
reports the viewpoint as follows: 
 
 “He said that…it is true judgement with an account that is knowledge (τὴν µὲν 
µετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήµην εἶναι);277 true judgement without an account 
falls outside of knowledge… the things of which there is no account are not 
knowable (yes, he actually called them that), while those which have an account are 
knowable.” (201d) 
 
Socrates is curious about how that man distinguishes these things which are 
knowable and unknowable. Moreover, Socrates claims that he wishes to check 
whether he himself heard the same version of the hearsay as Theaetetus (201d). This 
implies that both Socrates and Theaetetus have heard this definition from someone, 
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 Sedley argues that “λόγος” in the discussion of knowledge as true judgement with an account means 
“definitional account” while insisting on the broad meaning of its traditional usages. Sedley (2004) pp. 153-154. 
See also McDowell (1973) pp. 230-231, where he emphasizes the usage of “legein” in the texts. Burnyeat 
enumerates the meanings of “logos” to point out the complexity of this word. Burnyeat (1990) p. 134 
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but from different people, otherwise, Socrates would not wish to check the hearsay. 
Theaetetus is not confident of recollecting the hearsay and so Socrates says, “Listen 
then to a dream in return for a dream” (201d). Then, Socrates immediately gives us 
what he heard.  
Socrates in his dream was listening to people saying, 
 
“…that the primary elements (στοιχεῖα), as it were, of which we and everything 
else are composed, have no account (λόγον οὐκ ἔχοι). Each of them, in itself, can 
only be named; it is not possible to say anything else of it, either that it is or that it is 
not. That would mean that we were adding being or not-being to it; whereas we must 
not attach anything, if we are to speak of that thing itself alone.” (201e-202a)  
 
My first point is to make sure whether what Socrates says is relevant to the third 
definition of knowledge, i.e. knowledge is true judgement with an account. 278 
Socrates’ dream follows Theaetetus’ dream. In Theaetetus’ dream, true judgement 
with an account is knowledge and if there is only true judgement, namely, without an 
account, it falls outside of knowledge. Theaetetus makes clear the idea “true 
judgement only falls outside of knowledge” by explaining that things with no 
account are not knowable, while “those which have an account are knowable” (201d). 
Theaetetus seems to feel a little surprised by this, since he says “yes, he actually 
called them that” (201d). Burnyeat adds a note on this sentence, “The translation in 
the text expresses surprise about the claim that some things are not knowable at 
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 I agree with a conclusion which is drawed by W. G. Runciman: “…true opinion is not really relevant to the 
‘dream’ at all. The ‘dream’ states how true opinion as well as knowledge becomes possible by logos”. See 
Runciman (1962) p. 46. 
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all.”279 We need to consider Burnyeat’s note.  
Theaetetus is surprised by the idea that he heard from someone, where a 
distinction is made between knowable or unknowable by a criterion of account. What 
does “unknowable” mean? Does it mean “not knowable at all”? Not being a piece of 
knowledge means at least two things to Plato: being absolutely unknowable and 
being opinions/judgement280 or including true opinions/judgement. In the Republic, 
the object of opinion is defined as something that “is such as to be and also not to be” 
and is “intermediate between what purely is and what in no way is” (477a). Naturally, 
both Socrates and Glaucon agree, “opinion is clearly different from knowledge” 
(478a). As Burnyeat’s translation of the text has alluded (though he would not 
exclude the possibility of “opinion”), there is only a distinction between knowable 
and not knowable at all (201d). Nevertheless, there is the third possibility of 
opinions/judgements (Republic 477a). With this third possibility, Theaetetus’ dream 
becomes clear. What he says is that knowledge is true judgement with an account and 
that true judgement itself is unknowable, namely, true judgement itself is not 
knowledge. We need to keep in our mind that the investigation of the third definition 
of knowledge is following the discussion of the second one, i.e. knowledge is true 
judgement. What is new in the third definition is “an account”. It is reasonable to ask 
what “account” means. That is what Socrates does in his response to Theaetetus’ 
third definition. He does not ask it directly but rather asks how to distinguish the 
things that are knowable and unknowable, since “account” is the standard of being 
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 Burnyeat (1990) p. 338. 
280
 The Greek word“δόξα” is translated “opinion” or “judgement” in different dialogues.  
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knowable and unknowable, or in other words, accountability equals being knowable.  
Theaetetus’ response to Socrates’ question makes us upset, for he could follow 
if someone explained the distinction between unknowable and knowable (201d). 
Burnyeat describes him as “like a juryman”281 and doubts in what degree we could 
rely on the theory that he and Socrates will introduce. Burnyeat’s remark makes us 
think about what happens when Socrates and Theaetetus discuss the proposition that 
“knowledge is true judgement”, where Socrates thinks that a juryman could make a 
true judgement without any knowledge through being persuaded (201b-c). 
From these points, it is clear that Socrates’ dream is relevant to Theaetetus’ 
dream, for in Socrates’ dream, he tries to make clear what “account” is by discussing 
the distinction between the things that are knowable and unknowable. Burnyeat 
believes that “as the theory develops, it becomes increasing clear that it is couched in 
term of knowing objects.”282  It is necessary to consider what “objects” mean in 
Burnyeat’s interpretation. Nevertheless, Burnyeat does not focus on what “objects” 
mean, but on what “knowing” means, since for him, objects refer to “any object, 
concrete or abstract”. What Burnyeat is mainly concerned with is that “knowing” has 
four meanings:  
 
(1) Def. Ko Knowing o is having true judgement concerning o with an account 
of o;  
(2) Def. KP Knowing that p is having true judgement that p with an account of 
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 Burnyeat (1990) p. 130. 
282
 Burnyeat (1990) p. 132. 
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the proposition p. 
(3) Def. KP(e) Knowing that p is having true judgement that p with an 
explanation of why it is the case that p.  
(4) Def. KP(j) Knowing that p is having true judgement that p with adequate 
justification for the judgement that p.283 
 
Burnyeat admits that it is better not to assume knowing should be understood as 
any one of the four, since it is just the beginning of Socrates’ discussion, though we 
should keep those four meanings in mind. I agree with him, for once we find out the 
meaning of “knowing”, we actually find out the answer of the question of the whole 
dialogue, “What is knowledge?”  
Socrates does not discuss directly what “account” is, but investigates a pair of 
things, namely, element and complex, which are unknowable and knowable, 
respectively.284 That is to say, element and complex are employed by Socrates as an 
example for explaining how to make a distinction between knowable and 
unknowable things, i.e. what “account” means. 285  However, why does Socrates 
choose element and complex as the example? Socrates has explained the reason in 
his description of the dream, because the elements “have no account” (201e) and 
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 Burnyeat (1990) pp. 130-131. 
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 The distinction between unknowable elements and knowable syllables is called as “the Asymmetry Thesis” by 
Verity Harte who believes the epistemological asymmetry is the “central to the dream”. Further, there are two 
difficulties presented in this asymmetry thesis as Harte argues. See Harte (2002) pp. 33-34. 
285
 Burnyeat has a different understanding from me. He does not think that element and complex are just used as 
an example, but a metaphysical distinction for explaining “knowledge is true opinion with an account” by 
correlating “there actually are some objects of which there is no account, and others that have an account.” (p. 
132). See Burnyeat (1990) p. 134.  
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“can only be named” (201e).286 It is impossible “to say anything else of it, either that 
it is or that it is not” (201e). Further, unlike the elements, the complexes that are 
composed of elements have an account of their names, since the names of the 
elements can be “woven together” and then an account can be given of the names of 
the complexes (202b).  
My next approach to the thoughts in Socrates’ and Theaetetus’ dreams is to 
summarize them through twelve main points: 
(1) Socrates says he had a dream where he heard that primary elements had no 
account. Theaetetus had heard a similar dream, however, he could not find out its 
contents until he had been reminded (201c, 201d).  
(2) Knowledge is defined as true opinion with an account. Having an account is 
the criterion of knowledge (201d). 
(3) Elements have no account; therefore they are unknowable. They only have 
names. Everything, including us, is composed of elements (201e). 
(4) Being or not-being could not be applied or added to the elements (201e). 
(5) Words like “itself”, “that” “each”, “alone”, “this” or any other words of this 
kind also could not be applied to elements (202a). 
(6) The reason why the vocabulary in (5) is forbidden is because they could be 
applied to “all things alike” (202a).  
(7) The names of the elements are woven together, for the elements are woven 
together (202b). 
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 Robinson reminds us to notice that the if “the primary elements have no logos”, then “on this hypothesis the 
question What is X? would have no true answer when X was a primary element”. See Robinson (1971) p. 121. 
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(8)The names that are woven together become a kind of account of the names of 
the complex. (202b) 
(9) The elements are unaccountable, and unknowable, but perceivable. (202b) 
(10) The complex is knowable and expressible; it can be the object of true 
judgement. (202b) 
(11) Someone who gains only a true judgement about something does not know 
the thing, though his soul is in a state of truth. That is to say, he is still ignorant about 
something. (202b-c) 
(12) If someone could gain a true judgement with an account, he has knowledge 
(202c).287 
The distinction between element and complex is the most obscure part of the 
whole dream, especially when we meet the question, “What is ‘element’ in Socrates’ 
dream?” According to Socrates’ description, the elements could be discussed on two 
levels, the ontological level and the linguistic or cognitive level.288 Ontologically, 
elements compose the complex and are perceivable. These two properties are 
understandable and give us a philosophical idea of ontological hierarchy: the 
elements are the base of the pyramid of reality while the complex which is composed 
of elements is the rest of the pyramid. Socrates also assigns the property “perceivable” 
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 J. H. Lesher reminds us the distionction beteen “ἐπιστήµη” (knowledge that something is the case) and 
“γνῶσις” (knowledge by acquaintance) in the “dream” theory. Lesher (1969) pp. 72-74. 
288
 Cornford has a similar explanatory structure. He divides the theory in Socrates’ dream into three “heads”: 
“Things”, “Language” and “Cognition”. See Cornford (1935) pp. 144-146. Morrow offers the picture below. See 
Morrow (1970) p. 327. 
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to the elements (202b) and emphasizes that “the elements are woven together” 
(202b). Then, ontologically, it seems plausible that “the account” which is composed 
of elements is something, on Sedley’s account, “far from being one which ascends to 
the generic components of the definiendum, on the contrary descends into its 
material components”, which Sedley himself calls a “materialist interpretation”.289 
Indeed, an element is a component which could be perceivable and could compose a 
complex thing. However, how could we understand that the element should not be 
described by “being” or “not-being”? Let us take “hand” as an example for 
answering this question. Although a hand is not an element on Socrates’ meaning of 
element, since it could be divided into a palm with five fingers, let us nevertheless 
assume that a hand is an element in Socrates’ dream. A hand could not be described 
as “being” or “not-being”, because it is itself a hand, when it belongs to a body or a 
person. When a hand is cut off from the body, it is not a hand at all, though we could 
recognize that it was a hand of somebody from its shape and flesh or whatever else. 
It is not a hand any longer, for it does not have the function of a hand any longer. 
Consider a similar case, a leg of a table, when a leg of a table is cut off from the table, 
it is no longer a leg of the table, but just a piece of wood or steel or whatever 
materials it is made of, since it does not support the table any more and loses its 
function as a table leg. Sedley who has a different understanding of “the element is 
perceivable” believes that the idea has a strong connection to the discussion on 
perception in the first definition (184b3-187a3), which I do not agree with for four 
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reasons.290  Firstly, if an element is what someone perceives, then it is no longer a 
material thing which will certainly contradict with Sedley’ own approach as a whole 
which he calls a “materialist interpretation”. Once an element is what is perceived, 
the element becomes something inside the soul, then it certainly cannot be a material 
thing.291 Secondly, the colour red, as Sedley discusses at length as an example of 
perception, could not compose a complex thing by itself or with something else. Red 
is probably not to be considered as a part or a component of a complex thing. Red 
belongs to the body or bodily instruments without being a property of things or 
objects themselves. Hence, colour could not be a component of a complex thing. 
Thirdly, Socrates prohibits describing the element by “this”, “that”, or any words that 
could be used universally. Nevertheless, when Socrates talks at 156d-157b about 
perception by describing how the eyes see the white colour, he gives us exactly an 
opposite explanation. The eyes that fill with sight come into being as seeing eyes; 
while white comes into being from the other side (156e). Socrates believes that this 
account could be generally applied (156) and claims that everything is in motion, 
namely, all things are coming into being relatively to something (157a-b). He 
proposes that “The verb ‘to be’ must be totally abolished” and we are not allowed to 
use the words like “something”, “this” or “that” (157b). Socrates asks for abolishing 
terminology “to be”, “this” or “that” which could also be applied to the element. 
However, the result of his discussion of perception is that everything loses its own 
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 Sedley (2004) p. 159. 
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 Burnyeat notices Socrates’ emphasis on the distinction between the element and the element “in itself” (αὐτὸ 
καθ’ αὑτὸ) at 201e2-3 (p. 119), but seemingly does not apply this distinction when he discusses about “an element 
is perceptible” (p.121). See Burnyeat (1970) p. 119 and 121. 
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being and everything is becoming. In contrast, when he considers the element, he 
considers element as absolutely individual and isolated from other things to such an 
extent that every element cannot be said to have being or not-being. The discussion 
of element and perception are exactly opposite, though they lead to the same result, 
namely, losing the property of being or not-being. Lastly, the background of the 
discussion on perception is the first definition of knowledge, namely, knowledge is 
perception. When Socrates presents his argument on how the eyes perceive, he tries 
to give us a theory on knowledge, though the theory finally is rebutted. Comparing it 
to the elements, elements are unknowable and therefore Socrates cannot be trying to 
introduce a theory of knowledge when he discusses elements.  
It seems incorrect to make a strong connection between the discussion of the 
element and of perception. The understanding of perception would not help us to 
understand the element better. Hence, we should stick to the materialist interpretation 
to understand the elements as parts or components of complex things. 292 
Nevertheless, the story has not yet finished, for Socrates also describes the elements 
on the linguistic or cognitive level and the whole discussion of the elements employs 
the example of letters and syllables. Then, we should ask why Socrates employs the 
example in language to explain the element, if the element is a component of a 
complex thing? 
In order to answer the question, let us consider the linguistic or cognitive level 
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 This approach to the texts is originally from Aristotle who explains “elements” as having four meanings, i.e. (1) 
alphabetic letters; (2) mathematical elements; (3) earth, fire and other elements which appear in physics; (4) the 
component parts of any complex object. These four meanings are summarized by Sedley. See Sedley (2004) pp. 
155-156. Cornford has a similar understanding, see Cornford (1935) p. 144. 
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of the element. According to Socrates’ expression, the elements only have names and 
cannot be expressed in an account. Therefore, they are unknowable. When Socrates 
claims that the elements have no names, he uses the words “ὀνοµάσαι” (201e), 
“ὀνοµάζεσθαι” (202b) and “ὄνοµα ἔχειν” (202b) to indicate the word “name”. All the 
three expressions use the infinitive, a basic form of the verb. The use of the infinitive 
means that Socrates does not make clear who gives the elements their names. Further, 
we could always ask the person who gives the names, “Why do you give something 
such a name?” and expect the man to give an explanation or an account on this 
question. Even if he just gives the names at random, he could always say, “I just 
arbitrarily assign the names”, and this would also be an account.293 If so, even if they 
only have names, then this result contradicts the view that “the elements have no 
account”. Even worse, Socrates insists that we could not even say either it is or it is 
not (201e-202a). Additionally, he explains, 
 
“indeed we ought not to apply to it even such words as ‘itself’ or ‘that’, ‘each’, 
‘alone’, or ‘this’, or any other of the many words of this kind; for these go the round 
and are applied to all things alike, being other than the things to which they are added” 
(202a).  
 
Socrates again mentions this idea at 205c, where he claims regarding the 
element/primacy:  
 
“it would be incorrect to apply even the term ‘being’ to it when we spoke of it or the 
term ‘this’, because these terms signify different and alien things”.  
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Hence, “if it were possible to express the element itself and it had its own 
“proprietary account”, it would have to be expressed without any other things” 
(202a). Socrates endows the elements with an attribution, which we could call 
“absolute individuality”, namely, each of the elements is an absolute individual and 
is isolated from other things. Then, we could not employ any word or term to 
describe the elements that signifies a universal. Sedley gives us an explanation of this. 
According to his argument, when we say “red”, we are reporting “something 
irreducibly primitive”, but when we say, “Only this is red”, we unavoidably connect 
the primitive datum to another thing or add some more information to the primitive 
datum.294 
The greatest puzzle about the element and complex is, “How is it possible that 
the names of the elements become an account of the complex, when the names of the 
elements are woven together just as the elements are woven together?” According to 
Socrates’ expression, the elements themselves have no accounts and only have names. 
Therefore, they are unknowable. It seems that the name of an element could not be 
an account of the element. For otherwise, the named element has an account and is 
knowable. Since the elements are parts or components of complex things, then it is 
understandable when Socrates says that the elements could be woven together.  
Nevertheless, how could the names of the elements be woven together? The 
only information that Socrates offers is that the names of the elements are woven 
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together. It is nonsense or at least uninformative. Imagine the situation where a 
craftsman is composing a table by joining the parts or components of the table, and 
in the process nothing is actually added. The only difference between a table and its 
parts is the function. Say a table could support a person or some other things on it but 
the parts of a table could not. The table has such a function because of its structure. 
Then consider the names of the elements. They are language. Language must follow 
grammar which will ensure communication and understanding between language 
speakers. This means that names, notions or concepts could not alone compose a 
language, since they also need verbs at least. Further, a language needs adverbs, 
adjectives or pronouns. Although a name, a notion, or a concept itself could construct 
a sentence295 or a judgement or even a piece of knowledge in a special way, only 
names could not construct a sentence. Let us consider an example. You enter into a 
supermarket where you see a bag of apples. Someone points to the apples and asks, 
“What are they?”. You answer, “Apples.” In this case, the word “apples” not only 
constructs a sentence, but also a judgement, since you are actually judging what 
things are in the bag and you judge them apples from their shape or smell or 
whatever characteristic that make you realize that they are apples. Further, they are 
apples in the bag and you really make a true judgement, even a piece of knowledge, 
for you could always check the things in the bag to justify the judgement that they 
are apples. This example proves that a one-word sentence, i.e. a name, could be a 
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 A sentence that only has one word is called “one-word sentence” by Willard Quine. Although Quine does not 
have a systematical explanation on this concept, but we could understand it through the famous example 
“Gavagai!”. See Quine (1964) pp. 29-32. 
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piece of knowledge, though in few kinds of cases.296 
Then could a name become a kind of account? This question is more important 
than the question “Could a name become a piece of knowledge?”, since it is directly 
relevant to what Socrates argues in the text. Consider such a situation: when a 
criminal is sentenced to death, someone asks one juryman, “Why does this criminal 
deserve to die?” The juryman could reply, “Justice.” Or “Law” or whatever is a 
relevant answer in one word. Although the answer is not so satisfactory or is vague, it 
seems that it is still a kind of account. Then, could names, i.e. two or more names, 
become a kind of account? It seems not. Consider the law case again, how could the 
juryman answer the question only using two names? The juryman could answer the 
question by “Justice and law” or other similar answers, but he must also employ 
other parts of speech or other kinds of words in language. Even the phrase “justice 
and law” shows that the word “and” is necessary to the sentence for understanding 
and correction. Grant that the juryman says, “Justice, law”. In an extreme situation, 
this can be seen as correct and understandable, since the questioner could understand 
the sentence “Justice, law” as a kind of enumeration of the accounts. But there are 
two reasons to refuse this kind of sentence as a natural language. (A) This response 
could only apply to two words and could not include more than three words. (B) This 
response could be valid as a kind of account in a few extreme cases but obviously 
could not be applied generally as a kind of account. Further, in the law case above, 
the sentences “Justice” or “Justice, law” have another problem which is not 
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 This does not mean that Plato realizes a one-word sentence could be a piece of knowledge. As Gail Fine points 
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compatible with Socrates’ names of elements. The problem is that the words “justice” 
and “law” could not be the names of elements. As Socrates has clearly expressed, the 
elements are perceivable. Therefore, they could not be abstract things, like “justice” 
or “law”, for the simple reason that justice or law are not perceivable. Hence, 
following Socrates’ lines of thinking, it seems that abstract things are outside the 
region of knowledge, for they are neither elements nor complex. If that is correct, 
then it seems that pure names of the elements could not become a valid account.  
Let us consider another possibility. Someone could doubt the argument above 
by saying, “What you have argued is just one possibility, for you only consider the 
possibility of physical composition, as I could call it. The other possibility could be 
called chemical composition. In this kind of composition, the parts or the 
components of a complex thing would not be composed mechanically or physically.” 
He could further explain “chemical composition” in this way: “All the parts or 
components merge with each other and produce a completely new substance. This is 
unlike the example of the composition of a table, as you have given, where nothing 
new is created except a new function of the table. The new table supports something 
on it, but all the parts remain themselves, the wood is still wood, the iron is still iron. 
The new function of the table is produced by the new physical structure of the parts. 
What I claim here is that after the composition, if this word is still useful to describe 
the process, all the parts disappear and only one new complex thing remains or stays 
and you can no longer see any components. It is just like when red liquid is added to 
blue liquid: only purple liquid is left and the red or blue completely disappear.” 
272 
 
Surely, this response provides another possibility for interpreting the way that the 
names of the elements are woven together. For Socrates does not eloquently persuade 
us that the composition of the names of the elements is like the composition of a 
table, which seems impossible as I have argued. Could the chemical composition 
analogy save Socrates’ argument? As Socrates says, the way that the names of the 
elements are composed is like the way that the elements themselves are composed. 
Following the line of the chemical composition analogy, it seems that the names on 
the linguistic level should also disappear along with the notions or the concepts. How 
is this possible? Consider the example of the liquid from the skeptic: let us assume 
the red liquid and the blue liquid are the elements,297 then it seems that the purple 
liquid is another element, rather than a complex thing which is composed by the red 
and blue liquid together. The reason for this is that there is no difference between the 
red liquid, blue liquid or purple liquid. Even if the purple liquid is a complex thing 
composed by the liquid of red and of blue, it still seems impossible to give an 
account of the purple liquid by purely the two names of the red and blue liquids. 
When he meets the question “Why or in what way does the purple liquid appear?”, 
someone could answer, “It is because of the mixture of the red liquid and the blue 
liquid”. The answer is definitely an account for the phenomenon of the appearance of 
the purple liquid. However, again, the answer itself is not purely constructed by just 
the names of the red and blue liquids. Therefore, the answer is not satisfactory for 
explaining what Socrates maintains regarding the names becoming a kind of account 
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 We do not need to consider whether they are Socrates’ elements or not, for it is irrelevant to argument 
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in the Theaetetus. Assuming that “red liquid” and “blue liquid” are the names of the 
elements, in an extreme situation, the answer could be briefly like this: “Red liquid, 
blue liquid.” For an expert or someone who holds knowledge on colour, this kind of 
account is sufficient and satisfactory, though it would lead the questioner into 
perplexity. Just as I rebut the answer “Justice, law” in the law case above, this answer 
should also be refuted for the same reasons. Further, let us speculate how the 
chemical reaction could appear on the linguistic level. There are two bottles of liquid: 
one is red; the other one is blue. We could point to them and say, “Red liquid, blue 
liquid”. After the mixture of the two liquids, there is a bottle of purple liquid. The 
words we need to describe the bottle of purple are “Purple liquid”. It seems that there 
is no room and no need to mention the red liquid and blue liquid. How could “red 
liquid, blue liquid” become a kind of account of the purple liquid? It seems 
impossible and unreasonable. If that is correct, chemical composition does not save 
Socrates’ argument on the composition of the names of the elements.298 
As my arguments show, there is no way to understand how the names of the 
elements are composed together and become a kind of account of complex things. 
Therefore, we should doubt the validity of the idea that “the complexes are both 
knowable and expressible.” (202b) 
The next puzzle, as Socrates believes, is that complex things “can be the objects 
of true judgement” (202b). 299  The complex things are knowable, for they are 
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 C.f. Theaetetus 203c5-6. 
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 Cornford’s translation is more close to the Greek text, he translates the phrase as “you can have a true opinion 
of them”. However, the difference between various translations does not influence my following argument. See 
Cornford (1935) p. 143. 
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composed of the elements whose names become a kind of account through being 
woven together. Then why are the complexes the objects of true judgement? An 
intuitive answer to this question could be because knowledge is defined by 
Theaetetus as true judgement with an account (201d), which is to say, the objects of 
true judgement are the same as those of knowledge, namely, the complex things. The 
only difference between knowledge and true opinion is whether there is an account. 
If that is correct, then let us consider the consequence of such an interpretation. As 
we know, true judgement is different from knowledge, for it has no account. If the 
objects of true judgement and the objects of knowledge are the same, i.e. the 
complex things, then Socrates actually admits that knowledge could be gained from 
complex things in the sensible world. It is the account part in knowledge that makes 
knowledge knowable. Hence, all the ideas that Socrates presents on the element and 
the complex seem to be a kind of empirical theory. In fact, Socrates admits that a 
man’s soul gains truth when he only has a true judgement. For Socrates says: “when 
a man gets a true judgement about something without an account, his soul is in a 
state of truth as regards that thing” (202b-c), though the man does not know the thing 
in question. Further, he adds that someone “who cannot give and take an account of a 
thing is ignorant about it” (202c). Socrates thinks that someone who has true opinion 
on X has gained the truth on X, even if he cannot give an account on X. Socrates also 
thinks that if someone cannot give an account on X, he is ignorant on X. However, 
does this mean that someone who only has a true opinion on X, and thus has truth on 
X in this way alone, is also ignorant on something? In such a situation, when 
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someone gains a true opinion of X, then he gains the truth of X. But, he is still 
ignorant about X, for he does not have an account of X. Moreover, even if the factor 
of the account is the only standard of whether something is knowable or not, a 
complex thing could not be the object of true opinion, as Socrates says. For if a 
complex thing is the object of true opinion, then the complex is not knowable, for 
true opinion is unknowable because of having no account. However, Socrates holds 
that the complex thing is knowable through the names of the elements, which could 
become a kind of account.  
According to my analysis of the texts about the element and the complex, we 
find that the element is a little easier to understand than the complex.300 The elements 
should be understood as parts or components of a complex thing. But when we 
consider a complex thing, it seems that the attributions to a complex thing, as 
Socrates explains, are contradictory with each other. Therefore, the complexes are in 
the dark so far. It is time to consider the example of the complexes that Socrates 
gives. Socrates indeed gives examples of the primary elements by saying, “we and 
everything else are composed” (201e). “Everything else” in the sentence refers to 
anything that is composed by the elements except “we” and the elements. This is not 
actually helpful for understanding what the primacy elements are. Fortunately, we 
still have an example: “we”. The word “we” refers to us human beings. As the 
primary elements are the parts or components of a complex thing, we could 
reasonably consider things such as “hand” or “foot” or “head” in the example as the 
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 Burnyeat thinks the opposite. To him, Socrates’ description on the element is the “most mysterious feature”, 
but “as regards complexes, this is helpful, for it tells us that ‘we and everything else’ are complexes.” See 
Burnyeat (1990) p. 135. 
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elements of the complex thing, a human being. Flesh should not be considered as an 
element of human being, since flesh which leaves the human body is still flesh which 
could still be divided into smaller parts or components. Body could not be an element 
of a human being for the same reason. Although it itself is a kind of abstract thing, it 
could still be divided into smaller components. However, the hand or the head or the 
foot are different from flesh and body, for once they leave or separate from the 
human being, they become other things, as I have argued above. A further point we 
need to consider is that, theoretically, the hand, the foot and the head are composed 
of smaller components. Take the hand as an example, theoretically, it is composed of 
bones, the palm, the nails, the nerves, the blood, the flesh and the fingers. Some of 
these components are obviously not elements and some of them seemingly could be 
categorized as elements. If we strictly follow the attributions of the elements that 
Socrates presents, then we will be in perplexity. Surely, when Socrates says that the 
elements are perceivable, it is reasonable to assume that he does not refer to the 
blood, the bones or the nerves which are normally inside the hand, rather he refers to 
fingers, palm and nails which are the components of a hand, just like a foot of a table 
or a table top of a table. It is clear that the fingers or a palm or a piece of nail would 
not be themselves when they separate from the hand. Therefore, we could call them 
the elements of a hand.  
Through such a method, namely, the method of division, we build up a pyramid 
and a hierarchy. A human being could be divided into hands, head, feet and so on, 
and any part of a human being could still further be divided into smaller parts. A 
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hand could be further divided into the fingers, the palm and the nails. This kind of 
method is similar to that in Sophist, where Plato uses a familiar method of division 
for seeking definitions.301 We do not need to discuss the division method in Sophist, 
for the division method there is not the same as it in the Theaetetus. In the Sophist, 
division does not require something that is like the element in the Theaetetus as the 
bottom of the pyramid. Therefore, the division method in the Sophist does not reach 
the bottom of a complex thing; it just stops at some point. Hence, division in the 
Theaetetus is not the same as in the Sophist.  
Although the pyramid and the division method characterize what the elements 
and the complexes are, we still cannot understand why and how the names of the 
elements construct a kind of account which is essential to the name of a complex 
thing. The reason why there are difficulties in describing the elements and the 
complex things is maybe that this theory, or more exactly the theory of the dream, 
probably is not held by Socrates, for, as he says, everything in the dream is heard 
from other unknown people. Socrates never treats the “dream” theory seriously and 
instead links the dream with something terrible. In an earlier part of the discusiion, 
after Socrates has discussed perception, he admits,  
 
“What we have not yet discussed is the question of dreams, and of insanity, and 
other diseases; also what is called mishearing or misseeing or other cases of 
misperceiving.” (157e)  
 
                                                 
301
 McDowell gives an analysis of the connection of the method of division between Theaetetus and Sophist. He 
tries to analyse the method by Wittgenstein’s ideas. See McDowell (1973) pp. 233-237. 
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Although Socrates does not talk afterwards about the questions in the quotation, he 
actually has a discussion about the cases of false perception:  
 
“For in these conditions, we surely have false perception. Here it is far from 
being true that all things which appear to the individual also are. On the contrary, no 
one of the things which appear to him really is.” (158a)  
 
Apparently, Socrates does not think that in a dream condition, someone could gain 
the truth or that everything could be really as it is perceived by an individual. 302 
Further, Socrates makes a distinction between being asleep and being awake when he 
considers the question of whether “we are asleep and dreaming all our thoughts” or 
“awake and talking to each other in real life” (158b-c). Although Theaetetus admits, 
“there is an extraordinary likeness between the two experiences” (158c) -- i.e. of 
dreaming and being awake, Socrates thinks they are wholly different (158e). This 
again shows that Socrates believes what happens or what is thought in a dream is 
hugely different from what happens or what is thought in real life. Therefore, he 
could not treat seriously what happens in a dream or what he had heard from 
someone in a dream.303 
In order to prove the argument above, let us return to the beginning of the dream 
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 Interestingly, Socrates describes, “these opinions have now just been stirred up like a dream” after he 
questioned Meno’s slave for gaining the answer of a geometrical questions (Meno 85c).  
303
 Burnyeat offers a convincing discussion about the dream metaphor in Plato’s philosophy. He tries to “locates 
the Dream section firmly within Plato's own philosophic concerns instead of seeking to account for it wholly or 
partly in terms of alien sources” and rebuts the possibility that the dream theory comes from Antisthenes. See 
Brunyeat (1970) pp.101-122. Kunio Watanabe summarises two motivations of the dream theory in the 
Theaetetus : (A) that knowledge is true belief with λόγος and (B) that what lacksλόγος is unknowable and what 
has it is knowable” (p.145). He believes that on Burnyeat’s and other scholars’ reading, “…the Dream Theory, 
being the result of the elucidation on Socrates' part, must concern not (A), but only (B)” (p.145), which he 
disagrees. Watanabe thinks that the purposes of the dream theory are both (A) and (B). See Watanabe (1987) pp. 
143-165. 
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section (201d). Strictly speaking, Theaetetus does not mention that what he says, i.e. 
someone told him that knowledge is true judgement with an account, is a dream. It is 
actually Socrates who mentions the dream, when he finds that Theaetetus could not 
explain his third definition of knowledge. Therefore, there are two issues that need to 
be mentioned. Firstly, although it seems that Theaetetus proposes his third definition 
of knowledge seriously and does not mention that he heard the definition in a dream, 
Socrates tries to check Theaetetus’ dream with his own dream. Hence, Socrates 
presents what Theaetetus said about his third definition of knowledge as told by 
someone in a dream. Secondly, Theaetetus cannot explain or make any defence for 
his definition but just follows someone’s explanation of the definition. That means 
that Theaetetus could not in fact offer any more information except the definition 
itself and could not explain account as the criterion of what is knowable or not, 
unless someone reminded him of the explanation of the definition. Hence, if 
Theaetetus is alone or if he is with someone who is not capable of explaining the 
definition, then it is inevitable that his investigation of knowledge will fail. 304 If the 
failure of Theaetetus’ investigation is inevitable, it is reasonable of Socrates to call it 
a “dream”.305 
 
6.2 Letters and Syllables 
Although Socrates wishes to solve the question, “How could the complex things 
                                                 
304
 Gail Fine does not believe that Socrates’ whole discussion of the third definition of knowledge fails. She 
argues, “I shall argue instead, however, that Plato retains at least a modified version of the thesis that knowledge 
is true belief with an account, a view advanced not only in the Meno but also throughout the middle dialogues 
(see, for example, Phd. 76b, 78d, Rep. 534b)”. See Fine (1979) p. 369.  
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 Cf. Burnyeat (1970) pp. 101-122. 
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be knowable?”, he does not raise this question directly but rather points out that 
“there is one of the things said which I do not like.” (202d) The thing that Socrates 
does not find satisfactory is “the elements are unknowable and the complexes 
knowable” (202d-e) which is called “the subtlest point of all” (202d). As usual in the 
Theaetetus, Socrates does not try to investigate directly the point, but rather claims 
that both he and Theaetetus have “hostages for the theory” which are “the original 
models306 that were used when all these statements were made” (202e). They have 
hostages that could be the models of the dream which Socrates and Theaetetus heard. 
When Theaetetus curiously asks him which model he refers to, Socrates answers, 
“Letters -- the elements of language -- and syllables (Τὰ τῶν γραµµάτων στοιχεῖά τε 
καὶ συλλαβάς)” (202e).307 Socrates here plays a word-game, for the Greek words 
“στοιχεῖον” and “συλλαβή” may be translated respectively, as “element” and 
“complex”, but when the terms refer to language (γράµµατα) generally, they should 
be translated as “letter” and “syllable”. Socrates could attribute what he will discuss 
as the prototype of what has been said in the dream, since “element” and “complex” 
are the most important notions in the content of the dream. If Socrates thinks that the 
“letter” and the “syllable” are the original model of the “element” and “complex”, 
then it seems that he puts language in a prior position than reality. This is the first 
plausible interpretation or possibility.  
However, there is a second possibility. Socrates could refer in these Greek terms 
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 “The models” (τὰ παραδείγµατα) can also means “the examples”. 
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 The translation is used by both Cornford and Burnyeat, which I follow for consistency, though I prefer 
McDowell’s translation, “Elements and complexes of letters.” See Cornford (1935) p. 146, Burnyeat (1990) p. 
340 and McDowell (1973) p. 96. 
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to the names of the elements and complexes. The second possibility is more 
reasonable than the first for the following reasons. Firstly, how could language be 
prior to reality? It seems unreasonable to imagine that someone creates a name for 
nothing. Secondly, Socrates and Theaetetus are discussing the question “What is 
knowledge?”, which does not refer to reality directly, even if the elements are 
components or parts and the complexes are the composed things, according to 
Socrates’ description of them, which means both of them are in reality. As Socrates 
describes, the names of the elements which are woven together become a kind of 
account which is essential to the names of the complexes (202b). Socrates limits his 
argument or investigation only to names. Hence, Socrates now considers issues only 
on the linguistic level, rather than on any other level, including the level of reality. 
That is to say, that the model of “letters” and “syllables” is the prototype of the 
model “elements” and “complexes”, based on the sense that “letters” and “syllables” 
are more subtle or fundamental than “elements” and “complexes”, which are 
themselves names in a language.  
When Socrates expresses the ideas on the elements and complexes, he does not 
give any explanation about them. Therefore, Socrates assumes that a basic principle 
of the elements and the complexes, namely, “one can give an account of the syllables 
but not of the letters” (203a), is clear and correct. In order to discuss this principle, 
Socrates uses his own name as example. The first syllable of his name is “SO”.308 
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 Gilbert Ryle reminds that “Plato is certainly talking phonetics and not graphology” when Plato discusses letter 
and syllable in the Theaetetus. Ryle concludes: “Plato could confuse knowing what phonetic element a given 
letter name designates with knowing what written character symbolizes a given phonetic element. The ambiguity 
of ‘letter’ was not fully realized by him” (p. 437). See Ryle (1960) pp. 436-437.  
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According to the basic principle, the syllable “SO” has an account or an answer, “It 
is S and O”, when it meets a question like, “What is SO?”. According to this 
approach, the letters “S” and “O” obviously have no account, since they are not 
composed of other letters. Socrates says, “…we have established a point about 
knowledge”, which seemingly confirms that whereas the elements have no account, 
the complexes do have accounts. If someone uses the reply, as the answer to the 
question “What is SO?”, “It is S and O.”, then a problem arises. The problem is that 
this sort of answer indicates that “anyone who is ever to know a syllable must first 
get to know the letters” (203d). The answer “It is S and O.” assumes that the 
respondent already knows the letters of “S” and “O”, otherwise, how could he 
recognise the letter “S” and “O” in the word? The answer has shown that the 
respondent not only knows the letters “S” and “O”, but also knows the usage of the 
letters.309  
Through this example Socrates actually illustrates how the names of the 
elements could construct a kind of account of the complexes. The complex “SO” is 
composed by “S” and “O”. When someone asks, “What is ‘SO’?” the answer is “It is 
‘S’ and ‘O’.” The account of “SO” is composed by the pure names of the elements, 
which is emphasized by Socrates in his description of the dream (202b). As I have 
argued above, an account could not be purely names of the elements, since those 
names could just be woven together as the elements are woven together. Now, in the 
example, the account of the syllable “SO” inevitably uses words such as “it”, “is” 
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 For Harte, The problem which arises here is “One cannot infer from the fact that some pair of things has some 
property that any one member of that pair has the same property.” Her argument is obviously right. See Harte 
(2002) p. 36. 
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and “and”, which are also forbidden to be used on the elements (202a).  
The example of “SO” has revealed the failure of what has been said in the 
dream.310  The failure is rooted in the assumption that the syllable is simply the 
composition of the letters. When Socrates discusses the example of “SO”, he tries to 
ask Theaetetus, “What do we mean by ‘the syllable’?” (203c). He offers two options:  
“The two letters (or if there are more, all the letters)? Or do we mean some single 
form produced by their combination?” Theaetetus replies, “I think we mean all the 
letters” (203c). Theaetetus’ response is a natural result from the ideas in the dream, if 
the complex is simply composed of elements that are woven together. Nevertheless, a 
table which is composed of wood must have some further feature that makes it a 
table, a feature distinct from the wood. It is a pity that Socrates and Theaetetus do not 
mention this point at all in the dream.  
This point on the one hand determines the failure of the ideas in the dream but, 
on the other hand, it is a new starting-point for a further argument on the relationship 
between the part and the whole. If a syllable is no longer the composition of the 
letters, then it itself must have “some single form” and thereafter have “its own 
single nature -- something different from the letters” (203e). Hence, the syllable is no 
more like a picture or a graphic pattern composed by matches or any other similar 
things, but a completely new thing which is distinct from the letters. Referring to the 
pattern, let us grant that the pattern has no single form. We could ask whether this 
kind of nature, i.e. something that makes the matches as a pattern, exists or not. 
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 “In the dream” refers to what has been said in the dream that both Socrates and Theaetetus heard from 
someone. This phrase does not say that Socrates and Theaetetus are in a dream when they discuss the elements 
and the syllables.  
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Alternatively, we could ask whether it is a pattern or has its own nature endowed by 
itself or human beings, for it may be just a pile of matches at random. These two 
questions are both problematic. These two questions could be applied not only to the 
pattern but also to the syllable. Is there anything that makes the syllable? If the 
answer is “some single form”, then what is it? Further, is “some single form” 
endowed by someone or by itself? In the syllable example, this question could be 
asked, “Who grants that a syllable has a single form? Is it Socrates or Theaetetus or 
both of them?” Surely, this question to Socrates would seem somewhat over-stated, 
since Socrates does not believe the syllable has some single form. Nevertheless, the 
question is still open to possibilities until we make sense of the phrase “some single 
form”, which is discussed in the next argument on “part” and “whole”. 
Based on the new approach, Socrates claims,  
 
“Well then, Let’s suppose it’s as we’re saying now: a complex is one kind of 
thing which comes into being out of each set of elements that fit together, and that 
goes for letters and everything else alike” (204a). (Translated by McDowell) 
 
This idea inherits what has been said in the dream, where, according to Socrates’ 
description, the names of the elements are woven together in the same way as the 
elements are woven together (202b). Socrates mentions the composition of a 
complex.  
Three things can be found in the example of the “element and complex”: 
language, reality and thought. The gap between reality and thought could be easily 
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bridged through language. These three things could be treated as the same thing.311 
This idea dates back to Parmenides. In one fragment of Parmenides’ poem.312 he 
claims, “τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἔστιν τε καὶ εἶναι.” (For the same thing is there both to be 
thought of and to be) (KRS 292).313 In fragment 6 Parmenides continues, “χρὴ τὸ 
λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ’ἐὸν ἔµµεναι· ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι, µηδὲν δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν·” (What is there to 
be said and thought must needs be: for it is there for being, but nothing is not.) The 
former quotation denies the difference between thought and reality and destroys the 
gap between them. The latter one considers whether the object of the thought or 
saying exists or is in reality; it further gives us the connection between saying and 
thought and therefore the connection between language, thought and reality. 
Parmenides’ idea is inherited by Socrates in his argument on the model of elements 
and complexes and the model of letters and syllables, since the latter model is the 
prototype of the former one.  
Another point in Socrates’ quotation on the complexes at 204a is about the 
object of thought. As Socrates says, the complex is composed by the elements when 
they are woven together. If this could operate on both the level of language and the 
level of reality, then not only does reality become the object of thought, but also 
language is a kind of object of thought. That would mean that both language and 
reality are the objects of thought. However, if Socrates treats language, thought, and 
reality as the same thing, how could language and reality be the objects of thought? 
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If this were possible, would thought consider itself as a kind of object? In order to 
answer, let us firstly consider the idea that thought in some sense could be divided 
into two categories.314  One category relates to the idea on reality, namely using 
language to reflect reality so that we could know and grasp the essence of reality. The 
other category is relevant to the ideas (through language) present inside the soul.315 
The latter category concludes the reflection on language itself. In the model of 
complex and element, we could question, on the level of language, how the name of 
a complex thing which is composed by the names of the elements could have a new 
single form. If language is just like what happens in reality, then we need to consider 
the conclusion, “Let the complex be a single form resulting from the combination of 
the several elements when they fit together…” (204a) 
Socrates in the next stage of the discussion denies the existence of the parts in a 
complex, since “when a thing has parts, the whole is necessarily all the parts” (204a). 
This argument is not persuasive. Take the table as the example again. The fact that a 
table has its own single form as a table does not mean the table is not composed by 
all its parts. The problem in this argument is that Socrates uses “whole” instead of 
“complex” or “thing”. Or more exactly, Socrates understands “a single form” as 
“whole”. There is a gap between the complex thing itself or the single form of the 
complex and the whole of the thing. Indeed, if the complex has its own single form, 
then, the whole should not have parts; otherwise, it is all the parts. However, the 
relationship between whole and parts is only one of the relationships of a complex 
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thing. We could have various ways to consider a complex thing, including that the 
complex thing is composed by all its parts. That is to say, the fact that a complex 
thing has its own single form would not cover or deny the fact that the complex has 
parts. The root of the problem in the argument becomes the question, “How does 
Socrates understand the word ‘whole’ in his argument?” or “Is the whole the same 
thing as a single form?”316 
As expected, after he claims a complex has no parts, Socrates immediately adds, 
“Or do you mean by ‘the whole’ also a single form arising out of the parts, yet 
different from all the parts?”. Theaetetus prefers the second option, but Socrates 
points out that the second option refers to “sum”, not “whole” and that they are 
different (204a-b). After giving an mathematical example, Socrates defines “sum”: 
“all the parts are the sum, seeing that the total number is to be the sum” (204e). 
Therefore, it seems that “the whole does not consist of parts” (204e). If the argument 
is correct, then the parts constitute the sum not the whole, which means that the sum 
of something and the whole of something are both lacking something. However, if 
something is absent, then it could not be either a sum or a whole, since it contradicts 
the definitions of the sum and of the whole. Theaetetus realizes that there is no 
difference between whole and sum (205a), since both of them are all the parts (205a).  
A problem arises when Socrates builds the definition of the sum, namely, that 
the sum is all the parts. Let us consider the word “part”. A part could be applied to 
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something on various levels. A body has many parts, apparently. A part of the body 
could be a hand on some level; it could also be a finger on other level. However, a 
finger could also be a part of a hand. That is to say, a part itself could be a sum, even 
though Socrates here seems simply to use a part as an element or a letter which could 
not be a sum at any way. Hence, a sum could be applied to different levels. It could 
refer not only to a sum in a part, but also refer to a sum in a whole. The sum could 
not be the whole unless the whole could be found in a part, which is impossible, 
since in this case, there would be no difference between a complex and an element. 
Socrates could avoid this difficulty by insisting that any part is at any rate an element 
and that a part could not be a sum at the same time. Then Socrates would not admit 
that a hand is a part of the body.  
That whole and sum have no difference means that a single form is no longer a 
whole or sum -- it must have something else. Socrates turns to the relationship 
between the letter and the syllable:  
 
“Supposing the syllable is not just its letters,317 doesn’t it follow that it cannot 
contain the letters as parts of itself? Alternatively, if it is the same as the letters, it 
must be equally knowable with them?”  
Theaetetus replies, “That is so” (205B).  
 
A syllable/complex has no parts but only has a single form; otherwise, the parts, i.e. 
the letters/elements would be as knowable as the syllable/complex, which is 
impossible according to what has been said in the dream. If the syllable/complex has 
                                                 
317
 McDowell translates “letter” as “element”, and “syllable” as “complex” in this sentence. There is no difference 
between the two translations, for they are just different in different models or levels. McDowell (1973) p. 100. 
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no parts, then “a syllable is an absolutely single form, indivisible into parts” (205c). 
Socrates reminds Theaetetus that, according to the dream, elements/letters have no 
account and are indivisible and now the syllable/complex is also indivisible and has 
only a single form. Therefore, it seems that there is no difference between 
element/letter and syllable/complex, namely, “the complex [has] now fallen into the 
same class” as the element (205d).  
Socrates and Theaetetus, therefore, face two options, though both are contradict 
to what has been said in the dream a moment ago. The first option is this: if a 
complex is both composed by the elements and has a single form, then both the 
complex and the elements would be knowable and expressible, “since all the parts 
turned out to be the same thing as the whole.” (205d) The second option is this: if the 
complex has only a single form without any parts, then the complex would fall into 
the same class as the elements and both of them would be unknowable and 
unaccountable (205e). In the dream, as Socrates reported, the complexes are 
knowable, while the elements are unknowable. However, as the arguments progress, 
either both the complexes and the elements are knowable or both are unknowable; 
the situation that complexes are knowable and the elements are not knowable is 
impossible. Moreover, Socrates adds that  
 
“would not you more easily believe somebody who made the contrary statement, 
because of what you know of your own experience in learning to read and write…?” 
(206a) 
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This contrary statement is, 
 
“the elements are much more clearly known, and the knowledge of them is 
more decisive for the mastery of any branch of study than knowledge of the complex.” 
(206b)  
 
Hence, the discussion about the dream has completely finished. As the 
arguments have proved, the fundamental principles in the dream, i.e. that the 
elements are unknowable and the complexes are knowable, are incredible on both the 
language level and the reality level. If what has been said in the dream is false, then 
the third definition of knowledge, namely, knowledge is true judgement with an 
account (201c-d), is also in doubt, since Theaetetus claims he heard this definition 
from someone and Socrates presents this hearsay as something heard in a dream 
(201d). The fundamental principle “in the dream” refers to the distinction between 
“knowables and unknowables” (201d), which actually refers to the meaning of 
account, for the only difference between the knowable complexes and the 
unknowable elements is that the complexes have accounts, whereas the elements do 
not. Moreover, in the Theaetetus the only difference between the second definition of 
knowledge (knowledge is true judgement) and the third definition of knowledge 
(knowledge is true judgement with an account) is that the third one uses “account” in 
the definition. Hence, to understand the difference between the second and third 
definitions (or the difference inside the discussion on the third definition), the first 
and foremost task is to make clear what “account” in the third definition means. 
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6.3 Three Meanings of “Account” 
At the beginning of his investigation Socrates confirms that “account” has three 
meanings: “I think it must be one of three meanings (τριῶν γὰρ ἕν τί µοι δοκεῖ 
λέγειν)” (206c).318 Sedley has a different translation of this sentence: “It seems to me 
that he means one of three things.” Further, he explains who the “he” is:  
 
“The reference is to the ‘someone’ of 201c7, Theaetetus’ informant, and the 
meaning in question is therefore speaker’s meaning. Of the eight translations I have 
consulted, Valgimigli alone recognizes this. All the others, apart from Levett, adopt 
formulations which make it sound as if Socrates were stating a fact of 
lexicography.”319  
 
The difference between the translations, as Sedley has revealed, is about such a 
question, namely, “Whether these three meanings of ‘account’ are held by Socrates or 
by Theaetetus’ informant”. Just from the Greek, we could not find any hint that leads 
us to consider the three meanings of “account” are not held by Socrates.320 Hence, I 
agree with Burnyeat’s translation of this sentence. Nevertheless, after a quick rebuttal 
of the first possible meaning of “account”, Socrates says,  
 
“Well then, we mustn’t be too ready to condemn the author of the definition of 
                                                 
318
 The translation comes from Burnyeat. See Burnyeat (1990) p. 345. Glenn R. Morrow reminds, “The word 
logos has a signification more varied than that of almost any other term in Greek philosophy. Even in Plato’s own 
dialogues there are examples of its use in many meanings other than the three mentioned here. It sometimes 
means definition; sometimes proposition, or statement; sometimes theory; sometimes argument, or dialogue; 
sometimes thinking, or inner dialogue; and sometimes mathematical proportion”. See Morrow (1970) p. 310. 
319
 Sedley (2004) p 169, note 27.  
320
 The Greek sentence is “Φέρε δή, τί ποτε βούλεται τὸν λόγον ἡµῖν σηµαίνειν; τριῶν γὰρ ἕν τί µοι δοκεῖ λέγειν” 
(206c7-8). Although the subject of “βούλεται” refers to the informant of the dream, but Socrates clearly 
emphasizes, “To me (µοι), it must be one of three meanings”. In another place, at 206e6, Socrates seemingly 
attributes the second meaning of “account” to the informant of the dream, but he just attributes the third definition 
of knowledge to the informant. 
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knowledge now before us for talking nonsense. Perhaps he didn’t mean this; perhaps 
he meant being able, when questioned about what a thing is, to give an answer by 
reference to its elements.” (206e-207a).  
 
We should ask why Socrates mentions the author of the third definition here. If 
Socrates believes the three meanings of the account, why does he mention the author 
here? Let us analyse the quotation 206e-207a.  
Socrates seemingly only makes a defence on behalf of the author and tries to 
show that there are other possibilities for interpreting what the third definition means. 
Indeed, Socrates does not say the first meaning of account comes from the author; he 
just has a little doubt on the third definition of knowledge as a whole. However, 
when Socrates says, “Perhaps he didn’t mean this; perhaps he meant being able, 
when questioned about what a thing is, to give an answer by reference to its 
elements”, what does he mean? Apparently, Socrates in this sentence is talking about 
the meaning of “account” and he clearly mentions the connection between the 
meaning of account and the author. Actually, “perhaps” (ἴσως) shows that Socrates is 
not certain which of the three meanings of account is the exact meaning that the 
informant used in the third definition. If the informant holds the three meanings of 
account, why did Socrates not ask what the meaning of account is when he heard the 
dream theory? It seems unreasonable that the informant offers three meanings of 
account and leaves them to his audiences to guess. Therefore, we could reasonably 
assume either that the three meanings of account come from Socrates or they are the 
meanings of “account” as given in a lexicon.  
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Socrates tests each of the three meanings in turn to find out which exact 
meaning of account the informant used in the third definition of knowledge. Further, 
at Meno 98a, Socrates himself defines knowledge as true opinion/judgement plus a 
reason why. This gives a bridge to link the informant or the author of the dream 
theory and Socrates himself. It is proper and interesting to assume that Socrates 
himself is the author of the dream theory. Because it is first time that Socrates has 
met Theaetetus, Theaetetus cannot have heard the “dream” theory from Socrates. If 
he had, then he would have directly attributed the theory to Socrates. Nevertheless, 
we cannot rule out the possibility that Theaetetus heard the “dream” theory from his 
teacher, Theodorus or from other people who are familiar with Socrates’ definition 
on knowledge as presented in the Meno.  
Let us now consider Socrates’ examination of the three meanings of “account”, 
beginning with the first. As Socrates explains,  
 
“The first would be, making one’s thought apparent vocally by means of words 
and verbal expressions---when a man impresses an image of his judgement upon the 
stream of speech, like reflections upon water or in a mirror.” (206d)  
 
Socrates actually treats an “account” as a kind of reflection of thought. The 
relationship between thought and account is like an object and its reflection in a 
mirror or water. Therefore, an “account” actually becomes a statement. On this 
meaning, everyone could offer an account and such a result would lead us into the 
error of Protagoras’ “human being is the measure of all things”. Moreover, “account” 
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would mix up with true judgement and there would be no distinction between them. 
Socrates confirms this point when he says,  
 
“And that being so, anyone at all who makes a correct judgement will turn out 
to have it ‘together with an account’; correct judgement without knowledge will no 
longer be found anywhere.” (206d-e)  
 
The first attempt of the meaning of “account” fails, which brings the second. 
Here Socrates considers, 
“perhaps he meant being able, when questioned about what a thing is, to give an 
answer by reference to its elements.” (206e-207a)  
 
In other words, “an account is a matter of going through a thing element by element” 
(207c). Socrates explains this to Theaetetus by giving him the example of a wagon. 
When someone asks, “What is a wagon?” Socrates following the second meaning of 
account would answer in this way, “Wheels, axle, body, rails, yoke.”(207a) This 
answer obviously and strictly follows the principle of the dream theory, namely, the 
names of the elements combine together to become a kind of account of the complex 
thing. There are two problems that are produced by the example. One will be 
mentioned by Socrates to rebut this second meaning of account. The other one, 
Socrates does not mention and probably does not realize in the Theaetetus. Let us 
consider the second problem first.  
When someone asks, “What is a wagon?” he is actually asking “Do you know 
what a wagon is?” He is asking for a piece of information and a piece of knowledge, 
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since “what is a wagon?” requires the definition of wagon as its answer. When 
Socrates replies, “Wheels, axle, body, rails, yoke” (207a), as the answer to the 
question, “What is a wagon?”, he is offering a piece of knowledge, not just a kind of 
account, because “Wheels, axle, body, rails, yoke” is the answer to the question for 
pursuing knowledge about wagon. If so, account, which is defined as “to give an 
answer by reference to its elements” (207a), goes beyond the sphere of being an 
account, since the second meaning of “account” is actually producing knowledge. We 
do not see any other necessary part for replying to the question, “What is X?” besides 
the answer that enumerates every element of X. If we follow the procedure of “going 
right through the thing element by element” (207b), then, it seems unnecessary for 
every piece of knowledge to be composed of “true judgement with an account”. It is 
so, because an account is enough to be a piece of knowledge, according to the second 
meaning of account.  
The first problem is pointed out by Socrates in the text. If giving an account is 
rightly enumerating a thing element by element, then it seems sufficient for 
constructing a piece of knowledge of X that someone lists all the elements of X. 
However, that is not so in all cases. In some situations, enumerating all the elements 
are enough, but in some other situations, it is not sufficient. Take the name of 
Theaetetus as an example. Even if someone knows every syllable of the name 
Theaetetus, he will not have knowledge of the name if he has not idea of the right 
order of those syllables, even if he could spell the name Theaetetus by luck. 
Moreover, someone who knows the first syllable of the name Theaetetus, i.e. “THE”, 
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does not necessarily know the syllable, for “THE” could be the first syllable of 
another name, say, Theodorus. It is surely an open question whether someone knows 
the syllable “THE” in such a situation, as McDowell has pointed out.321 However, 
Socrates employs this point to rebut the second meaning of “account” that could 
make the third definition of knowledge possible. On the one hand, someone indeed 
has correct judgement together with an account when he correctly writes the name 
“Theaetetus”; on the other hand, he does not really know each element of the name.  
There is only the third choice left. Socrates tries to consider the third meaning of 
account. Before this, Theaetetus summarises the first two meanings of account as 
follows:  
 
“The first was a kind of vocal image of thought; the one we have just discussed 
was the way to the whole through the elements.” (208c)  
 
He adds, “Now what’s your third suggestion?” (208c) Socrates replies,  
 
“What the majority of people would say---namely, being able to tell some mark by 
which the object you are asked about differs from all other things” (208c).  
 
In order to respond to Theaetetus’ requirement, Socrates takes the sun as an example 
and says, “it is the brightest of the bodies that move round the earth in the heavens’’ 
(208d). Socrates further illustrates the third meaning of “account” as “if you get hold 
of the difference that distinguishes a thing from everything else, then, so some people 
                                                 
321
 McDowell (1973) p. 253. 
297 
 
say, you will have got an account of it” (208d). Socrates asks for the character or 
feature which could distinguish something completely from everything else. He 
actually calls for a unique character of something. The statement of the unique 
feature322 should directly refer to something and never be vague. In such a situation, 
 
“Then if a man with correct judgement about any one of the things that are 
grasps in addition its difference from the rest, he has become a knower of the thing 
he was a judger of before” (208e).  
 
If we consider the sun example again, we do not need to consider whether the feature 
“brightest of the bodies” is the essential/unique or inessential/non-unique feature of 
the sun.323 Rather we should consider how we could identify the unique feature of 
something. Why is “the sun is the heaviest of the bodies that move round the earth in 
the heavens” not the unique differentiation? In other words, what is the criterion of 
the unique character? Moreover, why does every piece of knowledge need to 
establish the unique feature of something? An account in a concrete case should be 
relevant to the true judgement, not to a differentiation.  
With these questions in mind, let us consider Socrates’ second example. This is 
about Theaetetus in person. Socrates claims that, when he makes a correct judgement 
on Theaetetus, there are two situations. The first situation is “merely judging” (209a), 
namely, making a true judgement on Theaetetus without an account; while the 
second one is knowing Theaetetus, if Socrates has an account for his true judgement. 
                                                 
322
 In the texts, Socrates calls it “some common feature” (208d).  
323
 Sedley has discussed this issue. Sedley (2004) p 175.  
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In the former situation, i.e. merely judging, Socrates only had a correct judgement on 
Theaetetus and his thought “failed to grasp any point of difference between you and 
the rest of mankind” (209a). This immediately brings Socrates into a dilemma: either 
he did not make a true judgement on Theaetetus or he has a true judgement with an 
account of Theaetetus. If he makes a true judgement on Theaetetus, then how does 
Socrates not grasp any point that could distinguish Theaetetus from another person? 
At least Socrates knows that he is Theaetetus, which makes him distinct from all 
other people. The problem of the third meaning of “account” is that the true 
judgement itself has included a kind of account in the sense of identifying the unique 
feature -- there is no need to give an extra account for distinguishing something from 
the rest. As Socrates summarizes,  
 
“We already have a correct judgement about the way a thing differs from other 
things” and it would be wrong that under such conditions, “we are then directed to 
add a correct judgement about the way it differs from other things” (209d).324 
 
Moreover, account as presenting the unique feature of something has assumed that 
the unique feature is already known. Therefore, the third definition of knowledge, 
namely, “knowledge is true judgement with an account” (201d), will be “correct 
judgement accompanied by knowledge of the differentness”, for as Socrates says 
“this is what we are asked to understand by the ‘addition of an account’” (210a). 
 
                                                 
324
 The text of 209d-e has a translation problem, though I will not discuss the text in detail. See Cornford (1930) 
p.114. 
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Conclusion 
The difference between the second definition of knowledge, i.e. knowledge is 
true judgement, and the third, i.e. knowledge is true opinion with an account, is that 
the third one adds an account. Therefore, the core question in this chapter is “What is 
an account?” or “What does ‘account’ mean?”  
As Socrates’ report about the dream theory shows, Socrates tries to gain the 
answer to the core question from the difference between the unknowable 
elements/letters and the knowable complexes/syllables. The failure of this attempt 
makes Socrates consider the three meanings of account directly in order to test 
whether the third definition is correct. Nevertheless, this strategy is dead at the end. 
Therefore, what lessons could be learnt from such failure? The first reflection is to 
ask whether “Knowledge could be analyzed”. A further question is whether 
knowledge could be defined by terms of belief.325 Nevertheless, in this case, how 
could we understand the meaning of account? Are the three meanings of “account” 
that Socrates offers us sufficient? These difficult questions are beyond the topic of 
my theme in this chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
325
 Timothy Williamson argues that knowledge is “unanalysable” and should not be defined by term of belief 
rather belief should be defined by term of knowledge. Williamson (2002) pp. 2-5, 27-41. 
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Conclusion: Plato’s epistemology in the Meno, Phaedo and 
Theaetetus as a coherent account 
 
Having scrutinised the texts of three of Plato’s dialogues, Meno, Phaedo and 
Theaetetus, my research on Plato’s epistemology as a coherent account in those three 
dialogues is approaching the end. In this thesis, I try to show that Plato held a 
coherent understanding of epistemology and constructed a system in those three 
dialogues, though this conclusion is not obvious. Plato offers us an outline of his 
ideas and theories on knowledge with problems and unclearness in Meno and Phaedo, 
but he faces those difficulties and realizes that all of the problems and the 
unclearness are caused by the unclear meaning and nature of the notion “knowledge”. 
Then, Plato gives his readers new ideas and theories during his investigation in 
Theaetetus on the question “What is knowledge?”. Although Plato tries to find out 
the exact meaning and nature of the concept “knowledge” and supplies new theories 
and ideas during this investigation, there are still problems and unclearness in his 
arguments on epistemology. First, I will consider the contribution of Meno and 
Phaedo, and the remaining problems. Secondly, I will consider the contribution of 
Theaetetus.  
 
Epistemology of Meno and Phaedo and the problems remaining  
The outline of epistemology in Meno and Phaedo can be divided into three 
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sections corresponding to different states of the soul: (1) soul in its original state is 
full of pure reason and it is in the region of the Forms (Phaedo 80d-81a). When the 
soul is in the realm of the Forms, it “has drawn near and consorted with” (πλησιάσας 
καὶ µιγεὶς) the Forms and gains knowledge from them (Republic 490b)326. Plato 
claims that the soul “has seen” (ἑωρακυῐα) everything and has learned everything in 
the region of the Forms in Meno (81c)327. 
(2) When a soul combines with a body, i.e. when someone is born as a person, 
the soul loses all the knowledge that it gets from the regions of the Forms (Phaedo 
73e, 75d, 76a), though, fortunately, the soul could regain the knowledge that is 
already “in the soul”328 (Phaedo 73a, ἐπιστήµη ἐνοῠσα “knowledge being inside”)329 
through recollection by the stimulation from the sensible objects or via questioning 
(Meno 85c). In the second stage, Plato tries to solve Meno’s paradox by explaining 
how learning or gaining knowledge is possible in the sensible world through his 
famous theory of recollection. Actually, Plato offers two versions of recollection 
theory in the Meno and Phaedo, respectively. In Meno, recollection is restricted to 
recollecting what the soul “has seen” in the other world or region, i.e. knowledge 
(section 1.3). Plato does not introduce his theory of Forms in Meno, rather he does 
this in Phaedo where recollection is not only for recollecting knowledge related to 
the Forms, but also for recalling the sensible objects (section 2.4). The new version 
of recollection in the Phaedo actually solves Meno’s paradox on the impossibility of 
                                                 
326
 Cf. Phaedo 79d, Laws 904d and Timaeus 90c2. 
327
 Cf. Phaedo 83b.  
328
 Knowledge is in the person (lover of knowledge) according to the texts of Phaedo, but considering the soul in 
person alone gains knowledge, so it is right to say, knowledge is in the soul. 
329
 Cf. Meno 85c. 
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learning, since the soul will not directly recollect the knowledge, but recollects the 
sensible objects first and then the soul would never be in the state of “cognitive 
blank”.  
(3) At the time that the soul separates from the body again, the soul could get rid 
of the influence from the bodily elements in some degree, depending on how a 
person takes care of his own soul when he is living. Getting rid of the influence from 
the body means that the soul has another opportunity to consort with the Forms. 
What needs to be noticed is that Plato never makes the first stage clear. He also 
does not tell us in what way the soul “consorts with” the Forms and gains knowledge 
from the Forms. Further, we have no sources from Meno and Phaedo to find out 
what the relationship between knowledge and the Forms is, including the questions 
such as, “Is the knowledge produced by the Forms or by the soul?” and “Could we 
understand the relationship between knowledge and the Forms as the content of a 
book and the book?” All these questions cannot be answered solely by reading Meno 
and Phaedo.  
In the second stage, during human life, my understanding is that the soul cannot 
access the Forms directly, but can access the images of the Forms. If recollection will 
finally lead the agent to recollect the images of Forms that his soul has “consorted 
with” in the region of the Forms, then knowledge is limited within a narrow sphere, 
or in other words, “knowledge” is used and understood in a narrow sphere. That 
means, some kinds of knowledge are denied as knowledge in the outline of 
epistemology presented in the Meno and Phaedo. Especially, knowledge that refers 
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to the factor of time is expelled out of the range of knowledge, since all the Forms 
are changeless. Because of the limitation of the features of the Forms, the application 
of recollection is limited, namely, recollection theory can only be applied to the 
objects that could finally lead to the Forms. Further, the argument that Plato employs 
for proving the validity of recollection seems not so persuasive. In Meno, Plato’s 
Socrates makes a slave who has never studied geometry before successfully answer a 
geometrical question. During this process, Socrates did not teach the slave about 
geometry, but only prompted the slave by questions. The problem is that geometry as 
a discipline is special. Anyone who does not have knowledge about geometry could 
seek the answer of a geometrical question by deductive reasoning. But other 
disciplines, such as history, medicine or biology, which need experiential data 
through experiments or observations, could not so easily fit with recollection. The 
other difficulty is that, according to Plato’s arguments on recollection, the process of 
how the recollection system operates remains unclear. Plato does not demonstrate in 
any detail how the soul through bodily organs make contact with the sensible object, 
how the perceptions are produced in the process, or how the perceptions stimulate 
the soul to recollect the Forms and gain knowledge.  
These problems of the second stage remain within the third stage. The main 
problem of the third stage is the unequal position between the soul and the body in 
the process of learning. Socrates emphasizes that only death could give the 
opportunity for getting rid of the bodily influence altogether and pursuing reality and 
knowledge without hindrance. This emphasis actually puts the body in an inferior 
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position to the soul in epistemology and expels the epistemological function of the 
body. The problem here is that removing the body from epistemology would mean 
that empirical knowledge would not be classed as a kind of knowledge which would 
leave Platonic knowledge as excessively narrow. 
Besides all these problems and lack of clarity in epistemology mentioned above 
in Meno and Phaedo, Plato’s writing style adds difficulty to understanding his outline 
of epistemology. Plato prefers to employ metaphors, analogies, stories and similes to 
illustrate his theories and ideas. Specifically, three metaphors need be briefly 
mentioned here. In Phaedo, the language used is of journeying to the other region, 
but it is also said about how soul makes contact with the Forms (Phaedo 79d). For 
this idea, the language used in the Republic is that the lover of knowledge “consorts 
with” the Forms when the soul stays within the region of the Forms (Republic 490b). 
An alternative metaphor is that the soul “has seen” everything there (Meno 81c) and 
it sees what is invisible (Phaedo 83b). As a result of this association or seeing 
knowledge comes to be “in the soul” (Phaedo 73a, ἐπιστήµη ἐνοῠσα, “knowledge 
being inside”). The phrases “consort with”, “see” and “in the soul” are metaphors. 
The first two metaphors give Plato’s readers a rough explanation of how soul gains 
knowledge and offers a solution to Meno’s paradox. The third metaphor tries to tell 
us about the relationship between knowledge and soul.  
Unfortunately, all these three metaphors are unclear for their purposes. 
Referring to the first metaphor, we wonder how the soul “consorts with” the Forms. 
Since it cannot make contact physically with the Forms, what is mental contact? 
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Plato says the soul stays with the Forms in the plural (περὶ ἐκεῐνα “about those 
objects”, Phaedo 79d), but is it possible that the soul “consorts with” many Forms at 
one time, or could the soul only “consort with” one Form at one time?  
Consider the second metaphor. It partly solves our confusions about the first 
metaphor, since Plato emphasizes that the soul “has seen” everything in the region of 
the Forms. How could the soul “see” the Forms?  Does the soul “see” all the Forms 
at one time or only a part of the Forms?  
Now consider the third metaphor, i.e. knowledge is “in the soul”. Is the 
knowledge in the soul like the goods in a warehouse? If it is, is the process of 
pursuing knowledge like seeking goods in a store? Then knowledge is not some 
abstract thing that needs language, rather knowledge is something like a bed or a 
desk, according to Plato’s understanding of knowledge. Then does knowledge not 
need the soul, rather the soul only needs to find knoledge? In addition, where is 
knowledge when it is “in the soul”?  
Those three metaphors seem to tell us something, but actually leave us with 
confusions. All the questions that relate either to the three metaphors or to the three 
stages of the outline of epistemology are left unanswered within the Meno and 
Phaedo. Theaetetus supplies answers to parts of those questions, problems and 
unclearness. 
 
Theaetetus as a supplement to the epistemology of Meno and Phaedo 
Theaetetus is a dialogue pursuing the answer to the question “What is 
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knowledge?” and this enquiry supplements the epistemology of Meno and Phaedo. 
After a careful investigation of the five characters (Euclides, Terpsion, Socrates, 
Theaetetus and Theodorus), I discover that all of them hold a philosophical position 
of anti-empiricism, either because of their own philosophy or because their identity 
could be seen as a symbol of anti-empiricism. The consideration of the characters’ 
philosophical standpoint is important to understanding Plato’s project of the meaning 
and the nature of knowledge in Theaetetus, since all the characters weave a 
framework for the whole dialogue that limits the development of the arguments in 
the dialogue. This is like a glass bottle that contains water; no matter whether the 
bottle is full or half-full, the shape of the water is limited and is therefore decided by 
the shape of the glass bottle. Only with this realization, we can find the true 
significance of the theories in Theaetetus that seem to be empirical.  
There are three approaches in Theaetetus that seem to be empirical. The first 
one is the theory about perceiving colour. Plato presents in detail the process of how 
eyes perceive the colour white. The whole process could be divided into three stages. 
The first stage is that there is a kind of motion produced by the contact between eyes 
and the object that is white; the second stage is that the white is produced by a 
motion. The last stage is that eyes could see the colour white in the process that is 
produced by another motion between white and eyes (section 4.5). The second 
approach is the wax block analogy. Plato offers us in the wax block analogy the 
process of how soul receives data from sensible objects and how these data become 
perception (section 5.1). But if we follow this analogy for the origin of perception, it 
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leads to the impossibility of false judgement (section 5.3). The third approach is the 
aviary example (section 5.2). This example tries to show how false judgement is 
possible, based on the wax block analogy. However, the aviary example also faces a 
difficulty, since if it is right then it actually admits that someone would make a false 
judgement on what he already knows.  
All these three attempts for exploring the meaning and nature of knowledge fail 
in the end, but it does not mean that they are meaningless. We link them to the 
outline of Plato’s epistemology in Meno and Phaedo. At first glance, these three 
approaches in Theaetetus are empirical and all of them may give us an impression 
that Plato develops his epistemology from the anti-empiricist position that appeared 
in the outline in Meno and Phaedo to empiricism in Theaetetus. However, actually, 
he does not. For these three theories are a supplement to the outline of the 
epistemology in Meno and Phaedo. The aviary example focuses on explaining how 
the soul operates when it recollects knowledge that is “in the soul”, i.e. how the soul 
actively grasps and uses knowledge that it already has. More importantly, the other 
two could be treated both as empirical theories and as theories that could help us to 
imagine what happens in the region of the Forms and how the soul gains knowledge 
of the Forms. The process of perceiving colour and the wax block analogy could be 
seen as explaining both how soul “consorts with” the Forms and how soul gains 
knowledge from the Forms in more detail, namely, there is something within the soul 
which receives an impression of the Forms. These three approaches have partly 
answered the questions and unclearness of the outline of epistemology and make 
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Plato’s project on epistemology more systematic.  
The three approaches are not the whole story of Plato’s investigation of the 
meaning and the nature of knowledge. For instance, when Theaetetus proposes his 
first definition of knowledge, i.e. knowledge is perception, Socrates reframes 
Protagoras’ “Man is the measure of all things” by considering Heraclitus’ “All things 
are in motion” in his objection to this definition. There are many problems and 
unclearness in his objection, but Plato simply takes for granted his philosophical 
position of anti-empiricism. In the second definition of knowledge, “knowledge is 
true judgement”, Plato’s Socrates figures out the possible types of false judgement 
that could produce a logical system that is very similar to the work that Aristotle does 
in his logical books. The discussions on the possibility and the types of false 
judgement enhance Plato’s solid position of anti-empiricism. When the third and the 
last definition, that knowledge is true opinion with an account, is considered, Plato 
comes back to the discussion of knowledge in the Meno, since the formula, 
“knowledge is true opinion with an explanation of the reason why” is seriously 
discussed in Meno. Nevertheless, in Meno, Plato does not make the meaning of the 
phrase “an explanation of the reason why” clear.330 Therefore, the whole formula in 
Meno is in fact not definitive. In Theaetetus, Plato starts considering the exact 
meanings of the notion “account”. Three meanings of account, namely, “statement”, 
“going through a thing element by element” and “offering unique features or 
                                                 
330
 I will not specifically discuss the difference between “true opinion” in the Meno and in the Theaetetus, as 
Burnyeat obsevered. He points out, “[Plato] took over from the Meno a point originally made on behalf of a 
restricted class of true beliefs and he presented it in the Theaetetus as a favourable characteristic of true belief 
quite generally” (p. 176). See Burnyeat (1980) pp. 173-176. 
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differentiation” are investigated. Although all three fail to fit the formula, 
nevertheless, Plato’s readers can still gain a better understanding of the formula 
through these discussions.  
My arguments in this thesis try to show that Plato does not change his 
philosophical position as an anti-empiricist on epistemology in Meno, Phaedo and 
Theaetetus. In Meno and Phaedo, Plato offers a rough outline of an epistemology 
that leaves difficulties and unclearness. In Theaetetus, Plato directly considers the 
question “What is knowledge?” and supplies three contributions to his epistemology. 
Theaetetus supplements with the following three contributions: (A) how the soul may 
operate in the region of the Forms; (B) what processes are involved when the soul 
actively uses knowledge it already has; (C) three possible meanings of the term 
“account” are discussed in detail. All the theories and ideas about knowledge in 
Meno, Phaedo and Theaetetus are coherent, since Theaetetus does not contradict 
Meno and Phaedo and adds three contributions to the epistemological system 
constructed in Meno and Phaedo, thereby extending or developing it.  
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